Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Lucila Magana-Magana, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States unlawfully in 1995. She faced a series of abusive relationships, including with Rafael Camacho and later Clyde Wakefield, whom she married in 2017. Wakefield's abuse led to their separation and eventual divorce. In 2007, Magana-Magana was arrested by U.S. Border Patrol, and the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. She applied for cancellation of removal, citing hardship to her U.S. citizen children, but her request was denied by an immigration judge (IJ) and later by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Her appeal to the Ninth Circuit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.In January 2022, Magana-Magana filed a motion with the BIA to reopen her removal proceedings, citing new evidence of abuse by Wakefield and her application for benefits under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The BIA denied her motion, stating it was untimely and that she had not demonstrated "extraordinary circumstances" to waive the one-year filing deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded it had jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination of "extraordinary circumstances" under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), as it involved applying a legal standard to undisputed facts. The court found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that the abuse suffered by Magana-Magana did not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" and that there was no basis to conclude that such circumstances caused the delay in filing her motion. The court also rejected her other arguments, including her unexhausted equitable-tolling claim and the BIA's discretionary decision not to reopen the case sua sponte. The petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "MAGANA-MAGANA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Ranjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, arrived in the United States without documentation in May 2013 and sought asylum, claiming persecution due to his political opinions and association with the Mann Party. An immigration judge (IJ) found inconsistencies in Singh's testimony regarding his political affiliations and the circumstances of his father's death, leading to an adverse credibility determination. Consequently, the IJ denied Singh's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, and the Ninth Circuit denied Singh's petition for review.In July 2021, Singh filed a motion to reopen his case, citing new fears of persecution due to India's passage of agricultural reform laws. He claimed eligibility for relief based on his religion as a Sikh, his membership in a particular social group of farmers, and his political opinions opposing the new laws. Singh submitted new evidence, including a sworn statement detailing threats and assaults against his family by the police and members of the BJP Party, medical records, photos of protests, land ownership papers, and news articles about the persecution of farmers and Sikhs.The BIA denied Singh's motion to reopen, concluding that the new evidence was immaterial due to the prior adverse credibility determination. The BIA found that Singh's new affidavit and documentary evidence did not sufficiently establish an individualized risk of persecution or torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA improperly relied on the prior adverse credibility determination to discredit Singh's new evidence. The court held that the BIA must credit evidence supporting a motion to reopen unless the facts asserted are inherently unbelievable. The Ninth Circuit granted Singh's petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the BIA to address Singh's new factual assertions independently of the prior adverse credibility finding. View "SINGH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Eulalia Mateo-Mateo and her two minor children, all Guatemalan citizens, sought asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. Mateo claimed that the mother of her children's father had physically and verbally abused her and would continue to do so if she returned to Guatemala. Mateo and her children were apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol upon arrival, and the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. They conceded removability, and Mateo applied for asylum and related relief.An Immigration Judge (IJ) held a hearing and found Mateo credible but denied her applications. The IJ concluded that Mateo did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. The IJ also found that Mateo did not establish that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect her. Mateo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), which affirmed the IJ's decision, finding no clear error in the IJ's findings and deeming Mateo's claim for CAT relief waived due to lack of meaningful identification of error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed both the IJ's and the Board's opinions. The court found that Mateo's claims for asylum, humanitarian asylum, and withholding of removal failed for two independent reasons: she did not challenge the finding that the Guatemalan government was not unable or unwilling to protect her, and substantial evidence supported the finding that she did not experience persecution on account of a protected ground. The court also concluded that Mateo's CAT claim failed on exhaustion grounds, as she did not challenge the Board's finding of waiver. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Mateo-Mateo v. Garland" on Justia Law

