Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that the county court erred when it concluded that the appointed guardian (Guardian) of her juvenile nephew (Juvenile) had not satisfied 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J) and therefore denied Guardian’s motion to make special factual findings that are necessary to apply for SIJ status under the statute.In denying Guardian’s request to make special findings to be used in immigration proceedings, the county court stated that Juvenile was “not dependent on this court” and that Guardian had not satisfied the dependency or custody component of section 1101(a)(27)(J). During the pendency of this appeal, the Nebraska Legislature amended Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1238(b) to clarify that courts with jurisdiction over initial child custody determinations under section 43-1238(a) also have jurisdiction and authority to make special findings of fact similar to the findings of fact contemplated by section 1101(a)(27)(J). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that because the county court made a custody determination under section 43-1238(a), it erred when it concluded that it had not made a custody determination for purposes of section 1101(a)(27)(J)(i). View "In re Guardianship of Carlos D." on Justia Law

Singh entered the U.S. in 1993. An IJ denied his applications for asylum and withholding of removal (alleging religious persecution) and issued an exclusion order. Before the BIA ruled, he married a U.S. citizen. In 2000, Singh obtained permanent residency. Three years later Singh was arrested in Indiana. In 2004 he pleaded guilty to felony corrupt business influence. An IJ found him removable, citing his conviction for an aggravated felony related to racketeering, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and his conviction, within five years of admission, for a crime involving moral turpitude with a possible sentence of one year or longer. Singh was removed and later readmitted on a visitor visa to pursue post-conviction relief. The Indiana court vacated his felony conviction and accepted Singh’s guilty plea to the crime of deception, a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment “for a fixed term of not more than one (1) year.” The BIA reopened. The government later alleged that Singh had fraudulently procured readmission and overstayed his visa, withdrawing the previous charge of removability, erroneously conceding that the moral-turpitude provision no longer applied. Months later, the government issued a new charge based on the deception conviction. The BIA affirmed a removal order, reasoning that the misdemeanor qualifies as a crime for which a sentence of “one year or longer” may be imposed. Meanwhile, Singh returned to state court, which vacated the deception conviction in exchange for a guilty plea to a different misdemeanor.The Seventh Circuit upheld the BIA's refusal to reopen. To warrant reopening, Singh had to show a substantive or procedural defect in the underlying criminal proceedings; his vacatur was based on a plea agreement. The court rejected alternative arguments that deception does not carry a possible sentence of “one year or longer” and that the government’s concession was binding. View "Singh v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted Frimmel's petition for review of the ALJ's final decision and order declining to suppress employment records ICE obtained through an investigation of Frimmel's compliance with employment verification requirements. ICE had initiated an investigation of Frimmel after the Maricopa Sheriff's Office (MCSO) conducted illegal raids of two restaurants and the home of Bret Frimmel, owner of Frimmel.The panel held that MCSO committed knowing or reckless material omissions and distortions in search warrant affidavits that resulted in a search violating the Fourth Amendment, and the violation was egregious because a reasonable officer should have known the conduct was unconstitutional. The panel also held that ICE's investigation was not attenuated from MCSO's illegal raid and ICE's evidence was the fruit of MCSO's illegal raid. Finally, the panel held that MCSO's conduct easily met the flagrancy standards and it had immigration enforcement in its "zone of primary interest." Therefore, the exclusionary rule would serve to deter MCSO from Fourth Amendment violations by the probability that illegally obtained evidence would not be useful to ICE, even in a civil proceeding. The panel reversed the ALJ's ruling that denied suppression of ICE's evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule, remanding for further proceedings. View "Frimmel Management, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for adjustment of status under the Violence Against Women Act. The court held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's finding that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, knew she was ineligible to vote in the 2004 election and did so anyway. Furthermore, petitioner failed to show clearly and beyond doubt that she was entitled to an entrapment-by-estoppel defense. View "Chernosky v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioners' motions to suppress evidence relating to their immigration status obtained by law enforcement agents during a nighttime search of their residence. The court held that petitioners made a sufficient showing of an egregious constitutional violation to warrant an evidentiary hearing and those facts could support a basis for excluding the evidence. In this case, petitioners presented substantial evidence that the search was improperly based on race; petitioners have raised fair questions as to whether a warrant existed and, if so, whether the search exceeded its scope; and petitioners presented sufficient evidence that, if credited, would show the agents engaged in severe conduct. View "Zuniga-Perez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of Petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the BIA did not err by affirming the IJ’s conclusion that Petitioner did not qualify for relief.Petitioner’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding of removal under the CAT were principally supported by her testimony that she was mistreated in Honduras because of her Afro-Honduran race and physical disability caused by polio. The IJ found that Petitioner had failed to carry her burden in proving either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution and rejected Petitioner’s claims. