Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Maximo Robert Vera Punin, a citizen of Ecuador, was ordered removed by immigration authorities after being convicted in state court of multiple counts involving the rape of a young child. He is currently serving a 25-year prison term and faces deportation upon completion of his sentence. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served him with a notice to appear in September 2020, charging him with being a removable alien under various sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act. DHS submitted a Form I-213 to prove his alienage, which listed detailed personal information and his previous removal from the United States.The Immigration Judge (IJ) admitted the I-213 over Vera Punin’s objection, finding it sufficient to prove his alienage by clear and convincing evidence. The IJ sustained the charges of removability and ordered Vera Punin removed to Ecuador. Vera Punin appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the I-213 was unreliable and should not have been admitted. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, holding that the I-213 was inherently trustworthy and sufficient to establish his alienage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Vera Punin did not exhaust his argument that the agency failed to explain its reasoning, and thus lacked authority to consider this claim. The court held that the I-213 is presumptively reliable and capable of proving alienage by clear and convincing evidence, and Vera Punin did not rebut that presumption. The court also found that the presumption of reliability afforded to an I-213 does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof away from the government. Additionally, the court determined that the temporary Appellate Immigration Judge was properly appointed by the Attorney General. Consequently, the petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Punin v. Garland" on Justia Law

Three foreign nationals, crewmembers aboard the vessel MARGUERITA, were detained in the United States after the vessel was held in port in Maine due to alleged improper disposal of bilge water and inaccurate record-keeping. The plaintiffs were ordered to remain in the U.S. as potential material witnesses. They were later allowed to leave but returned for trial and were awarded for their contributions to the conviction of the vessel's operator.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against various U.S. government entities and officials, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and various tort claims. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine dismissed the Bivens claim and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the FTCA claims. The court found that the plaintiffs' detention and the revocation of their landing permits were authorized and that the plaintiffs did not show that the actions taken by the government officials were unlawful or unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the requirement for ships to maintain an Oil Record Book under 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 is valid and that the plaintiffs' detention was justified under the circumstances. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to establish their claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA. Additionally, the court concluded that the Bivens claim presented a new context and that special factors counseled hesitation in extending a Bivens remedy, particularly given the availability of alternative remedies and the implications for government policy and international relations. View "Hornof v. United States" on Justia Law

Ashraf Abdulkarim-Ali Alkotof, a Yemeni citizen, entered the U.S. on a B1/B2 visa in 2006 and overstayed. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a notice to appear, alleging he was subject to removal. Alkotof admitted the allegations but sought adjustment of status based on an I-130 petition filed by his U.S. citizen spouse, Tiffany Alfano. After Alfano's petition was denied, Alkotof divorced her and married Hajer Ali Yehia, who filed another I-130 petition, which was initially approved but later revoked due to alleged marriage fraud. Alkotof appealed the revocation and also applied for a U-Visa as a crime victim.The Immigration Judge (IJ) continued Alkotof’s removal proceedings multiple times but ultimately ordered his removal in 2018, citing the lack of an approved I-130 petition and the speculative nature of his U-Visa application. Alkotof appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal and denied his motion to remand for cancellation of removal, citing insufficient evidence to rebut the marriage fraud finding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the BIA’s denial of Alkotof’s motion to remand for cancellation of removal, as it involved discretionary judgment. The court also found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Alkotof’s request for administrative closure or a continuance. The court noted that Alkotof was ineligible for adjustment of status due to the revoked I-130 petition and that he could continue to pursue his U-Visa application even after removal. Consequently, the court affirmed in part and dismissed in part Alkotof’s petition for review. View "Ashraf Abdulkarim-Ali Alkotof v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Sandra Estela Calvo-Tino and her minor daughter A.M.L.C., are natives of Guatemala. A.M.L.C. suffers from a severe genetic disorder that requires constant medical attention. In Guatemala, they faced inadequate medical care and alleged mistreatment by hospital staff, including accusations of poisoning and improper medical procedures. Fearing further mistreatment, they entered the United States in October 2016 and were subsequently charged as inadmissible aliens. They applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Immigration Judge denied all forms of relief, finding that Calvo-Tino had not suffered past persecution, had not established a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that her proposed social group of "parents of permanently disabled or handicapped individuals" was not cognizable. The judge also found no likelihood of torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed these findings, dismissing the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision under the substantial evidence standard. The court upheld the BIA's findings, agreeing that the alleged mistreatment did not amount to persecution and that there was no evidence of a well-founded fear of future persecution. The court also found that the BIA did not need to address the cognizability of the proposed social group since the claim failed on other grounds. Additionally, the court concluded that the petitioners did not meet the burden of proof for CAT relief, as there was no evidence that Calvo-Tino would be tortured if returned to Guatemala.The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision. View "Calvo-Tino v. Garland" on Justia Law

Shlomo Bador, an Israeli citizen, received conditional permanent resident status in the U.S. based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. Two years later, he and his wife filed a joint petition to remove the conditions on his status. However, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) suspected the marriage was fraudulent. After interviewing Bador’s wife, she withdrew her support for the petition, leading to the automatic termination of Bador’s conditional status. Consequently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Bador, and he conceded his removability.An Immigration Judge (IJ) reviewed the case, where Bador requested a good-faith waiver, claiming his marriage was genuine but had ended in divorce. During the hearing, Bador admitted the marriage was fraudulent, having paid his wife and a broker to secure his status. The IJ denied the good-faith waiver and ruled Bador ineligible for a fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), which applies to aliens charged with being inadmissible at the time of admission due to fraud. The IJ found that Bador’s removal was based on the termination of his conditional status, not the fraud itself.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Bador could not use the fraud waiver to excuse his failure to file a joint petition. The BIA dismissed his appeal, leading Bador to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review.The Second Circuit denied Bador’s petition, holding that he was ineligible for the fraud waiver. The court concluded that Bador’s removal was due to the termination of his conditional status for failing to file a joint petition, not because of his fraudulent marriage. Therefore, the fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) did not apply. View "Bador v. Garland" on Justia Law

