Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In 1994, K.A., a citizen of Nigeria, entered the U.S. without documentation. In 1997, he married a U.S. citizen. He subsequently committed second-degree robbery (N.J. Stat. 2C:15-1) and received a 10-year sentence, and committed third-degree possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school (2C:35-7), resulting in a five-year sentence. K.A. was paroled in 2008. During removal proceedings, K.A. was stopped for DUI and was charged with using inmates’ personal information to submit fraudulent tax returns. K.A. unsuccessfully sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The Third Circuit denied K.A.’s petition for review.In 2014, Nigeria criminalized same-sex sexual relationships. K.A. had begun a sexual relationship with his male cellmate. K.A. realized that his “identity as a bisexual man [was] permanent” and moved to reopen his immigration proceedings, arguing changed country conditions in Nigeria. He asserted that his New Jersey drug conviction no longer qualified as an aggravated felony and expressed fear that he would be subjected to persecution as a member of the LGBT community. The BIA denied K.A.’s motion. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The 2000 New Jersey robbery conviction constitutes an aggravated felony “theft offense” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), which constitutes a “particularly serious crime,” sections 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B), and disqualifies an alien from seeking asylum. A conviction for a particularly serious crime coupled with a prison sentence of at least five years bars withholding of removal. View "K. A. v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review challenging the Board's denial of petitioner's asylum application. Petitioner challenges only the IJ's alternative basis for denial of his petition—the exercise of discretion to deny asylum. The court concluded that petitioner failed to address the separate and dispositive determination that his application is statutorily time-barred, despite the government pointing out this deficiency in its brief. Consequently, this failure is fatal to his petition.The court also denied the petition for review challenging the Board's denial of petitioner's application for withholding of removal. The court concluded that petitioner failed to establish any of the elements necessary for withholding of removal where the record does not show that he is likely to suffer persecution due to his experience as a witness to an incident of gang violence twenty years ago—much less that there is no substantial evidence to support the IJ's determination to that effect. In this case, the Board's conclusion that petitioner would not suffer future harm upon return to Mexico was supported by substantial evidence. View "Guzman-Garcia v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to vacate his 2002 conviction under Cal. Pen. Code 1473.7, holding that Defendant demonstrated a reasonable probability that if he had been properly advised by counsel about the immigration consequences of his plea, he would not have pleaded guilty to an offense subjecting him to mandatory deportation.Defendant was six years old when he came to the United States and lacked any meaningful ties to Mexico, his country of birth. In 2002, Defendant pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine precursors with intent to manufacture. Defendant's counsel did not advise Defendant as to the actual immigration consequences of his plea. Defendant later obtained an order to expunge his conviction. In 2018, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction under section 1473.7. The trial court denied the motion without considering whether Defendant suffered prejudice from counsel's failure to provide adequate advise. The court of appeal affirmed, determining that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance but that Defendant suffered no prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant demonstrated a reasonable probability that if he had been properly advised about the immigration consequences of his plea he would not have pleaded guilty to the offense. View "People v. Vivar" on Justia Law

After being placed in removal proceedings, petitioner sought a U visa. However, petitioner could not acquire the visa without a waiver of inadmissibility. Petitioner requested that waiver from USCIS, but USCIS denied the request.The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal, concluding that the DOJ's regulations empower the IJ to consider petitioner's application for an inadmissibility waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii). The court explained that an IJ's ability to grant a section 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) waiver is consistent with the statutory and regulatory scheme, which entrusts IJs with the responsibility to determine a petitioner's admissibility in removal proceedings, as well as the forms of relief available. The court remanded for the IJ to determine what relief, if any, to which petitioner is entitled, including whether an inadmissibility waiver is appropriate. View "Jimenez-Rodriguez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Nonpermanent resident aliens ordered removed from the U.S. may obtain discretionary relief if, among other things, they can establish their continuous presence in the country for at least 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). The “stop-time rule” included in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) provides that the period of continuous presence “shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear” in removal proceedings; “notice to appear” is defined as “written notice . . . specifying” certain information, such as the charges and the time and place at which the removal proceedings will be held. A notice that omits any required information does not trigger the stop-time rule.The government ordered the removal of Niz-Chavez and sent him a document containing the charges against him. Weeks later, it sent another document, providing the time and place of his hearing. The government argued that because the documents collectively specified all statutorily required information for “a notice to appear,” Niz-Chavez’s continuous presence in the country stopped when he was served with the second document.The Supreme Court held that a notice to appear sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule is a single document containing all the information about an individual’s removal hearing specified in section 1229(a)(1). In addition to the statute’s use of the article, “a” and the singular noun, “notice,” its structure and history support requiring the government to issue a single notice containing all the required information. Administrative inconvenience never justifies departing from a statute’s clear text. View "Niz-Chavez v. Garland" on Justia Law