Vitaliy Chmukh, a native and citizen of Ukraine, came to the United States as a refugee in 2001. In 2017, he was involved in using a stolen vehicle to steal packages from porches, leading to his arrest. He pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen vehicle under RCW § 9A.56.068 and possession of heroin under RCW § 69.50.4013. He was sentenced to 43 months for the stolen vehicle charge and 24 months for the controlled substance charge, serving 38 months in total.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Chmukh with removability based on these convictions, alleging that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and that the controlled substance conviction violated the Controlled Substances Act. An immigration judge (IJ) found him removable and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime, making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Chmukh’s conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) because it matched the generic federal offense of possession of stolen property, requiring possession, actual knowledge that the property was stolen, and intent to deprive the owner of the property. The court also found that the conviction was a particularly serious crime, barring withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). The court rejected Chmukh’s arguments that the statute was overbroad and that the agency erred in its analysis. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Chmukh’s petition for review. View "CHMUKH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Miguel Angel Moctezuma-Reyes, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States illegally in 2005 and has since lived in Michigan with his wife, three of his four children, and his niece. His two youngest sons are American citizens, while his wife and daughter lack legal status. Moctezuma-Reyes works in a fence factory, and his daughter is a medical assistant. Together, they support the family financially. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him in 2018.An Immigration Judge denied Moctezuma-Reyes's application for cancellation of removal, concluding that he did not meet the statutory requirement of demonstrating "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to his qualifying relatives. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that the hardship his family would face did not meet the necessary threshold.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory standard of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" requires hardship that is significantly different from or greater than that typically associated with deportation. The court found that the financial and emotional hardships cited by Moctezuma-Reyes, while severe, were not uncommon in deportation cases. The court also noted that his daughter’s employment mitigated some financial hardship and that his sons did not have special needs that would make their situation exceptional. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision. View "Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland" on Justia Law

Broadgate, Inc. employed an H-1B visa holder who filed a complaint with the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division in February 2018, alleging that Broadgate had not paid him the full wages required by the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Division’s investigation substantiated the claim and found additional violations, including failure to post required workplace notices. Consequently, the Division issued a determination letter in December 2018, finding Broadgate had willfully violated the Act, barring it from the H-1B program for two years, requiring payment of back wages, and assessing a civil penalty.Broadgate sought review before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), challenging only the determination regarding the workplace notices. The ALJ agreed with Broadgate, vacating the determination. However, the Department’s Administrative Review Board reversed this decision. On remand, Broadgate argued that the Division exceeded its authority by investigating violations not alleged in the original complaint. The ALJ rejected this argument, and the Review Board and the district court affirmed the Director’s imposition of fines and penalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Broadgate argued that the District Director lacked authority to issue the determination letter and that the Wage and Hour Division exceeded its authority by investigating the notice violations. The court held that the presumption of regularity applied, meaning the Director’s issuance of the letter was presumptive proof of her authority. The court also found that the Division was entitled to investigate the notice violations discovered during the investigation of the wage complaint. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, rejecting Broadgate’s arguments. View "Broadgate, Inc v. Su" on Justia Law

Vicente David Cuenca-Arroyo, a native and citizen of Mexico, was brought to the United States as a child without being admitted or paroled. He has a minor son, B.A., who is a U.S. citizen and primarily resides with his mother but spends weekends with Cuenca-Arroyo. In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Cuenca-Arroyo, charging him as inadmissible. Cuenca-Arroyo conceded the charge and was found removable by an immigration judge. He applied for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure but was denied both. He also sought a continuance to include his parents as qualifying relatives for his cancellation application, which was also denied.Cuenca-Arroyo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the immigration judge's decisions. The BIA agreed that there was no good cause for a continuance, that the hardships to Cuenca-Arroyo's son were not "exceptional and extremely unusual," and that Cuenca-Arroyo did not merit voluntary departure based on the equities.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the BIA's determination that Cuenca-Arroyo did not demonstrate the required hardship for cancellation of removal, noting that the hardships presented were common consequences of removal. The court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary decision regarding voluntary departure. Lastly, the court found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in affirming the denial of Cuenca-Arroyo's motion for a continuance.The Fifth Circuit denied Cuenca-Arroyo's petition for review regarding the cancellation of removal and dismissed the petition regarding the voluntary departure decision. The court also upheld the BIA's decision on the continuance denial. View "Cuenca-Arroyo v. Garland" on Justia Law

