Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Romio Villagomez, a native and citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia, was convicted of felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm under Nevada Revised Statutes § 200.481(2)(b). Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him, arguing that his conviction qualified as a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).An Immigration Judge determined that Villagomez’s conviction was indeed a crime of violence and ordered his removal. Villagomez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal. He then petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether Villagomez’s conviction under Nevada law qualified as a crime of violence. The court noted that a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court referenced its previous decision in United States v. Fitzgerald, which held that the attempt version of the same Nevada statute is categorically a crime of violence.Villagomez argued that the Nevada statute criminalizes mere unwanted touching and allows for conviction where substantial bodily harm occurs recklessly. The court rejected these arguments, holding that causing substantial bodily harm in Nevada necessarily requires Johnson-level force, which is force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court also held that Nevada law requires intentional conduct for battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, and thus, the statute does not encompass injuries caused by reckless deployments of force.The Ninth Circuit concluded that Nevada felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the Board’s removability determination. The petition for review was denied. View "VILLAGOMEZ V. MCHENRY" on Justia Law

Iowa enacted Senate File 2340, which criminalizes the presence of aliens who have illegally reentered the United States within its boundaries. The Act mandates that aliens violating it must return to the country they reentered from and prohibits judges from abating state prosecutions due to pending or possible federal determinations of the alien’s immigration status. The United States sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Act, which the district court granted. Iowa appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa ruled that the United States had standing to sue and could state a cause of action to enjoin the Act. The court found that the United States established a likelihood of success on the merits, showing that federal immigration law preempts the Act under both conflict and field preemption. The court also found that irreparable harm would occur if the Act went into effect and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, examining factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the United States had standing and an equitable cause of action to enjoin the Act. The court found that the Act likely conflicts with federal immigration law, as it obstructs the discretion of federal officials and creates a parallel enforcement scheme. The court also agreed that the United States demonstrated irreparable harm and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Act was affirmed. View "United States v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

Krishna Kishore Geda and Chaya Durga Sruthi Keerthi Nunna, married Indian nationals residing in the U.S. on employment-based nonimmigrant visas, filed I-485 applications for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residents. After waiting nearly eight years, they were informed that their applications were on hold due to the unavailability of the required immigrant visa. Frustrated by the delay, they sued the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its Director, claiming unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed their claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, stating that the Adjudication Hold Policy is a discretionary decision shielded from judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that the decision to delay adjudication of the Gedas' applications under the Adjudication Hold Policy is a discretionary action specified under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which grants the Secretary of Homeland Security broad discretion over the adjustment of status process. Consequently, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes judicial review of discretionary decisions by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The court concluded that only the executive and legislative branches could provide the relief sought by the Gedas. View "Geda v. Director United States Citizenship and Immigration" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program by several states, led by Texas. DACA, established in 2012, allows certain undocumented immigrants who arrived as children to receive a renewable two-year period of deferred action from deportation and eligibility for work authorization. The plaintiffs argue that DACA is procedurally and substantively unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas initially ruled in 2021 that Texas had standing to challenge DACA and that the program was unlawful. The court vacated the program but stayed the vacatur for existing DACA recipients. In 2022, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded the case, noting that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had issued a Final Rule to address procedural defects. On remand, the district court found the Final Rule substantively unlawful and vacated it, maintaining the stay for existing recipients.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Texas has standing to challenge DACA based on the financial burden imposed by the presence of DACA recipients. The court also found that the Final Rule is substantively unlawful as it conflicts with the INA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment but modified the remedial order to limit the injunction to Texas and to sever the forbearance provisions from the work authorization provisions of the Final Rule. The court also maintained the stay for existing DACA recipients pending further appeal. View "Texas v. United States" on Justia Law

The defendants, Namrata Patnaik and Kartiki Parekh, served as the chief executive officer and human resources manager of a semiconductor chip design consulting and staffing company, respectively. They were charged with submitting fraudulent H-1B visa applications by falsely stating that the visa applicants would be working on internal projects on-site, while in reality, they were contracted out to other companies. The government alleged that these false statements were material misrepresentations that could influence the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting the visas.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, accepting the defendants' argument that the false statements could not be materially false because it was unlawful for the government to ask for such information. The district court relied on the ITServe All., Inc. v. Cissna decision and a USCIS memorandum that suggested USCIS could not require details about specific projects or work assignments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that lying on H-1B visa applications constitutes visa fraud even if the government asked questions it was not legally entitled to ask, as long as the misrepresentations could have influenced USCIS at the time they were made. The court emphasized that the government may protect itself against fraud regardless of whether it had the right to ask the questions. The case was remanded for reinstatement of the criminal charges against the defendants. View "USA V. PATNAIK" on Justia Law