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holing (1) there was substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s and IJ’s conclusions that Petitioner had not shown past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution; and (2) the BIA did not err by failing to consider Petitioner’s claim for humanitarian asylum. View "Martinez-Perez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

In 2002, Morales pleaded no contest to a drug offense. He served his sentence, voluntarily departed the U.S., and reentered the country. In 2017, while residing in the U.S., he moved to vacate this conviction under the newly enacted Penal Code section 1473.71, hoping to obtain legal status via a “U visa.” Morales contended that but for his conviction, his assistance in a 2009 law enforcement investigation would have made him eligible for that visa, and that he pleaded no contest only because of the ineffective assistance of his counsel, who failed to tell him his conviction would result in his deportation and inability to ever legally reenter the U.S.. The superior court denied his motion without prejudice based on its interpretation of section 1437(b), which addresses the timeliness and due diligence required of motions filed in the face of removal proceedings. The court of appeal reversed. The lower court ignored the plain terms of section 1473.7(a)(1); interpreting subdivision (b) to prevent noncitizens from seeking relief until and unless they are subject to removal proceedings would turn a provision about timeliness and due diligence into one that guarantees delay and renders section 1473.7 ineffectual in many cases. View "People v. Morales" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by plaintiff under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), challenging the U.S. Consulate's denial of his visa application filed on behalf of his wife, who is a native and citizen of Germany. Determining that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability did not strip the district court of that jurisdiction, the panel held that the APA provides no avenue for review of a consular officer's adjudication of a visa on the merits. The panel explained that, rather, the only standard by which it could review the merits of a consular officer's denial of a visa was for constitutional error, where the visa application was denied without a facially legitimate and bona fide reason. In this case, the consular officer's citations to the Immigration and Nationality Act and identification of the wife's criminal history constituted facially legitimate and bona fide reasons for rejecting her visa application. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's denial of the petition for writ of mandamus. View "Allen v. Milas" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner's conviction for felony child endangerment constituted a crime of child abuse that rendered him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Petitioner's conviction of felony child endangerment under California Penal Code 273a(a) was for driving under the influence with a child in his car who was not wearing a seat belt. The panel held that the Board's interpretation of a crime of child abuse, neglect or abandonment in Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503 (BIA 2008), and Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 378 (BIA 2010), was entitled to Chevron deference. Applying that definition in this instance, the panel held that petitioner's California conviction was a categorical match to the crime of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Furthermore, the Board's interpretation applied retroactively to Martinez-Cedillo's 2008 conviction, which occurred before the Board's decisions in Velazquez-Herrera and Soram. View "Martinez-Cedillo v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for USCIS in an action filed by plaintiff, under the Administrative Procedure Act, to renounce his United States citizenship. USCIS denied plaintiff's renunciation request, claiming that he lacked the "intention" necessary to relinquish his citizenship under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Determining that plaintiff's claim was ripe for review, the court held that the Tritten Letter's interpretation of "intention" in 8 U.S.C. 1481 did not warrant Chevron deference. Absent Chevron deference, the court held that USCIS's interpretation was in tension with the statute's structure; USCIS's interpretation rested on a faulty premise that plaintiff did not intend to relinquish his citizenship because one's mere physical presence in the United States did not require exercising a right of citizenship; and USCIS purported to adopt the State Department's interpretation of the intention requirement, but it misconstrued the State Department's approach. Therefore, the Tritten Letter's interpretation of "intention" was impermissible. View "Kaufman v. Nielsen" on Justia Law