Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Sanchez, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the U.S. unlawfully in 1997 and obtained Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in 2001. TPS allows foreign nationals from countries designated by the government as having unusually bad or dangerous conditions to temporarily live and work in the U.S. In 2014, Sanchez unsuccessfully applied under 8 U.S.C. 1255 to obtain lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. Section 1255 provides a way for a “nonimmigrant”—a foreign national lawfully present in this country on a temporary basis—to obtain adjustment of status to LPR. The Third Circuit agreed that Sanchez’s unlawful entry precluded his eligibility for LPR status under section 1255, notwithstanding his TPS.A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. Section 1255 provides that eligibility for LPR status generally requires an “admission,” the lawful entry of the alien into the U.S. after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. Sanchez did not enter lawfully and his TPS does not eliminate the effect of that unlawful entry. Section 1254a(f)(4) provides that a TPS recipient who applies for permanent residency will be treated as having nonimmigrant status, the status traditionally and generally needed to invoke the section 1255 LPR process, but that provision does not address 1255’s separate admission requirement. Lawful status and admission are distinct concepts and establishing the former does not establish the latter. There are immigration categories in which individuals have nonimmigrant status without admission, so when Congress confers nonimmigrant status for purposes of 1255, but says nothing about admission, the Court has no basis for finding an unlawful entrant eligible to become an LPR. View "Sanchez v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's final order finding that petitioner was removable as a non-citizen convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude based on its determination that New York petit larceny constitutes such a crime.The Second Circuit certified the following question to the New York State Court of Appeals: Does an intent to "appropriate" property under New York Penal Law 155.00(4)(b) require an intent to deprive the owner of his or her property either permanently or under circumstances where the owner's property rights are substantially eroded? View "Ferreiras Veloz v. Garland" on Justia Law

Garcia, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection in 2000 and was placed in removal proceedings in 2011. Garcia sought Cancellation of Removal or voluntary departure in the alternative. In 2018, Garcia married a U.S. citizen, who filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative. An IJ denied Garcia’s request for a continuance pending adjudication of his I-130 petition, noting that even if USCIS approved his I-130 petition, Garcia would have to leave and be processed at the American consulate in Mexico because he had not been “admitted or paroled following inspection.” The IJ found Garcia ineligible for Cancellation of Removal but granted voluntary departure.While his BIA appeal was pending, USCIS approved Garcia's I-130 petition, which required Garcia, to travel to a U.S. consulate but by leaving the U.S., noncitizens who have been unlawfully present for more than one year become inadmissible for 10 years. The Attorney General may waive this bar for immigrant-spouses of U.S. citizens. USCIS could take over a year to process the waiver, during which a noncitizen remains abroad. USCIS amended its regulations in 2013 to permit applicants to apply for a provisional unlawful presence waiver before departing the U.S.; this workaround did not extend to noncitizens in removal proceedings, unless those proceedings are administratively closed. In 2018, then-Attorney General Sessions issued the “Castro-Tum” decision, holding that IJs and the BIA did not have general authority to grant administrative closure. The BIA, citing Castro-Tum, denied Garcia’s request for administrative closure and upheld the denial of Cancellation of Removal.The Sixth Circuit vacated. IJs and the BIA have the authority for administrative closure to permit noncitizens to seek provisional unlawful presence waivers. Administrative closure is “appropriate and necessary” for the disposition of Garcia’scase. View "Garcia-DeLeon v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of sua sponte reopening petitioner's immigration proceedings based on the departure bar provision in 8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(1). Petitioner argued that an IJ should not be prevented from reopening a noncitizen's case on the IJ's own motion based solely on the noncitizen's departure during or after prior proceedings.The panel joined the Tenth Circuit and held that the departure bar does not apply in the context of sua sponte reopening. That is, an IJ's discretion to reopen a case on his or her own motion is not limited by the fact that a noncitizen has previously been removed or has departed from the United States. Therefore, the BIA erred in determining that the departure bar prevented the IJ from reopening petitioner's immigration proceedings sua sponte. The panel remanded to the BIA to consider whether the alternative bases the IJ offered for denying sua sponte reopening were permissible. View "Balerio Rubalcaba v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ademiju immigrated to the U.S. in 2001 and had a green card. In 2011, he became involved in a scheme to defraud Medicare. He pled guilty to healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, and stipulated to a $1.5 million loss amount, acknowledging that “pleading guilty may have consequences with respect to his immigration status” and that he “affirms that he wants to plead guilty … even if the consequence is his automatic removal.” At sentencing, Ademiju personally acknowledged that his ability to stay in this country was not assured. His counsel told the court, “I’m not an immigration specialist … But it’s my understanding that … any sentence of less than one year … he would be at least eligible for a waiver.” Apparently, no one knew that statement was incorrect. The district court sentenced Ademiju to 11 months’ imprisonment plus $1.5 million in restitution.Ademiju was released from federal prison and transferred into ICE custody; he retained an immigration attorney who informed him that his offense of conviction and the stipulated loss amount subjected him to mandatory deportation. Ademiju filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction because his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled because he received incorrect advice from an attorney about his options for recourse within the limitations period and could not have discovered the problem himself due to the inadequacy of his prison’s law library. