Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns an individual who was born in El Salvador in 1981 to unmarried parents. His biological father acknowledged paternity by signing the birth certificate, but the two did not have a relationship. At age 11, he immigrated to the United States as a lawful permanent resident to join his mother. When he was 16, his mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen. As an adult, he was convicted of drug-related offenses. Years later, removal proceedings were initiated against him despite an earlier case memorandum indicating he had derived citizenship through his mother.An immigration judge (IJ) initially denied his motion to terminate removal proceedings, finding that he failed to prove his paternity had not been legitimated under Salvadoran law, and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed the removal order but remanded for reconsideration of his claim under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Subsequent IJ and Board orders continued to find him removable and not a U.S. citizen, though relief under CAT was granted and later vacated. Both sides appealed these orders, leading to multiple remands and re-entries of removal orders. Ultimately, the Board reaffirmed its prior rulings, and the petitioner remained in immigration detention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the consolidated petitions. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review both the 2024 and 2025 Board orders. On the merits, the court determined that, under the relevant federal statute in effect when the petitioner’s mother naturalized, his paternity had not been “established by legitimation.” Because all other statutory requirements were met, he automatically became a U.S. citizen upon his mother’s naturalization. The court granted the petitions, vacated the Board’s orders, and remanded with instructions to terminate removal proceedings. View "Lopez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Immigrant investors who seek permanent residency in the United States may do so by investing in regional centers that promote economic growth and job creation. In 2022, Congress reformed this program, establishing new oversight measures including an annual fee for all regional centers to fund monitoring and fraud prevention. EB5 Holdings, which owns two regional centers designated before 2022, challenged the application of this fee to “pre-RIA” (pre-2022 Reform and Integrity Act) regional centers. EB5 argued that only centers designated after the 2022 reforms should be subject to the annual fee, claiming the statute did not authorize the fee’s collection from centers designated under previous law.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed EB5’s Administrative Procedure Act challenge after the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services announced that all regional centers must pay the new fee to maintain their status. The district court denied EB5’s motion for summary judgment and granted the government’s motion to dismiss, finding that the fee provision unambiguously applies to both pre- and post-RIA regional centers.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the statutory text requires all currently designated regional centers—regardless of when they were initially designated—to pay the annual Integrity Fund fee. The court reasoned that the phrase “designated under subparagraph (E)” refers to the current status of being designated to operate as a regional center under the reformed program, not the timing of original designation. The court further rejected the argument that applying the fee to pre-RIA centers was impermissibly retroactive, as the fee only applies prospectively to centers wishing to maintain their designation. Thus, the district court’s dismissal was affirmed. View "EB5 Holdings Inc. v. Edlow" on Justia Law

Two Mexican nationals entered the United States illegally, one in 2009 and the other in 2001. In 2025, both were apprehended by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials, who determined that they were inadmissible because they were present in the United States without having been lawfully admitted or paroled. Consequently, DHS initiated removal proceedings against both individuals and detained them under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) without bond pending the outcome of those proceedings.Each petitioner requested a bond hearing before an immigration judge, but both requests were denied on the grounds that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandated detention without bond for “applicants for admission” who are not “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Subsequently, both individuals filed habeas corpus petitions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, arguing that they were entitled to bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The district courts agreed, concluding that because the petitioners were not actively “seeking admission” at the time of apprehension, their detention was governed by § 1226(a), which allows for discretionary bond. Both petitioners received bond hearings and were released.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the consolidated government appeals. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district courts’ orders. The court held that individuals present in the United States without having been admitted—regardless of how long they have resided here—are deemed “applicants for admission” under § 1225(a)(1) and are therefore subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without eligibility for bond during removal proceedings. The court found that the statutory text, structure, and context supported the government’s interpretation, and the prior practice of allowing bond did not override the statute’s plain meaning. The cases were remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The defendant, a legal permanent resident who immigrated from the Dominican Republic, was arrested in Massachusetts after police observed him engaging in a suspected drug exchange. Upon searching his vehicle, officers found heroin, cash, and drug paraphernalia, leading to a charge of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. In 2018, the defendant pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence with probation. Approximately two years later, while returning from the Dominican Republic, he was detained by immigration officials who informed him that his conviction made him automatically deportable, a consequence he claims not to have understood when entering his plea.The Salem Division of the District Court Department accepted the guilty plea. In 2022, the defendant moved to withdraw his plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney had not adequately explained the immigration consequences. He submitted affidavits from himself and his plea counsel, stating that counsel had advised him only of possible citizenship consequences, not the mandatory nature of deportation stemming from the conviction. The motion judge, who was also the plea judge, denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding the affidavits not credible, primarily because they were inconsistent with counsel’s statement during the plea colloquy that immigration consequences had been discussed.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the denial following an unpublished affirmance by the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the motion judge erred by discrediting the affidavits solely based on perceived inconsistency with the plea colloquy, as the affidavit and colloquy statements were not inherently contradictory. The court vacated the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and remanded the case for further proceedings, including the possibility of an evidentiary hearing. View "Commonwealth v. Santana" on Justia Law

Two individuals, one a Nigerian citizen and another a Jamaican citizen, were held in U.S. immigration detention for extended periods following the completion of criminal sentences or pending immigration proceedings. Both petitioned for writs of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, challenging their prolonged detention without individualized bond hearings as violations of their Fifth Amendment rights. The District Court granted both petitions, ordered bond hearings, and both individuals were subsequently released on bond.Following their success, each petitioner sought attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The District Court found that the government’s position in opposing the habeas petitions was not "substantially justified" and awarded fees: $18,224.58 to the Nigerian petitioner and $15,841.60 to the Jamaican petitioner. The government appealed these fee awards to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed whether a habeas corpus petition challenging immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 qualifies as a “civil action” under the EAJA, thus entitling prevailing parties to attorneys’ fees and costs. The Third Circuit held that such habeas actions are indeed “civil actions” within the meaning of the EAJA, relying on longstanding legal tradition and statutory interpretation. The court further affirmed that the government’s position in the Nigerian petitioner’s case was not substantially justified, due to the lengthy detention without a bond hearing. Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s awards of attorneys’ fees and costs to both petitioners. View "Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Correctional Center" on Justia Law

A citizen of the Ivory Coast immigrated to the United States as a child refugee and later became a lawful permanent resident. As an adult, he was convicted in North Dakota of robbery, a Class B felony, for brandishing a gun and menacing others during a theft. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him with removability based on two convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude and for the robbery conviction, which it classified as an aggravated felony for attempted theft.The Immigration Judge initially found the individual removable for the moral-turpitude convictions but determined he was eligible for cancellation of removal, concluding that the North Dakota robbery statute was overbroad compared to the federal definition of theft. The Department appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) disagreed, finding the statute not facially overbroad and instructing the Immigration Judge to apply the “realistic probability” test to determine if the statute was applied to conduct beyond the generic federal definition. On remand, the Immigration Judge found the petitioner failed to show a realistic probability that the statute covered nongeneric conduct and ordered removal. The BIA dismissed the appeal, upholding the order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed only the legal and constitutional claims, as required by statute. It held that North Dakota’s robbery statute is not unambiguously broader than the federal generic definition of attempted theft and that the petitioner had not demonstrated North Dakota actually prosecutes robbery based on conduct beyond that definition. Thus, the court found the robbery conviction to be an aggravated felony, rendering the petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal, and denied the petition for review. View "Banyee v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including individual Temporary Protected Status (TPS) beneficiaries and an organization, challenged actions taken by the Secretary of Homeland Security. These actions included vacating and terminating Venezuela’s TPS designation and partially vacating Haiti’s TPS designation. TPS provides eligible nationals of designated countries temporary protection from deportation and work authorization due to conditions such as armed conflict or environmental disaster in their home countries. The Secretary’s actions resulted in many TPS holders losing their protection and work authorization, leading to job loss, detention, deportation, and family separation.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court initially postponed the effectiveness of the Venezuela TPS vacatur and later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The district court held that the Secretary exceeded her statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a by vacating and terminating the Venezuela TPS designation and partially vacating Haiti’s TPS designation. The court also found these actions arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and set them aside. The government appealed these rulings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the TPS statute does not grant the Secretary authority to vacate an existing TPS designation or to partially vacate a TPS extension. The court further held that the Secretary’s attempted vacatur and terminations were in excess of statutory authority and invalid. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that setting aside these actions under the APA was appropriate and not barred by statutory limitations on judicial review or injunctive relief. The court affirmed full vacatur of the Secretary’s actions, restoring the prior TPS designations and extensions. View "National TPS Alliance v. Noem" on Justia Law