A family of four from Ecuador, including Milton Geovanny Vargas Panchi, his wife, and their two children, entered the United States in August 2021. They sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming persecution based on race and membership in the social group of "Indigenous Ecuadorian men." Vargas Panchi cited frequent discrimination, including verbal harassment, threats, and a physical attack after a soccer game, as well as denial of medical treatment due to his indigeneity. He provided declarations, photographs, and country-conditions evidence to support his claims.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and Vargas Panchi conceded removability but applied for asylum and withholding of removal. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found his testimony credible but concluded that the attack after the soccer game was motivated by the opposing team's loss rather than his indigeneity. The IJ also found that other discrimination he faced did not rise to the level of persecution and that his fear of future persecution was not objectively well-founded. Consequently, the IJ denied his asylum and withholding of removal claims.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that there was no clear error in the IJ's finding that the soccer game attack lacked a nexus to a protected ground. The BIA also concurred that the other discrimination Vargas Panchi faced did not constitute persecution. As a result, the BIA concluded that he was not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the agency's findings, including the lack of a nexus between the soccer game attack and a protected ground, and the determination that the denial of medical care did not rise to the level of persecution. The court also agreed that Vargas Panchi did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. Consequently, the petition for review was denied. View "Vargas Panchi v. Garland" on Justia Law

Mateo Alexander Mateo-Esteban and his father, Montejo, natives of Guatemala, entered the United States illegally in 2015. Mateo-Esteban applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention against Torture (CAT). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served both with notices to appear, and they were ordered removed in absentia after failing to attend their hearing. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) later reopened the case. At the reopened hearing, Montejo testified about gang extortion and threats in Guatemala, leading to their flight to the U.S.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Mateo-Esteban’s application, finding that his proposed social group, “people who are afraid of gangs in Guatemala,” was not legally cognizable and that he failed to demonstrate that the Guatemalan government would acquiesce in his torture if he returned. The IJ also found Montejo’s testimony lacked credibility and noted that they could have relocated within Guatemala or that Mateo-Esteban could have lived with his mother. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that the proposed social group was not cognizable and that there was no likelihood of government acquiescence in torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Mateo-Esteban’s proposed social group was not legally cognizable, as it lacked particularity and social distinction. The court also found that the evidence did not compel the conclusion that the Guatemalan government would acquiesce in Mateo-Esteban’s torture. The court noted that the Guatemalan government had made efforts to combat gang violence and police corruption. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit denied Mateo-Esteban’s petition for review. View "Mateo-Esteban v. Garland" on Justia Law

A Kenyan national, lawfully admitted to the United States, was convicted in 2014 and 2019 of felony vehicular fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing police officer under Pennsylvania law. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removability based on these convictions, arguing they constituted crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the removal orders.In 2017, DHS charged the petitioner with removability based on his 2014 fleeing-or-eluding conviction and 2016 simple assault convictions. The Immigration Judge found that simple assault did not constitute a CIMT and terminated the proceedings. However, the judge noted that the fleeing-or-eluding conviction could be a CIMT if combined with another CIMT. In 2019, after the petitioner’s second fleeing-or-eluding conviction, DHS again charged him with removability. The Immigration Judge rejected the petitioner’s res judicata defense and concluded that both fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs, sustaining the charge of removability. The BIA affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA misapplied the categorical approach by relying on a realistic-probability analysis to determine that the fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs. The court held that the Pennsylvania statute under which the petitioner was convicted is divisible and that one of the felony subsections does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, concluding that the petitioner’s convictions did not qualify as CIMTs under the categorical approach, and thus, he was not removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). View "Ndungu v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Emerson Levi Godoy-Aguilar, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 as a permanent resident. In 2015, he was charged and subsequently convicted under California Penal Code (CPC) § 136.1(c)(1) for dissuading a witness by force or threat. He was sentenced to 365 days in Los Angeles County Jail. Following his conviction, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for having committed an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), relating to obstruction of justice.An Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction under CPC § 136.1(c)(1) constituted an aggravated felony of obstruction of justice and issued a removal order. Godoy-Aguilar appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the state offense categorically fell within the federal definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court analyzed whether CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is a categorical match for the generic federal offense of an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The court concluded that CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is indeed a categorical match, as it involves specific intent conduct aimed at obstructing justice, and no pending investigation or proceeding is required. The court found that the elements of the underlying crimes in CPC § 136.1(a)(1)-(2) and (b)(1)-(3) do not sweep more broadly than the generic federal offense. Consequently, the court held that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction and sentence constituted an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice and denied the petition for review. View "GODOY-AGUILAR V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Rasheed Akinsanya, a Nigerian citizen, petitioned for review of the administrative denial of his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Akinsanya argued that he would be tortured by Boko Haram if returned to Nigeria. He had previously served in the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) of the Nigeria Police Force and cooperated in an investigation against his unit for corruption and ties to Boko Haram. After receiving threats and learning of attacks on his family, Akinsanya overstayed his visa in the United States. He was later convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft, leading to his identification as a removable noncitizen.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Akinsanya and his witnesses credible but concluded that he was ineligible for deferral of removal under the CAT. The IJ determined that Akinsanya failed to prove that he would be tortured with the acquiescence of Nigerian officials. The IJ noted the Nigerian government's efforts to combat Boko Haram, including designating it a terrorist organization and engaging in counterterrorism efforts, but found these efforts insufficient to establish government acquiescence.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the Nigerian authorities' inability to protect Akinsanya did not amount to acquiescence. The BIA emphasized that the Nigerian government was taking some measures to combat Boko Haram, and the potential ineffectiveness of these measures was not enough to prove government acquiescence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA did not adequately analyze whether Nigerian authorities would likely acquiesce in Akinsanya's torture. The court noted that the BIA failed to apply the correct legal standard for acquiescence, which requires identifying the government's legal duty and considering whether the steps taken by officials satisfy that duty. The court granted the petition and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Akinsanya v. Garland" on Justia Law