Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

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The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen. In this case, petitioner's application for cancellation of removal was denied for reasons that have since become legally infirm. However, petitioner reentered the country illegally rather than challenge his removal from abroad. Petitioner was re-apprehended by immigration authorities more than a decade later. The court held that his original order of removal was not subject to being reopened because he conceded that he had reentered the United States illegally after having been removed. View "Rodriguez-Saragosa v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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In 2014, Appellant pled guilty to felony aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of a billy club. He also admitted the allegations in the motion to revoke probation in an earlier case. Appellant was sentenced to three years’ probation and a 180-day county jail term. When he entered his pleas the court explained, and Appellant acknowledged, the possible immigration consequences of his convictions. Counsel stated he had advised Appellant accordingly. Appellant was placed in removal proceedings but was granted cancellation of the removal. In 2015, Appellant was found in possession of methamphetamine for sale, resisted arrest, and attempted to destroy evidence; he was placed on probation for five years. In the new criminal case, Appellant pleaded guilty to resisting arrest and was sentenced to 360 days in the county jail. In 2017, Appellant moved to vacate revocation of probation under Penal Code 1473.7(a)(1), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the immigration consequences of his admission and sentence. The court of appeal affirmed denial of the motion. Appellant, a convicted felon currently on formal probation, is not entitled to the relief under section 1473.7. He did not establish ineffective assistance; the trial court would not have tolerated any lesser sentence and it is unlikely Appellant would have gone to trial under the circumstances. View "People v. Cruz-Lopez" on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal because petitioner had derivative citizenship from his citizen father. The court held that the temporary physical separation caused by petitioner's time in federal pretrial juvenile detention did not strip petitioner's father of his "physical custody" of petitioner as that term is used in 8 U.S.C. 1431(a), and therefore petitioner is a U.S. citizen.The court explained that the statutory context and history of the derivative citizenship statute indicate that the "physical custody" requirement ensures that the legal permanent resident child, such as petitioner, has a strong connection to the naturalizing parent and to the United States at the time the child becomes eligible for derivative citizenship. Furthermore, the applicable canons of statutory interpretation also favored construing the term "physical custody" so that such custody does not terminate upon a brief, temporary separation from a parent; and the distinctive nature of federal pretrial juvenile detention—which encourages continued family involvement with the child during such detention—further supports the conclusion that petitioner's father retained "physical custody" over him. View "Khalid v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) final decision denying his application for cancellation of removal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner’s challenges to the BIA’s decision.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States illegally, filed an application for cancellation of removal pursuant to section 240A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). Due in part to criminal charges pending against Defendant of child molestation, an immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s request. The BIA affirmed the IJ and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that jurisdiction was lacking where Petitioner stated no colorable legal or constitutional claim. View "Rivera v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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Tima, a citizen of Cameroon, entered the U.S. in 1989 on a nonimmigrant student visa. To stay past his student-eligibility period, he entered into a sham marriage. Tima pleaded guilty to a felony charge of making false statements, admitting to the sham. The government did not promptly issue a notice to appear. In 1997, Tima married a now-naturalized citizen. They have three children, all U.S. citizens. The government issued Tima a notice to appear in 2003. An IJ sustained charges of marriage fraud (8 U.S.C.1227(a)(1)(G)(ii)), termination of conditional-permanent-resident status (1227(a)(1)(D)(i)), and a moral-turpitude conviction (1227(a)(2)(A)(i)) and ruled that the fraud waiver, under which the Attorney General may waive a removal charge that is based on inadmissibility for misrepresenting a material fact to gain admission, could extend to the marriage-fraud charge but not to the other charges. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied Tima’s petition for review. If the Attorney General grants a fraud waiver, the Act automatically extends that waiver to other removal provisions based on “grounds of inadmissibility directly resulting from such fraud or misrepresentation” (1227(a)(1)(H)), but a removal charge based on a post-admission crime is not based on a “ground of inadmissibility.” View "Tima v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal. The panel held that petitioner was not removable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), as an alien who made a false claim of citizenship to obtain private employment, because there was no basis in the record to conclude that he represented himself as a citizen on a Form I–9. In this case, there was nothing in the record showing that petitioner ever filled out a Form I-9 and thus nothing in the record to show that he made a false representation of citizenship. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Diaz-Jimenez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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Where a state statute contains two layers of disjunctive lists, the analysis outlined in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), for applying the categorical approach, applies to both layers of the statute and must be performed twice. A methamphetamine conviction under California Health & Safety Code 11378 or 11379(a) does not qualify as a controlled substance offense under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order finding petitioner removable for a controlled substance offense. The panel held that the California definition of methamphetamine was broader than the federal definition. The panel also held that the methamphetamine element applicable to a conviction under sections 11378 or 11379(a) was not divisible, because the different varieties of methamphetamine covered by California law were alternative means of committing a single crime rather than alternative elements of separate crimes. Therefore, the panel did not apply the modified categorical approach. View "Atenia Lorenzo v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner sought relief after he and his family were the victims of threats, home invasions, beatings, and killings at the hands of Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional guerillas.The panel held that petitioner was eligible for asylum and entitled to withholding of removal. In this case, the record compelled a finding of past persecution, and substantial evidence did not support the agency's determination that the government successfully rebutted the presumption of future persecution. The panel applied the pre-REAL ID Act standards and held that the harm petitioner suffered had a nexus to a protected ground because the guerillas were motivated by his family's government and military service. The panel also held that the BIA erred as a matter of law in denying petitioner's application for CAT relief. The panel remanded for reconsideration of the CAT claim. View "Quiroz Parada v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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DHS detained Ramirez, a citizen of Guatemala, in 2014, after she illegally entered the U.S. Ramirez stated she feared a neighbor would kill her if she returned to Guatemala because he frequently asked her to have sex, and she refused; she reported this neighbor to the police after he attempted to rape another woman, but the police did not arrest him. Ramirez said this neighbor sent men to confront her at knifepoint, demanding money and threatening to kill her. Ramirez submitted her asylum application (completed with the help of an attorney) and represented herself pro se. The IJ denied the application, stating Ramirez feared a “personal and a potential criminal act,” not “persecution” or “torture” necessary for securing asylum, withholding of removal, or Convention Against Torture relief. The written decision concluded that Ramirez failed to demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The decision repeatedly, erroneously, referred to Mexico and its caption charged Ramirez under the wrong statutory section. The BIA found “harmless error.” Ramirez argued the IJ’s hearing conduct violated procedural due process, failing to provide individualized consideration. The Eighth Circuit denied relief. The IJ gave Ramirez declined repeated opportunities to expound on her claim; on appeal, Ramirez failed to explain the evidence she might have offered had the IJ asked further questions. The BIA's order disavowed any errors and exercised the requisite independent judgment supported by substantial evidence. View "Ramirez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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Alvarenga-Flores, apprehended crossing the U.S. border, gave a “credible fear” interview while he was detained, stating that he was afraid to return to El Salvador, where he is a citizen, because after witnessing a friend's murder, he received threats from the gang members responsible. Alvarenga applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ denied all of relief based on an adverse credibility finding; he also found that Alvarenga’s asylum application was time-barred. The IJ cited inconsistencies in Alvarenga’s testimony about his escapes from gang members who attacked him in a taxi and from gang members who approached him on a bus. Alvarenga had submitted affidavits from his parents; both were written in English, although neither parent speaks English. Alvarenga’s parents lacked firsthand knowledge of the events and “restate[d] things that they can only have heard from [Alvarenga].” The IJ further noted that Alvarenga’s parents could have testified telephonically but did not. The BIA found the discrepancies sufficient to sustain an adverse credibility finding, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4)(C). The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the decisions of the immigration judge and the Board, and the record does not compel a contrary conclusion. View "Alvarenga-Flores v. Sessions" on Justia Law