Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Paulo Afamasaga was a native and citizen of Samoa who entered the United States on a nonimmigrant tourist visa and remained beyond the date authorized. After he pleaded guilty to making a false statement when applying for an American passport, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him. Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b, but the immigration judge (IJ) deemed him ineligible on the ground that violating Section 1542 was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed and dismissed his appeal. “Exercising jurisdiction to review questions of law decided in BIA removal orders (see Flores-Molina v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2017)), the Tenth Circuit upheld the BIA’s determination that petitioner was not eligible for cancellation of removal. View "Afamasaga v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review from the denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application, ruling that his claimed social group was not a protected ground under the Immigration and Nationality Act and that Petitioner had not established a nexus between his alleged persecution, or fear of future persecution, and any protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decision, concluding that Petitioner did not establish that any persecution he had suffered or feared was on account of a protected ground. The First Circuit agreed, holding that there was substantial evidence before the IJ and BIA that Petitioner failed to meet his burden to establish a nexus between his alleged persecution and a statutorily protected ground. View "Lopez-Lopez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review from the denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application, ruling that his claimed social group was not a protected ground under the Immigration and Nationality Act and that Petitioner had not established a nexus between his alleged persecution, or fear of future persecution, and any protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decision, concluding that Petitioner did not establish that any persecution he had suffered or feared was on account of a protected ground. The First Circuit agreed, holding that there was substantial evidence before the IJ and BIA that Petitioner failed to meet his burden to establish a nexus between his alleged persecution and a statutorily protected ground. View "Lopez-Lopez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Defendant Ortiz-Lazaro pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1326(a)(1) and (b)(1), and he admitted that he violated the supervised release terms of his prior illegal reentry charge. He appealed his above-guidelines sentence for the supervised release violation as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. In looking at the detailed explanation the district court gave for its deviation from the guidelines, the Tenth Circuit concluded the sentence was reasonable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Ortiz-Lazaro" on Justia Law

The State of Georgia appealed the grant of habeas relief in regard to appellee Jude Ebele Aduka, a citizen of Nigeria. Appellee was arrested in 2007 after being found with numerous counterfeit goods. An indictment was handed down in 2009 and thereafter the State offered a plea deal which appellee rejected because of concerns he had about how such a deal would impact his immigration status. In 2012, however, appellee pleaded guilty to a single count of offer for sale of counterfeit goods. During the plea colloquy with the trial court, appellee stated he understood that entering a guilty plea “may have an impact” on his immigration status and that he understood that his guilty plea “could mean [he] could be deported.” The trial court sentenced appellee to five years of “confinement” to be served entirely on probation and ordered him to pay a fine. In 2015, appellee was arrested by federal immigration agents. Appellee petitioned for habeas relief concerning his 2012 plea and conviction. While the habeas petition was still pending, an immigration judge issued an order for appellee’s removal from the United States due to his counterfeit goods conviction. In his habeas petition, appellee alleged that plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to advise appellee that pleading guilty to a violation of OCGA 10-1-454 would subject him to mandatory deportation for committing an “aggravated felony” under federal law. The habeas court determined plea counsel was deficient by failing to inform appellee that he would be deported if he pleaded guilty to violating OCGA 10-1-454 (c). The habeas court found plea counsel’s informing appellee that he “may” be deported was not reasonable upon a direct reading of the federal statute at issue. The Georgia Supreme Court found appellee's plea counsel did not act outside the wide range of reasonable conduct afforded attorneys who represent criminal defendants, including those defendants who are noncitizens, when he advised appellee that he “could be” deported, rather than informing appellee that he “would be” deported if he entered the plea in question. Accordingly, the Court reversed the habeas court's judgment. View "Georgia v. Aduka" on Justia Law

Flores, a native of Ecuador, legally entered the U.S. in 1978 but overstayed his visa. He obtained legal permanent resident (LPR) status in 1979 and a passport stamp reading “temporary evidence of lawful admission for permanent residence valid until 1‐2‐80.” In November 1979, INS denied Flores’ application for adjustment of status and granted voluntary departure. Flores remained. In 1994, an immigration judge ordered his deportation. The BIA dismissed his appeal. In 2008, Flores was arrested and placed in detention. After three months, he was placed on supervised release. The BIA granted a motion to reopen; an IJ terminated the removal proceedings in 2010. The BIA closed the case in 2011. Flores subsequently received a notice from USCIS requesting that he report for a “[r]eview of your IJ decision, and LPR status.” Flores appeared and received a second passport stamp. He received his green card in 2012. In 2013, Flores sent administrative claims to federal entities under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671‐2680. After those entities denied his claims, Flores filed suit under the FTCA, alleging false arrest and imprisonment and other claims. The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the government. Flores failed to present his claims within the two‐year statute of limitations; the “continuing violation doctrine” did not apply to this action and Flores failed to establish entitlement to equitable tolling of the limitations period. Flores’s injuries ceased after the IJ’s 2010 order. View "Flores v. United States" on Justia Law