Felix Jacobo Salomon-Guillen, a native of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 on an O-3 visa as the spouse of Lucia Parker Salomon, a recording artist who later became a naturalized citizen. Salomon-Guillen became a permanent resident and managed his wife's music career. In 2013, he began working as a marketing director for a book publisher and engaged in a fraudulent scheme that cost the company $1.4 million. He was indicted for wire fraud, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 18 months in prison.The government sought to remove Salomon-Guillen from the country due to his aggravated felony conviction. He conceded removability and applied for adjustment of status and an inadmissibility waiver. The immigration judge denied his applications, finding that he failed to demonstrate that his removal would cause "extreme hardship" to his wife or mother, both U.S. citizens. The judge also concluded that Salomon-Guillen did not merit a waiver or adjustment of status as a matter of discretion due to the severity of his fraud offense.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge's decision. The BIA, with Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge Denise G. Brown participating, found that Salomon-Guillen failed to show that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if she accompanied him to El Salvador. The BIA also agreed that he did not merit a waiver or adjustment of status as a matter of discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the regulation allowing temporary Board members to serve six-month terms did not preclude their reappointment for additional terms. The court also found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary denial of the inadmissibility waiver. Consequently, the petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Saloman-Guillen v. Garland" on Justia Law

Dagoberto Luna, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in 1997 without valid entry documents. In 2003, the Government mailed Luna a Notice to Appear (NTA) for a removal hearing, which did not specify the date and time. Subsequently, a notice of hearing (NOH) was sent to the same address, informing Luna of a hearing scheduled for November 13, 2003. Luna did not attend the hearing, and an immigration judge ordered his removal in absentia. In 2018, Luna moved to rescind the removal order, claiming he did not receive the NTA or NOH and argued the NTA was defective under Pereira v. Sessions.The immigration judge denied Luna’s motion, finding that he had not rebutted the presumption of delivery and that the notice provided in the NOH was sufficient. The judge also declined to reopen the proceedings sua sponte. Luna appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal, holding that Luna had not rebutted the presumption of receipt, his motion to reopen was untimely, and he had not demonstrated exceptional hardship to his relatives.Luna petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review. Initially, the court granted his petition based on the defective NTA. However, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Campos-Chaves v. Garland, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered. The court held that the defective NTA did not deprive the immigration judge of jurisdiction and that the NOH provided sufficient notice. The court also found that Luna had not rebutted the presumption of delivery of the NOH and lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte.The Fifth Circuit dismissed Luna’s petition in part for lack of jurisdiction and denied it in part, concluding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion. The petition for rehearing was granted. View "Luna v. Garland" on Justia Law

Janine Cavalcanti Viana Guedes and her husband, Jose Mauricio Oliveira Guedes Jr., entered the United States on B-2 nonimmigrant visas in 2017. Viana Guedes later applied for an F-1 student visa, and her husband received derivative beneficiary status. In 2019, Viana Guedes filed an I-140 petition for an EB-2 classification and sought a National Interest Waiver (NIW) to bypass the job offer requirement. USCIS initially approved her I-140 petition and NIW but later denied her adjustment of status application, citing misrepresentations and non-compliance with visa requirements.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the appellants' case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) and the Supreme Court's decision in Patel v. Garland precluded judicial review of the USCIS's denial of their adjustment of status applications and the alleged revocation of Viana Guedes' I-140 petition and NIW.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) barred judicial review of the USCIS's denial of the adjustment of status applications. Additionally, the court found that the alleged revocations of the I-140 petition and NIW were unreviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), as these decisions were within the discretion of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the appellants' claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Viana Guedes v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law