A citizen of El Salvador entered the United States near El Paso, Texas, in February 2023 without proper documentation. He was detained and placed in removal proceedings, where he conceded removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He alleged that he had been detained and abused by Salvadoran authorities on several occasions, including being beaten and subjected to harsh conditions, and pointed to his and his mother’s limited involvement in a human rights organization as evidence that he was targeted for political reasons. He also described a general pattern of young men in his neighborhood being suspected of gang affiliation by police.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found that, while the petitioner’s testimony was at times lacking in detail, he was not found to be non-credible. However, the IJ concluded that the petitioner failed to establish a nexus between his alleged persecution and any protected ground such as political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The IJ also determined that the mistreatment described did not rise to the level of torture under the CAT and that internal relocation within El Salvador might be possible. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the petitioner had not met the requirements for asylum, withholding, or CAT relief, and rejected claims of an unfair hearing.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that the petitioner had not shown persecution on account of a protected ground, nor that he was more likely than not to face torture if returned. The court also found no due process violation, determining that the IJ adequately developed the record and that there was insufficient evidence of prejudicial translation errors. The petition for review was denied. View "Bonilla-Espinoza v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident who had lived in the United States for nearly twenty years was twice convicted in Massachusetts for violating a statute that prohibits “open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior.” Following his second conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his convictions constituted two “crimes involving moral turpitude” (CIMTs) under federal immigration law. The resident contested this classification, contending that the Massachusetts statute did not require lewd intent and thus did not categorically define a CIMT.An Immigration Judge denied the resident’s motion to terminate proceedings and ordered him removed, finding that the statute was categorically a CIMT. The resident appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the order of removal. The BIA concluded that the statute necessarily required lewd intent and thus qualified as a CIMT.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court applied the categorical approach, examining whether the Massachusetts statute required proof of lewd intent as an element for every conviction. The First Circuit determined that a conviction under the statute did not require a finding of lewd intent or sexual motivation; instead, it could be satisfied by intentional, open exposure that caused shock or alarm, even without a lewd purpose. The court found a realistic probability that Massachusetts would apply the statute to conduct not involving moral turpitude.The First Circuit held that the Massachusetts statute is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because it does not require proof of lewd intent. The court concluded that the BIA erred as a matter of law and reversed the removal order. The petition for review was granted, the BIA’s decision was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cabral Fortes Tomar v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A mother and her minor daughter, citizens of Honduras, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture in the United States. The mother credibly testified that she endured repeated and severe domestic abuse from her partner, Oscar, who was a gang member. The abuse included a stabbing incident and threats, which often occurred when she tried to attend church. She explained that Oscar threatened to kill her if she reported him to police, and that others feared reporting him due to his violent reputation. On one occasion, police briefly arrested Oscar for assaulting a man but released him the next day.An immigration judge with the Department of Justice denied all forms of relief, concluding that the petitioners had not shown the Honduran government was unable or unwilling to protect them, largely because the abuse was never reported to authorities. The Board of Immigration Appeals adopted and affirmed the immigration judge's reasoning, emphasizing the lack of a police report and finding no persuasive challenge to this determination on appeal. The Board also found the Convention Against Torture claim unexhausted because it was not raised before it.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court held that the record compelled the conclusion that reporting the abuse would have been futile and dangerous, given Oscar’s threats and the government’s documented inaction. The court granted the petition for review as to asylum and withholding of removal, remanding for further proceedings on the remaining elements of those claims. The petition was denied regarding protection under the Convention Against Torture, as that claim was unexhausted. The court ordered that each party bear its own costs. View "GUEVARA-SERRANO V. BONDI" on Justia Law