Hugo Abraham Aguilar, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without inspection in 2001 and has three U.S. citizen children. In January 2014, he was arrested in New Jersey for allegedly sexually assaulting his stepdaughter and remained in pretrial detention for 1,332 days due to his inability to afford bail. In May 2017, Aguilar pled guilty to a reduced charge of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child and was sentenced to 1,332 days in prison, with credit for time served. Shortly after his sentencing, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Aguilar statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, citing his inability to demonstrate "good moral character" due to his confinement for more than 180 days as a result of his conviction. The IJ also denied his request for a continuance to challenge his conviction in state court. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Aguilar's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's findings and concluding that the IJ acted within his discretion in denying the continuance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that pre-conviction detention credited toward a defendant's sentence is considered confinement "as a result of conviction" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Consequently, Aguilar's 1,332 days of pre-conviction detention, credited as time served, precluded him from establishing the required good moral character for cancellation of removal. The court also denied as moot Aguilar's challenge to the BIA's decision dismissing his appeal from the IJ's denial of a continuance, as his state post-conviction relief efforts had concluded unsuccessfully. The Third Circuit denied Aguilar's petition for review. View "Aguilar v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The case involves Raymond Sefakor Yao Azumah, a Ghanaian national who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2010. After a trip to Ghana in 2014, Azumah was deemed inadmissible due to an intervening embezzlement conviction. Despite this, the government paroled Azumah into the country and initiated removal proceedings against him. These proceedings were later dismissed, and Azumah applied for citizenship. However, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied his application, arguing that Azumah was statutorily ineligible because he was not “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” upon his return to the United States in 2014. The district court affirmed this denial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court noted that Azumah was indeed “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” at all relevant times, including 2010, 2014, and when he sought citizenship, because he had the status of a legal permanent resident of the United States. The court did not interpret the agency regulation to impose upon Azumah the additional burden of showing that he was “lawfully admitted” rather than paroled when he returned to the United States in 2014. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Azumah v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Three Chinese individuals invested in a project to improve Philadelphia’s transit infrastructure as part of an effort to obtain EB-5 visas, which are visas for foreign investors who create jobs in the United States. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) approved their visa applications. However, due to the oversubscription of the EB-5 visa program, the investors were waiting in line for visas to become available. In 2022, Congress changed the eligibility requirements for EB-5 visas, creating a new category of “reserved” EB-5 visas for foreigners who invest in “infrastructure projects”. The investors believed that they should be eligible for the new “reserved” visas based on their past investments in infrastructure. They sued the Department of Homeland Security and USCIS, arguing that previous investments in already-approved infrastructure-focused projects should be eligible for reserved EB-5 visas. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the government had taken no final agency action that may be challenged at this time.The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court agreed with the lower court that the arguments made by the appellants were premature. The court found that the statements made by USCIS in a Q&A and a policy manual merely clarified the existing process for seeking an immigration benefit and did not constitute final agency action. The court also noted that the appellants were not precluded from applying for reserved EB-5 visas. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the district court, dismissing the appellants' claims for lack of finality under the Administrative Procedure Act. View "Delaware Valley Regional Center, LLC v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The case involves a family from El Salvador seeking asylum in the United States. The family consists of Jose Maria Rivera, a pastor, his wife Morena, their two children, and Morena's son Reyes. Rivera and his church were known for evangelizing to gang members, which led to threats and violence from the gangs. The situation escalated when a gang member, Ronal Granadeno, decided to join Rivera's church, leading to an attack on Rivera, Granadeno, and Morena. Granadeno was killed, and Rivera was threatened with death. The family fled to the United States, and Rivera applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on behalf of himself and his family.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Rivera and Reyes credible but concluded that Rivera had failed to demonstrate that the persecution was "on account of" his religion or any other protected ground. The IJ reasoned that the gang was angry that Rivera had interfered with the gang's ranks by convincing Granadeno to leave the gang, and that Rivera's religion was therefore only "incidental" to his persecution. The IJ denied the family's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the family's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit partially granted the family's petition for review. The court found that the BIA and IJ had erred in their analysis of whether Rivera's religion was a central reason for his persecution. The court noted that the BIA and IJ had failed to consider evidence that Rivera's religion may have been an additional central reason for his persecution. The court vacated the BIA's decision on the issue of nexus and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the court denied the petition for review as to Reyes's separate asylum claim, finding that the record did not compel the conclusion that his membership in the family was one central reason that he was threatened. View "Rivera v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves an American citizen and her noncitizen husband who sued two U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officials, alleging that USCIS unreasonably delayed adjudicating a waiver application the husband submitted two years prior. The plaintiffs argued that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Mandamus Act granted subject-matter jurisdiction over their claims. The district court dismissed their claims, concluding that language in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that denies courts jurisdiction over suits based on agency “decisions or actions” also bars suits over agency inaction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, but for different reasons. The appellate court found that the district court erred in interpreting the INA's jurisdictional bar to include agency inaction. However, the court concluded that no statute or regulation requires USCIS to adjudicate the husband’s waiver application, and therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims. The court noted that while the delay in adjudication was stressful for the plaintiffs, their complaint should be addressed to the political branches, as the court lacked jurisdiction to order the relief sought. View "Lovo v. Miller" on Justia Law