Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Federal courts lack jurisdiction over challenges to the denial of aliens' applications for LPR status unless and until the challenge has been exhausted in removal proceedings.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's appeal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the district court did not have jurisdiction to review the denial of plaintiff's application to USCIS for LPR status, where no removal proceedings had been initiated against him. The court held that Cardoso v. Reno, 216 F.3d 512, 517–18 (5th Cir. 2000), which held that the district court lacked jurisdiction in similar circumstances, was controlling in this case. View "Benavides Nolasco v. Crockett" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied petitions for review of the BIA's decision affirming the denial of asylum and related relief, as well as denial of petitioner's motion to reopen seeking termination of proceedings in light of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018).The panel held that substantial evidence supported the denial of asylum relief where the IJ, and the BIA agreed, that petitioner was not credible based on identified inconsistencies and implausibilities in petitioner's account, some of which reach the heart of her claim for relief. Furthermore, substantial evidence support the denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture, based on the conclusion that petitioner could internally relocate within Mexico. The panel also held that a Notice to Appear lacking the time, date, and location of a petitioner's initial removal hearing does not deprive the agency of jurisdiction over removal proceedings. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reopen proceedings. View "Aguilar Fermin v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied the government's motion for a stay pending appeal of the district court's preliminary injunction enjoining Presidential Proclamation No. 9945, Suspension of Entry of Immigrants Who Will Financially Burden the United States Health Care System. The Proclamation barred, with some exceptions, individuals seeking to enter the United States on an immigrant visa from entering unless they could demonstrate that they will be covered by certain approved health insurance within 30 days of entry or that they have the resources to cover foreseeable healthcare costs.The panel held that the government has not established the requisite irreparable harm necessary to justify a stay pending appeal. In this case, the government's rights may be vindicated upon completion of this litigation; the alleged monetary harms to third parties upon which the government relies do not constitute irreparable harm; and the government did not meet its high burden to satisfy the other Nken factors. Therefore, the government has not demonstrated a likelihood of success. The panel also held that staying the injunction would injure both the plaintiff class and third parties, and the public interest weighs against entering a stay; the preliminary injunction preserves the status quo during the pendency of this appeal; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the scope of the preliminary injunction. View "John Doe #1 v. Trump" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition seeking review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of her untimely motion to reopen her family's removal proceedings, holding that the BIA's denial of Petitioner's motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Indonesia, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture for her herself, her husband, and her two daughters. An immigration judge denied the application, and the BIA affirmed. Six years later, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen the removal proceedings. The BIA denied the motion as untimely. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA's decision not to reopen the proceedings was neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "Sutarsim v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted in part a petition for review of the BIA's finding that petitioner was removable based on his conviction for possession of visual presentation depicting sexual conduct of a person under 16 years of age, in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes (N.R.S.) 200.730.Applying the categorical approach, the panel compared the elements of N.R.S. 200.730 with the applicable definition of "sexual abuse of a minor," which requires proof of three elements. The panel held that N.R.S. 200.730 punishes a broader range of conduct because the Nevada statute does not require proof that the offender participated in sexual conduct with a minor. Therefore, petitioner's conviction did not qualify as sexual abuse of a minor. The panel explained that, with a possession-only offense such as N.R.S. 200.730, the minor depicted in the image is not the direct object of the offender's conduct, which is a necessary predicate for the offense to qualify as sexual abuse of a minor. View "Mero v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Attorney General imposed conditions on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (Byrne JAG), 34 U.S.C.10151, which the primary source of federal criminal justice enforcement funding for state and local governments. The district court granted a preliminary injunction as to conditions that required that state or local officials honor requests to provide federal agents advance notice of the scheduled release of aliens in custody and that state or local correctional facilities give federal agents access to aliens in their custody. The Seventh Circuit upheld a nationwide injunction. The district court granted a permanent injunction and