After petitioner was convicted of drug and firearm offenses in Georgia, the state pardoned him. However, DHS sought to remove petitioner based on his convictions before the pardon. The IJ ordered petitioner's removal and the BIA dismissed the appeal.The Fourth Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part the petition for review, concluding that petitioner failed to exhaust his argument that pardoned offenses do not qualify as convictions under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The court also concluded that a pardon waives only the removal grounds specifically enumerated in the Act, and petitioner's pardon does not waive all of the removal grounds proven by the government. View "Tetteh v. Garland" on Justia Law

Torres started working for Precision in 2011. He was not then legally authorized to work in the U.S. but obtained work authorization about five months later. Torres listed a fake Social Security number on a tax form when he started the job. In May 2012, Torres injured his back at work. Precision did not pay all of the doctor's bills. Torres pursued a workers’ compensation claim. After receiving a September 2011 call from Torres’s lawyer, supervisors confronted Torres. Torres recorded their threatening and profanity-laced statements. Torres was immediately terminated.Torres sued, claiming Precision violated Tennessee law by firing him in retaliation for making a workers’ compensation claim. The district court rejected the claim, citing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. On remand, the district court found Precision liable for retaliatory discharge and held that federal law did not preempt a damage award. The court awarded Torres backpay, compensatory damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal law makes it illegal to employ undocumented aliens, but Tennessee’s workers’ compensation law protects them. Because of federal law, the company cannot be required to pay lost wages that the alien was not allowed to earn; the employer is liable for wages the employee could have lawfully received, and for damages unrelated to the employee’s immigration status. View "Torres v. Precision Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal from the IJ's order removing him on the ground that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence. The court concluded that petitioner's conviction for second-degree assault under New York Penal Law 120.05(1) is a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16(a). In this case, petitioner's conviction for second-degree assault meets section 16(a)'s physical force requirement because NYPL 120.05(1) requires that a defendant (1) cause a serious physical injury to another (2) with the intent to do so. The court explained that a person who causes serious physical injury with the intent to do so, in violation of NYPL 120.05(1), necessarily uses physical force. Finally, the court rejected defendant's contention that NYPL 120.05(1) is overbroad. View "Thompson v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner Victor Zarate-Alvarez, a native and citizen of Mexico, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. Zarate pleaded guilty to knowing or reckless child abuse in violation of Colorado law. Several years later, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because he was present without having been admitted or paroled. Zarate conceded removability and filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). After a hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the application, concluding that Zarate was ineligible for cancellation under section 1229b(b)(l)(C) because his state child abuse conviction constituted “a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). The BIA agreed with the IJ’s determination and dismissed Zarate’s appeal. Challenging the Board's decisions, Zarate argued: (1) the BIA’s most recent interpretations of section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) were not entitled to deference; and (2) his state conviction was not a categorical match to a “crime of child abuse” as defined by the Board. The Tenth Circuit rejected both arguments and affirmed the Board. View "Zarate-Alvarez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Board's determination that petitioner's 2011 Iowa conviction for possession of a controlled substance disqualifies him from relief in the form of cancellation of removal. The court concluded that the Board correctly found Iowa Code Section 124.401(5) divisible as between marijuana and other controlled substances, and the Board did not err in finding petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court also concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration when it interpreted petitioner's arguments in his motion as new and as clearly distinct from what he had raised in his appeal. View "Aquino Arroyo v. Garland" on Justia Law