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his motion; Ademiju has not met the high standard for equitable tolling. View "Ademiju v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review challenging the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum and withholding of removal. The court concluded that the BIA's decision to review the factual issue for clear error was correct.The court also concluded that, even if the court assumed that petitioner suffered harm that amounted to past persecution, the court would still conclude that it was not motivated by her membership in a particular social group. In this case, the record shows that petitioner was targeted because the individual that threatened her father assumed that she owned the land that once belonged to her father—not because she was related to him. Finally, petitioner failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution because she failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that she could not relocate in Honduras. View "Padilla-Franco v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding that petitioner failed to establish a nexus between the identity of her nuclear family and her asserted persecution. The court explained that petitioner is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because the gang that targeted her family did so only as a means to the end of obtaining funds, not because of any animus against her family. Furthermore, petitioner is ineligible for CAT relief because she has not established that any harm she will suffer if returned to her home country will come with at least the acquiescence of a government official. View "Sanchez-Castro v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Alcaraz-Enriquez and Dai each appeared before an immigration judge (IJ), requesting that he not be returned to his country of origin. For Alcaraz-Enriquez, the IJ had to determine whether Alcaraz-Enriquez had committed a disqualifying “particularly serious crime” based on a California conviction. The IJ considered his probation report, which detailed a serious domestic violence incident, and Alcaraz-Enriquez’s own testimony, admitting that he hit his girlfriend, allegedly in defense of his daughter. The IJ found Alcaraz-Enriquez ineligible for relief. The BIA affirmed. Dai testified that he and his family had suffered past persecution by Chinese officials and expected future persecution upon return. Dai initially failed to disclose that his wife and daughter had returned voluntarily to China since accompanying him to the U.S. When confronted, Dai told the “real story.” The IJ denied relief. The BIA affirmed. In both cases the Ninth Circuit granted relief, noting that neither the IJ nor the BIA made an explicit “adverse credibility determination” under 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C), 1229a(c)(4)(C). The Supreme Court vacated. A reviewing court must accept administrative findings as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” In neither case did the Ninth Circuit consider the possibility that the BIA implicitly found the presumption of credibility rebutted. The BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision, which noted that Alcaraz-Enriquez’s story had changed, a factor the statute specifically identifies as relevant to credibility. In Dai’s case, the BIA also adopted the IJ’s decision, which discussed specific problems with Dai’s demeanor, candor, and internal inconsistency. The statute requires the noncitizen to satisfy the trier of fact on credibility, persuasiveness, and the burden of proof. Even if the BIA treats a noncitizen’s testimony as credible, the agency need not find such evidence persuasive or sufficient to meet the burden of proof. View "Garland v. Dai" on Justia Law

After petitioner prevailed on an application for a writ of habeas corpus seeking release from federal immigration detention, he sought to recover attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The Fourth Circuit has previously held, pursuant to O'Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 508 (4th Cir. 2005), that the Act does not apply to a habeas proceeding seeking release from criminal detention. The court held that the same is true for habeas proceedings seeking release from civil detention. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of attorney's fees because the Act does not provide a basis for petitioner to recover attorney's fees. View "Obando-Segura v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's final order of removal. At issue is whether the government must carry its burden of proving that a returning LPR meets one of the six exceptions under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C) before it paroles that LPR into the United States under section 1182(d)(5).The panel deferred to a precedential opinion issued by the BIA, Matter of Valenzuela-Felix, 26 I. & N. Dec. 53 (BIA 2012), and held that the government may exercise its discretion to parole a returning LPR into the United States for prosecution without carrying its burden of proving that the LPR falls within one of the six exceptions. The government must, however, carry its burden of proof in subsequent removal proceedings if any ensue. In this case, when petitioner arrived at LAX, the CBP exercised its discretion to parole him into the United States for prosecution; the panel explained that it does not second-guess the CBP's decision to do so; petitioner then pleaded guilty to a crime involving moral turpitude; and, at subsequent removal proceedings, the government properly relied on petitioner's conviction to carry its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he could be regarded as an alien seeking an admission into the United States under section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v). Therefore, petitioner was properly subjected to a charge of inadmissibility. View "Vazquez Romero v. Garland" on Justia Law