Cruz-Martinez, a Mexican citizen, came to the U.S. illegally in 1993. He was removed in 2002 under a stipulated removal order for “Rocha-Martinez,” which was an alias. Cruz-Martinez states that in 2005 armed men who had fought with his brothers threatened him at his mother’s home in Mexico while looking for his brother; the police did nothing. Cruz-Martinez returned to the U.S. without permission. He acquired criminal convictions for aggravated assault, possession of cocaine, and obstructing police. Cruz-Martinez married a U.S. citizen with whom he has a child and is a step-father to her other children. All of his siblings and his mother now reside in the U.S. Some, including his mother, have gone back and forth to Mexico without incident; none have sought protection from persecution. In 2014, DHS reinstated the 2002 removal order. The Chicago Asylum Office made a positive reasonable-fear determination. The IJ denied Cruz-Martinez’s applications for asylum and for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture, finding no clear probability of persecution or torture. The Board affirmed, denying Cruz-Martinez’s request for consideration of new evidence concerning the State Department’s travel warning and news articles about conditions in Mexico. The Seventh Circuit denied his petition for review, upholding the reinstatement of the removal order, the refusal to consider new evidence, and findings that Cruz-Martinez was ineligible for asylum and not eligible for CAT protection. View "Cruz-Martinez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Cruz-Martinez, a Mexican citizen, came to the U.S. illegally in 1993. He was removed in 2002 under a stipulated removal order for “Rocha-Martinez,” which was an alias. Cruz-Martinez states that in 2005 armed men who had fought with his brothers threatened him at his mother’s home in Mexico while looking for his brother; the police did nothing. Cruz-Martinez returned to the U.S. without permission. He acquired criminal convictions for aggravated assault, possession of cocaine, and obstructing police. Cruz-Martinez married a U.S. citizen with whom he has a child and is a step-father to her other children. All of his siblings and his mother now reside in the U.S. Some, including his mother, have gone back and forth to Mexico without incident; none have sought protection from persecution. In 2014, DHS reinstated the 2002 removal order. The Chicago Asylum Office made a positive reasonable-fear determination. The IJ denied Cruz-Martinez’s applications for asylum and for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture, finding no clear probability of persecution or torture. The Board affirmed, denying Cruz-Martinez’s request for consideration of new evidence concerning the State Department’s travel warning and news articles about conditions in Mexico. The Seventh Circuit denied his petition for review, upholding the reinstatement of the removal order, the refusal to consider new evidence, and findings that Cruz-Martinez was ineligible for asylum and not eligible for CAT protection. View "Cruz-Martinez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit upheld Senate Bill 4 (SB4), a Texas law that forbids "sanctuary city" policies throughout the state, and held that SB4's provisions, with one exception, did not violate the Constitution. The court held that none of SB4's provisions conflict with federal law where the assistance-cooperation, the status-inquiry, and the information-sharing provisions were not conflict preempted. The court affirmed the district court's injunction against enforcement of Section 752.053(a)(1) only as it prohibits elected officials from "endors[ing] a policy under which the entity or department prohibits or materially limits the enforcement of immigration laws." The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish that every seizure authorized by the ICE-detainer mandate violated the Fourth Amendment; the "materially limits" phrase had a clear core and was not void for vagueness; and plaintiffs' "commandeering" argument failed. Accordingly, the court vacated in large part the district court's preliminary injunction and remanded with instructions to dismiss the vacated provisions. View "City of El Cenizo v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's denial of cancellation of removal. In this case, petitioner satisfied the third requirement of eligibility for cancellation of removal where the Florida statute under which petitioner had been convicted, trafficking in cocaine, was neither divisible nor had a categorical match in the Controlled Substance Act (CSA). Therefore, the court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Francisco v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law