Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal. The court held that petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1956(h) is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(D). The court also held that the IJ's reliance on the forfeiture order was appropriate, and the IJ did not commit clear error in finding that the government established that petitioner laundered more than $10,000 by clear and convincing evidence. View "Barikyan v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's grant of DHS's motion to pretermit petitioner's cancellation of removal application. At issue was whether petitioner's Nebraska criminal attempt conviction qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude. Petitioner's plea arose from his use of a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment.The court held that the criminal impersonation statute underlying petitioner's attempt conviction was a divisible statute. The court applied the modified categorical approach, but was unable to determine which subsection under which petitioner was convicted. The court explained that petitioner had the burden of establishing his eligibility for cancellation of removal, and because he failed to meet his burden, the court upheld the Board's determination that he has not shown such eligibility. View "Pereida v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Oregon Supreme Court allowed review of two cases this case, and Gutale v. Oregon, 395 P3d 942 (2017), requiring it to interpret the meaning and scope of the "escape clause" found in ORS 138.510(3). In both cases, petitioners alleged that their trial counsels were constitutionally ineffective and inadequate under the state and federal constitutions, based on the failure of those attorneys to provide petitioners with information regarding the immigration consequences of their guilty pleas. And petitioners in both cases alleged that their claims fell within the escape clause because they learned of their counsel’s inadequacy only when they were put in deportation proceedings after the statute of limitations had run. Both petitioners argued that they should not have been presumed to know the law any sooner than that. In this case (but not in Gutale), petitioner Ricardo Perez-Rodriquez was told at the time of his plea that there might be immigration consequences to his conviction, even though he was not told that there certainly would be immigration consequences. Furthermore, in this case (but not in Gutale), petitioner alleged that his mental illness and intellectual disability prevented him from knowing that he had a claim for post-conviction relief within the two-year limitations period. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that the laws underlying petitioner’s claim were reasonably available to him. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time-barred under ORS 138.510(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Finding no error in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the post-conviction court. View "Perez-Rodriguez v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Petitioner Abdulla Gutale was an immigrant who pleaded guilty to the crime of sex abuse in the third degree. He alleged in a petition for post-conviction relief that his trial counsel had failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea to a class A misdemeanor and, through that omission, led petitioner to believe that there would be no immigration consequences. Based on that alleged failure, petitioner asserted that his trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate and ineffective under the state and federal constitutions. His petition was filed outside the two-year limitations period, but petitioner alleged that his petition fell within an escape clause because he could not reasonably have known of his grounds for post-conviction relief within the limitations period because neither trial counsel nor the sentencing court gave him any indication that his plea could carry immigration consequences, even when petitioner stated, on the record, that he was pleading guilty in part because he wished to travel and become a United States citizen. Petitioner alleged that he learned of counsel’s inadequacy only when he was placed in deportation proceedings, after the statute of limitations had run. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time-barred under ORS 138.510(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed, based on the principle that “persons are assumed to know laws that are publicly available and relevant to them,” including relevant immigration law. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the post-conviction court and the Court of Appeals: "Our conclusion that the subject of the reasonable- ness inquiry in ORS 138.510(3) is an unrepresented petitioner, rather than counsel, is significant. Although counsel may be responsible for knowing that there may be immigration consequences to a criminal conviction, we do not presume that to be the case for an individual petitioner, unless there is a factual basis for concluding that the petitioner knew that there may be immigration consequences to his or her conviction." View "Gutale v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Santos-Santos, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1999. In 2000, he and his wife attempted to enter Canada but were denied admission and directed back to Port Huron, where they were questioned. Both admitted to entering the U.S. illegally. The Immigration and Naturalization Service personally served Santos-Santos with a notice to appear (NTA), charging him with inadmissibility and ordering him to appear for a hearing in Detroit. The NTA listed his Chicago address and indicated that the hearing date and time were “to be determined.” On May 24, the Detroit immigration court mailed a Notice of Hearing for October 20, to the Chicago address. Santos-Santos failed to appear and was ordered removed in absentia. The order was mailed to the same address. Santos-Santos claims he did not receive that order. In 2018, Santos-Santos moved to reopen the in absentia order, stating he did not receive any notices after the NTA. The BIA upheld the denial of the motion, finding no evidence that the mailings were returned to the immigration court; Santos-Santos did not argue that the notice was addressed incorrectly or that he was having mail delivery problems or report any efforts to determine the status of his proceedings during 17 years before his motion. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Santos-Santos failed to rebut the presumption of delivery. View "Santos-Santos v. Barr" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision dismissing her appeal of the IJ's denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Ninth Circuit granted the petition in part and remanded for reconsideration of petitioner's claims. The panel held that the IJ did not deny petitioner her due process rights to counsel and an unbiased factfinder. In this case, petitioner had reasonable time to locate an attorney and was provided several continuances so she could do so. Although the IJ was rude and harsh with petitioner, petitioner failed to show that the harshness or rudeness prejudiced her.In regard to petitioner's asylum and withholding of removal claims, the Board erred as a matter of law in its analysis and application of the "firm resettlement" rule. In regard to petitioner's claim for relief under the CAT, substantial evidence did not support the Board's determination that petitioner could safely relocate in another area of Cameroon. View "Arrey v. Barr" on Justia Law

Barry was born in Guinea. His father was a member of an opposition political party during the 1990s. The Guinean government took drastic measures to locate Barry’s father and prevent his political activities, including stabbing Barry and beating his mother. Barry is no longer in touch with his father and has no current affiliation with any Guinean political party; a different political party is now in power. In 1998 Barry and his mother arrived in the U.S. Barry was admitted as a temporary visitor. He never returned to Guinea and is now 30 years old. Around 2009, Barry committed crimes, including controlled substances offenses and possession of a firearm. DHS issued a removal order under 8 U.S.C. 1228(b) based on his felony conspiracy to commit robbery conviction. Barry applied for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. 1208.17, testifying that he feared returning to Guinea because of the earlier threats and because he is bisexual. Barry married an American woman, but testified he also had relationships with men; he believes “regular civilians” in Guinea would discover his sexuality and “beat [him] to death.” The IJ found Barry and his mother to be credible but denied Barry’s application because Barry failed to meet his burden of producing evidence that if removed to Guinea he more likely than not would be tortured. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding that Barry failed to substantiate his claims. View "Barry v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order upholding the IJ's finding that petitioner was removeable. The court held that petitioner's 2009 deferred judgment under Iowa Code 907.3(1) was a conviction for immigration purposes under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(48)(A), because he entered a guilty plea and the IJ ordered a restraint on his liberty with deferred judgment and probation. Moreover, the reinstatement of the deferred judgment was not intended to correct a procedural or substantive defect. View "Zazueta v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of Petitioner’s motion to terminate removal proceedings, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding of the lower courts that Petitioner’s convictions qualified as crimes involving moral turpitude.Based on Petitioner’s Missouri convictions for receiving stolen property and passing bad checks, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Petitioner with removability. Petitioner filed a motion to terminate removal proceedings, alleging that DHS did not demonstrate that her convictions qualified as crimes involving moral turpitude. The IJ denied the petition, and the BIA affirmed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that, applying the modified categorical approach, Petitioner’s four Missouri convictions for passing a bad check qualified as crimes involving moral turpitude. View "Dolic v. Barr" on Justia Law

The U Visa, created under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 114 Stat. 1464, grants temporary legal status to victims of specified crimes who have cooperated or are likely to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of those crimes. After three years of holding a U Visa, an alien may apply for permanent resident status (8 U.S.C. 1255(m)(1)). Carmen entered the U.S. in 2005, became a lawful permanent resident under the “U Visa” statute because she was a rape victim, then sought permanent resident status for her son, Dario, under 8 U.S.C. 1255(m)(3), which empowers the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to grant that status to certain family members, including a “child,” of an immigrant in Carmen’s situation. While that application was pending, Dario reached the age of 21, which made him ineligible under a DHS regulation that implements section 1255(m)(3). The Third Circuit upheld the denial of the application. Section 1255(m)(3) unambiguously requires DHS to assess the familial relationship required under that statute as it exists when DHS decides the application, even though this means a child can “age out” of eligibility while an application is pending. The DHS regulation adheres to this unambiguous meaning of the statute. View "Aybar v. Secretary United States Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law