invalidated a condition requiring that state or local governments certify their compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373, which prohibits them from restricting their officials from communicating information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any individual to the INS, was unconstitutional but stayed the injunction to the extent that it applied beyond Chicago.The Seventh Circuit again held that the Attorney General cannot pursue the executive branch's policy objectives through the power of the purse or the arm of local law enforcement, rejecting the Attorney General’s assertion that Congress itself provided that authority in the language of the statutes. Chicago has determined that effective law enforcement requires the cooperation of its undocumented residents; such cooperation cannot be accomplished if those residents fear immigration consequences should they communicate with the police; and, local law enforcement must remain independent from federal immigration enforcement. The Byrne JAG grant was enacted to support the needs of local law enforcement to help fight crime, but “is being used as a hammer to further a completely different policy of the executive branch.” States do not forfeit all autonomy over their own police power merely by accepting federal grants. There is no reason to stay the application of the injunction. View "City of Chicago v. Barr" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the denials of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Second Circuit found no error in the BIA's rejection of petitioner's untimely asylum claim and its denial of withholding or CAT protection insofar as petitioner professes fear of persecution and torture from former police supervisors. However, insofar as petitioner seeks withholding and CAT protection based on feared persecution and torture from gangs, the court held that the record does not permit it to determine whether the agency considered all relevant evidence and applied the correct legal standard. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, affirming in part and vacating in part the BIA's decision. View "Scarlett v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied petitioner's request for compensation at government expense of his court-appointed pro bono counsel in a petition for review of the BIA's denial of relief from removal.The panel held that petitioner and his amici curiae identify no authority, including under the federal habeas statutes, the All Writs Act, and the Criminal Justice Act, as informed by the Suspension Clause, allowing the panel to order the government to compensate counsel for mentally incompetent petitioners in petitions for review under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a). The panel stated that, although it has inherent authority to appoint pro bono counsel for petitioner, and did so in his petition for review, it lacked the requisite statutory authority to order government compensation for his appointed counsel. View "Perez v. Barr" on Justia Law

Calderon-Rosas, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. in 2001. He and his wife lack lawful immigration status. Their three children are U.S. citizens. Calderon-Rosas was a successful contractor for 11 years. In 2018, Calderon-Rosas was charged with DUI. Those charges were later dismissed. The government initiated removal proceedings. Calderon-Rosas hired attorney Grannan, who would soon be disbarred for “multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct in seven separate client matters” in a “troubling pattern of neglect.” Calderon-Rosas sought asylum (8 U.S.C. 1158) and cancellation of removal (section 1229b(b). Although Calderon-Rosas spent over $7000 on Grannan’s services, Grannan never visited him, never discussed his case by phone, and never explained to Calderon-Rosas the requirements for the relief he sought. Grannan failed to meaningfully pursue Calderon-Rosas’s asylum application and did not obtain adequate medical records of Calderon-Rosas’s children to support Calderon-Rosas’s cancellation of removal application.The IJ denied relief, finding the asylum application abandoned and that the children's suffering would not amount to “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to qualify Calderon-Rosas for cancellation. With new counsel before the BIA, Calderon-Rosa argued ineffective assistance and submitted new evidence, including medical records for his three children, which demonstrated multiple medical conditions. The BIA dismissed Calderon-Rosas’s appeal. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, first holding that it had jurisdiction although Calderon-Rosas, sought only discretionary relief. Calderon-Rosas plainly presented a meritorious ineffective-assistance claim. View "Calderon-Rosas v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit held that the requirements for establishing membership in a particular social group in support of a request for asylum or withholding of removal do not categorically preclude applicants from successfully relying on any group defined in material part as women "unable to leave" a domestic relationship.Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner alleged that her former domestic partner and the father of her son abused her in the past, will abuse her in the future, and will remain unfettered by Dominican law enforcement authorities. The immigration judge ruled against Petitioner in part on claimed inadequacy of the tendered social groups. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the BIA's holding that Petitioner's claim necessarily failed because the groups to which she claimed to belong were necessarily deficient was arbitrary and unexamined. View "De Pena-Paniagua v. Barr" on Justia Law