Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of India, appealed from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Petitioner has been in ICE custody for 31 months and argued that he was entitled to release under the Supreme Court's ruling in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution limits detention of lawfully-admitted noncitizens under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6) to a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien's removal and does not permit indefinite detention.The Eleventh Circuit held that section 1231(a)(1)(C) requires that petitioner return the incomplete travel document application in bad faith, i.e., petitioner intentionally withheld the necessary information in order to apply. In this case, the court could not evaluate whether petitioner's removal period had been extended by operation of section 1231(a)(1)(C). Because there was insufficient evidence to evaluate the district court's denial of the petition for habeas relief, the court reversed and remanded. View "Singh v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The BIA must consider the principles of equitable tolling when an untimely appeal is filed and the petitioner raises the issue.The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision refusing to accept petitioner's untimely appeal of an IJ's order of removal from Ghana. The court held that the BIA erred in refusing to consider whether the argument that the appeal deadline, which is nonjurisdictional, is subject to an equitable tolling exception. The court found that the appeal deadline is a claim‐processing rule amenable to equitable tolling and thus remanded to the BIA to develop standards for equitable tolling, determining whether petitioner qualified for such relief. View "Attipoe v. Barr" on Justia Law

Eight-year-old Quinteros and his mother came to the U.S. from El Salvador in 2001. When he was 13, Quinteros joined the gang MS-13. In 2011, Quinteros was indicted for conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(6). The planned gang attack never occurred. Quinteros later pled guilty and was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment. In prison, Quinteros left MS-13 to follow Christianity. Other MS-13 members in prison told him that when he was deported “things are going to change. There’s no getting out over there.” Quinteros was charged as removable for having committed an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), (U), and (J). Quinteros checked the form box to contest his deportability but failed to follow up with additional documentation. Quinteros then sought withholding of removal. An asylum officer determined that Quinteros demonstrated a reasonable fear that he would be tortured in El Salvador. Before an IJ, Quinteros testified and presented studies and reports, that discussed the perception and treatment of individuals with tattoos in El Salvador. The Third Circuit vacated the BIA’s rejection of Quinteros’s claims. Quinteros’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(6) is not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), (U), or (J); conviction under section 1959(a)(6) does not require an overt act and is not a categorical match for conspiracy under the Immigration Act. View "Quinteros v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Aguilar-Calvo pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(1). He had been previously convicted of felony drug possession, assault, driving under the influence, and illegal reentry. In its sentencing memorandum, the government addressed18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s sentencing factors, noting that some people are “impatient for action to protect their perceived economic interests, as promised by our duly enacted immigration policies. Aguilar-Calvo’s sentencing memorandum argued that the district court should not consider such “extraneous, inflammatory, and idiosyncratic views.” The government responded that it did not agree that these concerns are “extraneous,” noting that the guidelines recommend a higher sentence for recidivist illegal reentries and for defendants who have a prior felony conviction. The district court sentenced Aguilar-Calvo to 38 months of imprisonment after a lengthy explanation, citing 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Aguilar-Calvo objected to “any consideration of the Government’s arguments about the political debate about illegal immigration.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable. At no point in sentencing Aguilar-Calvo did the district court rely on the government’s inappropriate representations, on unreasonable speculation or on erroneous information. View "United States v. Aguilar-Calvo" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of a 2018 indictment charging defendant with illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. The court agreed with the government's contention that the district court erred in sustaining defendant's collateral attack on his underlying 2013 deportation order and dismissing the 2018 illegal-reentry indictment.In this case, the district court found that the IJ and the BIA erroneously classified bail jumping as an aggravated felony and the error led the IJ not to consider defendant's claims for asylum and withholding of removal. The court disagreed with the district court for two reasons: first, the district court diluted the actual prejudice standard; and second, applying the correct actual-prejudice standard, the record foreclosed any notion that defendant likely would have escaped deportation either through asylum or withholding of removal. The court saw nothing in the record indicating that defendant was likely eligible for asylum or withholding of removal. Therefore, even assuming the IJ and BIA erred in classifying defendant's bail jumping conviction as an aggravated felony, defendant still could not show actual prejudice under section 1326(d). View "United States v. Ramirez-Cortinas" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Robert Vivar pled guilty to possession of materials with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Defendant was placed on probation for three years, and as a condition of probation was to serve one year in county jail. He also received a referral to the Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) program. Shortly after his release, defendant was removed from the country as a consequence of his plea. Over a decade later, defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7. The trial court denied defendant’s motion. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate his guilty plea because his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and advise defendant of the immigration consequences of his plea and for failing to defend or mitigate the judgment. Defendant also argued that his plea must be vacated because it was legally invalid. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Vivar" on Justia Law

Notwithstanding a district court's release order pursuant to the Bail Reform Act (BRA), the government has the authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to detain a criminal defendant who is an alien in the course of an administrative removal proceeding.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of an indictment against defendant with prejudice. The court held that the district court's bail release order under the BRA did not preclude the government from detaining defendant under the INA as an inadmissible alien subject to removal. The court found defendant's arguments to the contrary unavailing. View "United States v. Lett" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of asylum and related relief. The panel held that an asylum officer's credibility conclusion could not support an adverse credibility finding. In this case, the agency legally erred by relying on the asylum officer's assessment of petitioner's credibility.The panel also held that, where, as here, petitioner's testimony was consistent with, but more detailed than, her asylum application, petitioner's testimony is not per se lacking in credibility. Therefore, the finding that petitioner was less credible merely because her statement did not note the specific date the abortion occurred or the names of the family planning director and hospital staff was unreasonable. The panel also held that petitioner's testimony about the asylum interview did not support the adverse credibility finding; the IJ's speculation that petitioner was in fact still living in Indiana was not a sufficient basis for an adverse credibility finding; the BIA impermissibly engaged in factfinding; and petitioner was entitled to notice and an opportunity to produce corroborating evidence or explain why it was unavailable. View "Lizhi Qiu v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioners' request for humanitarian asylum. Petitioners, seeking asylum for themselves and their children, contend that the district court erred in requiring that they show past persecution on account of a protected ground as a prerequisite for obtaining humanitarian asylum.The court held that petitioner's argument was foreclosed by this court's existing precedent in Kanagu v. Holder, 781 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2015), which held that the petitioner's failure to prove persecution on a protected ground made him ineligible for humanitarian asylum. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners' requested relief. View "Mejia-Lopez v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition filed by Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, seeking review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying as untimely Petitioner's motion to reopen her earlier removal proceedings, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion.Petitioner sought to reopen her earlier removal proceedings alleging that changed country conditions in China regarding religious persecution would impact her given her recent conversion to Christianity. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, finding that it was time-barred and that the evidence did not support an exception to the time limits. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Petitioner's motion to reopen removal proceedings was time-barred. View "Lin v. Barr" on Justia Law