Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Meridor arrived in the U.S. about 25 years ago as a political refugee from Haiti and applied for political asylum. He withdrew his application after it lingered for many years. In 2013, DHS notified Meridor that he was subject to removal as a foreign national without a valid visa or passport, and because he had convictions for a crime of moral turpitude and controlled-substance offenses. Meridor applied for asylum and for withholding of removal. An IJ agreed that Meridor was removable and denied his requests for asylum and withholding of removal. Meridor moved for reconsideration, but before the IJ ruled, Meridor applied to USCIS for a U visa (available to certain crime victims). The IJ terminated his removal proceedings, and, acting as the Attorney General’s delegate, stated that she had jurisdiction over the waiver application. Before the IJ could issue a written opinion, USCIS denied Meridor’s applications for a U visa and waiver of inadmissibility. Three weeks later, the IJ granted the waiver, citing “extraordinary circumstances.” The BIA reversed the IJ’s decision, holding that only DHS can grant waivers of inadmissibility for U visa applications and that Meridor did not merit such a waiver. The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The plain language of 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3)(A) gives IJs authority to grant waivers of inadmissibility and the BIA committed legal error in reaching its alternative holding on the merits. View "Meridor v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application of asylum and withholding of removal. The panel held that substantial evidence supported the determination that petitioner's testimony, even if credible, was not persuasive and did not sufficiently demonstrate eligibility for refugee status; the IJ and BIA determinations that petitioner needed corroborating evidence were supported by the record; petitioner did not provide any meaningful corroborating evidence and that failure supported the denial of his applications; and petitioner had sufficient notice that corroborating evidence was required. View "Jie Shi Liu v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Macias, a six-year-old citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1976. In 1990, he was convicted of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated battery, and burglary. While in prison, he was convicted of possession of a weapon by a felon. An IJ ordered Macias removed, prohibiting Macias from returning to the U.S. for five years unless he obtained permission from the Attorney General, In 1995, Macias reentered, purportedly to care for his young son. He claims that border officers waved him into the U.S. without questioning him or asking to see travel documents. For 21 years, he made no attempt to bring his immigration status into legal compliance In 2016, Macias was arrested for aggravated DUI. DHS served him with a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order of Removal. His counsel argued that Macias’s reentry was “procedurally irregular” but lawful because Macias presented himself for inspection and did not attempt to deceive anyone. An ICE deportation officer reinstated the removal order. Prosecutorial discretion was denied due to the serious nature of Macias’s past crimes, his admitted membership in the Latin Kings, and his recent arrest. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The statute providing for reinstatement for aliens who have reentered “illegally” after previously having been removed is not ambiguous. A person who reenters without the consent of the Attorney General during the required period reenters illegally, violating 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A). View "Mendoza v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to deny Petitioner’s application for deferral of removal based on the protection to which he claimed he was entitled under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT).Petitioner, a native of Jamaica and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was charged with removability for being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contended that, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1208.17, he was eligible for deferral of removal under CAT based on the fact that a gang leader in Jamaica with ties to the Jamaican police had threatened to kill him for being an informant. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s claim for deferral of removal. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to show that he was entitled to deferral of removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1208.17(a). View "Morris v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Bonilla, a citizen of El Salvador, first attempted to enter the U.S. illegally in 2010 and was removed but returned. In 2017, Bonilla was arrested and found to be the subject of a removal order. He expressed a fear of persecution or torture if returned to El Salvador. Bonilla first three meetings with an asylum officer ended because Bonilla wanted his attorney present. At the fourth meeting, with his attorney present via telephone, Bonilla stated that he had been extorted by a gang in El Salvador because they thought he received money from his family in the U.S. and had light skin color. They never physically harmed or threatened him and he did not report these incidents to the police. The asylum officer issued a negative reasonable fear determination. Bonilla then appeared before an IJ. Bonilla later declared that he did not request that his attorney be present because he believed his attorney was listening on the phone; his counsel submitted a letter notifying the IJ of counsel’s error in not appearing. The IJ upheld the determination. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Bonilla has not shown that the regulations explicitly invested him with a right to counsel at the IJ’s review hearing and Bonilla was not denied the opportunity to obtain the counsel of his choice; his attorney simply failed him. Bonilla has not shown that he suffered prejudice by the absence of his counsel. View "Bonilla v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Gnatyuk entered the U.S. on a visitor’s visa in 2003. His wife, Melnik, arrived a year later but was apprehended on entry because she presented a fraudulent passport. She requested asylum and passed a credible fear interview. The government later denied her application and placed her in removal proceedings. Gnatyuk sought asylum in 2010, but the government also denied this application, placed him in removal proceedings, and consolidated the cases. Before coming to the U.S., the two operated a clothing business in Ukraine. Melnik testified that, during that period, “racketeers” victimized them through extortion, beat Gnatyuk several times, and once set his car on fire. Local police did nothing. They closed their business and lived separately to ensure Melnik’s safety and the safety of her daughter, who still lives in Ukraine. Gnatyuk’s brother‐in‐law was a recent victim of extortion and beating; Melnik described her hometown as “destroyed.” Melnik owes money for the false Ukrainian passport and testified that her family had faced “constant threats” after her departure. The two had built a business in the U.S., comprising 15 trucks and drivers. The Seventh Circuit denied relief after the BIA affirmed an order of removal. The couple did not demonstrate membership in a cognizable social group nor did they establish a nexus between small‐business‐group membership and their targeting by the criminal group. View "Melnik v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and order of removal. The court held that petitioner's prior violations of two municipal ordinances were misdemeanors that disqualified him from TPS status under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A). The court also held that petitioner suffered no due process prejudice. View "Rubio v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Omissions need not go to the heart of a claim to be considered in adverse credibility determinations, but they must still be weighed in light of the totality of the circumstances and in the context of the record as a whole. The Second Circuit granted petitions for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of asylum and related relief based on adverse credibility grounds. In this case, petitioners testified during removal proceedings regarding the medical attention they received for injuries they sustained from police beatings, but omitted that information from their initial applications and supporting documents. The court held that, in light of the totality of the circumstances and in the context of the record as a whole, the IJ and BIA erred in substantially relying on certain omissions in the record in each case. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Gao v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision granting postconviction relief to Defendant on his claim that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel from an immigration attorney when he tried to get a driver’s license, holding that no right to counsel had attached when Defendant went to the driver’s license station.Defendant’s visit to the driver’s license station triggered a criminal investigation and ultimately a conviction for a previously committed fraudulent practice. The district court set aside Defendant’s guilty plea and sentence, holding that Defendant’s counsel, who was representing Defendant in a pending federal immigration case, breached his essential duty to provide necessary advice to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the right to counsel under Iowa Const. art. I, 10, nor the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached at the time Defendant’s attorney advised Defendant regarding getting a driver’s license, as this was before any investigation or criminal proceedings had begun. View "Hernandez-Ruiz v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the Board's determination that he was subject to removal as an alien who has been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and that he was ineligible for a waiver of removal under former INA 212(c). The Fourth Circuit held that petitioner's 1995 conviction for unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell constitutes a conviction of both an aggravated felony and a CIMT. Therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction to review petitioner's challenges to the BIA's decision, except to the extent they raised constitutional or legal issues. The court also held that petitioner was ineligible for relief under former INA 212(c) because his convictions in 2000 for felony larceny and felony breaking and entering constitute convictions of CIMTs that were not waivable under section 212(c), which was repealed in 1996. Furthermore, petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal under INA 240A(a) because such relief was not available to any alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony. Accordingly, the court dismissed petition number 17-1833, and dismissed in part and denied in part petition number 16-2434. View "Guevara-Solorzano v. Sessions" on Justia Law