Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Jose Maria Garcia-Martinez was a lawful permanent resident at the time of his convictions, and the BIA found him removable, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for having been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT), not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. He was granted review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision, arguing the BIA erred in concluding that Garcia’s Oregon theft convictions were CIMTs. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Oregon theft offenses for which Garcia was convicted did not require a permanent taking of property. Therefore, the panel concluded that, at the time Garcia committed the offenses, they were not crimes involving moral turpitude because for many decades the BIA had required a permanent intent to deprive in order for a theft offense to be a crime involving moral turpitude. "In short, Garcia’s thefts were not CIMTs, and his removal order must be set aside. ... the BIA has changed or updated or revised its rule for the future. Nevertheless, that rule should not be applied to Garcia, who pled and was convicted while the old rule was extant." View "Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Moreno, a 49-year-old citizen of Argentina, was admitted to the U.S. under a grant of humanitarian parole in 1980. In 2015, Moreno pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography under Pennsylvania’s “Sexual abuse of children” statute and was sentenced to five years of probation and required to register as a sex offender. DHS initiated removal proceedings in 2016, charging Moreno as removable for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The Immigration Judge ordered him removed; the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Moreno’s appeal. The Third Circuit denied his petition for review, rejecting Moreno’s argument that, under the categorical approach, the least culpable conduct hypothetically necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute of his conviction is not morally turpitudinous. Pennsylvania’s Pennsylvania’s community consensus, as gauged by case law and legislative enactments, condemns the least culpable conduct punishable under the statute as morally turpitudinous. View "Moreno v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The conviction in this case stemmed from an incident that occurred in the summer of 2010. Defendant, who was attending the University of Vermont (UVM) at that time, met with complainant, another UVM student, to go to a Burlington beach. Complainant later reported that defendant had compelled her to engage in nonconsensual oral sex. In 2012, defendant was convicted of felony sexual assault and sentenced to eight years to life in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing his sentence violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because his immigration status interacted with the to-serve sentence to make him unable to get sex-offender treatment, which meant that he would not be eligible for release under the Department of Corrections’ internal procedures. Without reaching the constitutional question, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded for resentencing, directing the trial court to consider the consequences that defendant’s immigration status had on his sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the court approved nine of the special conditions suggested in the PSI, but amended the proposed language of several. There was not, however, a disclosure of any other conditions that might be imposed on defendant. The probation order, which issued after the hearing, included not only the special conditions discussed on the record and imposed at the sentencing hearing, but also nineteen additional “standard” conditions. Defendant challenged the probation conditions before the Supreme Court, arguing many of the conditions were not orally pronounced during the sentencing hearing and were not sufficiently connected to his crime or rehabilitation. He also argued the sex-offender condition prohibiting defendant from purchasing, possessing, or using pornography or erotica and from going to “adult bookstores, sex shops, topless bars, etc.” was unrelated to his offense and unconstitutionally vague. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded defendant failed to properly preserve his objections to the standard conditions and reviewed them for plain error. Based on the particular provisions and the State’s concessions, the Court struck some conditions, remanded some conditions, and affirmed the remaining. The Supreme Court struck the challenged special condition as unsupported by the record. View "Vermont v. Lumumba" on Justia Law

The conviction in this case stemmed from an incident that occurred in the summer of 2010. Defendant, who was attending the University of Vermont (UVM) at that time, met with complainant, another UVM student, to go to a Burlington beach. Complainant later reported that defendant had compelled her to engage in nonconsensual oral sex. In 2012, defendant was convicted of felony sexual assault and sentenced to eight years to life in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing his sentence violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because his immigration status interacted with the to-serve sentence to make him unable to get sex-offender treatment, which meant that he would not be eligible for release under the Department of Corrections’ internal procedures. Without reaching the constitutional question, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded for resentencing, directing the trial court to consider the consequences that defendant’s immigration status had on his sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the court approved nine of the special conditions suggested in the PSI, but amended the proposed language of several. There was not, however, a disclosure of any other conditions that might be imposed on defendant. The probation order, which issued after the hearing, included not only the special conditions discussed on the record and imposed at the sentencing hearing, but also nineteen additional “standard” conditions. Defendant challenged the probation conditions before the Supreme Court, arguing many of the conditions were not orally pronounced during the sentencing hearing and were not sufficiently connected to his crime or rehabilitation. He also argued the sex-offender condition prohibiting defendant from purchasing, possessing, or using pornography or erotica and from going to “adult bookstores, sex shops, topless bars, etc.” was unrelated to his offense and unconstitutionally vague. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded defendant failed to properly preserve his objections to the standard conditions and reviewed them for plain error. Based on the particular provisions and the State’s concessions, the Court struck some conditions, remanded some conditions, and affirmed the remaining. The Supreme Court struck the challenged special condition as unsupported by the record. View "Vermont v. Lumumba" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner was statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal because he was convicted of a "particularly serious crime," and holding that an applicant's "mental health as a factor in a criminal act falls within the province of the criminal courts and is not a factor to be considered in a particularly serious crime analysis." See Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339 (BIA 2014). The panel held that Matter of G-G-S- was not entitled to Chevron deference where its blanket rule against considering mental health was contrary to Congress's clearly expressed intent that the particularly serious crime determination, in cases where a conviction falls outside the only statutorily enumerated per se category of particularly serious crimes, required a case-by-case analysis. Furthermore, the BIA's interpretation was not reasonable in that the BIA's two rationales for its broad rule – 1) that the Agency could not reassess a criminal court's findings, and 2) that mental health was never relevant to the particularly serious crime determination – were unpersuasive and were inconsistent with the law of this Circuit and the BIA's own decisions. View "Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's decision to deny the I-751 petition, to terminate petitioner's permanent resident status, and to have her removed under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(D)(i). The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that petitioner failed to establish that her marriage was bona fide and not entered into primarily to secure an immigration benefit. In this case, there was substantial direct evidence of the couple's intent at the time of marriage for petitioner to come to the country to enter into a sham marriage for immigration purposes. View "Sagoe v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions for review of the BIA's order denying petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner, on behalf of herself and her son, claimed that her husband and a male neighbor have persecuted her on account of her membership in a particular social group as a Guatemalan woman, and will persecute her again if she returns to Guatemala. The court held that petitioner failed to establish that she suffered past persecution and that she did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. The court explained that persecution was an extreme concept and minor beatings from her husband did not amount to persecution. Furthermore, the harassment and threats from her neighbor also did not cross the threshold to constitute persecution. Finally, petitioner has not demonstrated an entitlement to relief under the Convention Against Torture, because the record did not show more likely than not that she would be subjected to torture in Guatemala. View "Lopez-Coronado De Lopez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions for review of the BIA's order denying petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner, on behalf of herself and her son, claimed that her husband and a male neighbor have persecuted her on account of her membership in a particular social group as a Guatemalan woman, and will persecute her again if she returns to Guatemala. The court held that petitioner failed to establish that she suffered past persecution and that she did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. The court explained that persecution was an extreme concept and minor beatings from her husband did not amount to persecution. Furthermore, the harassment and threats from her neighbor also did not cross the threshold to constitute persecution. Finally, petitioner has not demonstrated an entitlement to relief under the Convention Against Torture, because the record did not show more likely than not that she would be subjected to torture in Guatemala. View "Lopez-Coronado De Lopez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal based on his five criminal convictions for drug offenses under Florida Statute 893.13. The court held that the BIA did not err in concluding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his Florida conviction for sale of cocaine, in violation of Fla. Stat. 893.13(1)(a)(1), constituted "illicit trafficking" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B). View "Choizilme v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal based on his five criminal convictions for drug offenses under Florida Statute 893.13. The court held that the BIA did not err in concluding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his Florida conviction for sale of cocaine, in violation of Fla. Stat. 893.13(1)(a)(1), constituted "illicit trafficking" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B). View "Choizilme v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law