Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's denial of asylum and withholding where petitioner, a citizen of China, alleged that he was beaten, arrested, jailed, and denied food, water, sleep, and medical care because he tried to stop the police from forcing his wife to have an abortion. The panel held that neither the IJ nor the BIA made a finding that petitioner's testimony was not credible. Under the panel's well-established precedent, the panel was required to treat a petitioner's testimony as credible in the absence of such a finding. The panel adopted this rule before the REAL ID Act and reaffirmed it after its passage. The panel explained that the plain text and context of the statute dictate the conclusion that the REAL ID Act's rebuttable presumption of credibility applies only on appeal to the BIA. In this case, petitioner's evidence was sufficiently persuasive and compelled the conclusion that the harm he suffered from the government due to his resistance to his wife's forced abortion rose to the level of past persecution. Furthermore, petitioner and his wife were not similarly situated, and thus the BIA erred in concluding that the wife's voluntary return to China undermined petitioner's own fear of future persecution. The panel remanded for the district court to exercise its discretion in granting petitioner asylum relief, and to grant him withholding relief. View "Ming Dai v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the BIA's retroactive application of a new rule expanding the types of larceny that qualify as a crime of moral turpitude. The Second Circuit granted the petition for review and reversed the BIA's latest order issued on remand. In this case, the BIA issued Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. 847 (B.I.A. 2016), on the same day that it dismissed petitioner's appeal. The court considered the factors in Lugo v. Holder, 783 F.3d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 2015), to determine that the BIA could not apply the new rule in Diaz-Lizarraga retroactively. In light of the second and third Lugo factors, the court found that Diaz-Lizarraga was an abrupt departure from BIA precedent and that petitioner relied on the previous rule when pleading guilty. The court then applied the categorical approach and the BIA's pre-Diaz-Lizarraga standard for larceny crimes involving moral turpitude, and held that the BIA erred when it found that petitioner's larceny conviction constituted such a crime. View "Obeya v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Melesio‐Rodriguez was brought to the U.S. from Mexico as a child. She became a lawful permanent resident in 1998, at age 19. She was convicted of battery and attempted possession of cocaine in 2003 and of attempted burglary in 2013. DHS charged her as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)) and alleged that she had failed to disclose a cocaine‐possession conviction that occurred before she was granted permanent resident status. An immigration judge found Melesio‐Rodriguez removeable. She told the judge she did not wish to apply for protection but expressed interest in applying for a U‐visa, for which she was potentially eligible as a victim of domestic violence. The judge stated that only USCIS had jurisdiction over U‐ visas and that he would order removal. Melesio‐Rodriguez said she understood “really clearly” and confirmed twice that she wished to accept the order as final rather than reserve an appeal. Melesio‐Rodriguez then retained counsel and unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, arguing that the IJ had not fully apprised her of her rights; one of her convictions was not a “conviction” for immigration purposes; she was eligible for a U‐visa; she feared torture in Mexico; and the removal proceedings violated the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit dismissed her petition for review. Melesio‐Rodriguez is a criminal alien and the question of her waiver of appeal is factual in nature, so the court lacked jurisdiction, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). View "Melesio-Rodriguez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Melesio‐Rodriguez was brought to the U.S. from Mexico as a child. She became a lawful permanent resident in 1998, at age 19. She was convicted of battery and attempted possession of cocaine in 2003 and of attempted burglary in 2013. DHS charged her as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)) and alleged that she had failed to disclose a cocaine‐possession conviction that occurred before she was granted permanent resident status. An immigration judge found Melesio‐Rodriguez removeable. She told the judge she did not wish to apply for protection but expressed interest in applying for a U‐visa, for which she was potentially eligible as a victim of domestic violence. The judge stated that only USCIS had jurisdiction over U‐ visas and that he would order removal. Melesio‐Rodriguez said she understood “really clearly” and confirmed twice that she wished to accept the order as final rather than reserve an appeal. Melesio‐Rodriguez then retained counsel and unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, arguing that the IJ had not fully apprised her of her rights; one of her convictions was not a “conviction” for immigration purposes; she was eligible for a U‐visa; she feared torture in Mexico; and the removal proceedings violated the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit dismissed her petition for review. Melesio‐Rodriguez is a criminal alien and the question of her waiver of appeal is factual in nature, so the court lacked jurisdiction, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). View "Melesio-Rodriguez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Mondragon-Gonzalez was admitted to the U.S. in 2008 on an immigrant visa. In 2015, he pled guilty under Pennsylvania law, which provides: A person commits an offense if he is intentionally in contact with a minor" for specified purposes. He admitted to sending a girl pictures of his penis and was sentenced to a prison term of eight to 23 months. DHS commenced deportation proceedings. An Immigration Judge found that Mondragon-Gonzalez’s conviction fell within 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which provides that “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted of . . . a crime of child abuse . . . is deportable.” The BIA dismissed his appeal, comparing the elements of the state conviction and its interpretation of a “crime of child abuse” in Matter of Velazquez-Herrera. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Given Congress’ intent to make crimes that harm children deportable offenses, the BIA’s interpretation is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. The Pennsylvania law requires intentional contact with a minor for the purpose of engaging in sexual abuse of children; it meets the generic definitional requirement in section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), that the act constitute maltreatment of a child such that there was a sufficiently high risk of harm to a child’s physical or mental well-being. View "Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen. The court held that whether petitioner diligently pursued her rights to warrant equitable tolling was a question of fact and the jurisdictional bar of 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C) applied. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition. View "Penalva v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of her appeal from the denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal of herself and, derivatively, her two minor children, holding that Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of her claims failed.At her removal proceedings before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner testified and submitted a declaration in support of her applications for asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that she suffered past persecution in Honduras on account of her membership in her family and that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her familial ties. The IJ denied Petitioner’s applications and ordered Petitioner and her minor children removed. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit agreed with the IJ and the BIA, holding that Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of her asylum claim failed, and so, for identical reasons, did her challenge to the denial of her withholding of removal claim also fail. View "Sosa-Perez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of her appeal from the denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal of herself and, derivatively, her two minor children, holding that Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of her claims failed.At her removal proceedings before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner testified and submitted a declaration in support of her applications for asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that she suffered past persecution in Honduras on account of her membership in her family and that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her familial ties. The IJ denied Petitioner’s applications and ordered Petitioner and her minor children removed. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit agreed with the IJ and the BIA, holding that Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of her asylum claim failed, and so, for identical reasons, did her challenge to the denial of her withholding of removal claim also fail. View "Sosa-Perez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied petitions for review of a precedential decision of the BIA finding petitioner ineligible for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act based on the ground that she provided "material support" to a terrorist organization, notwithstanding that she acted under duress. The court held that Chevron deference was warranted in this case and joined several other circuits in holding that the material support bar does not except aliens who acted under duress. The court rejected petitioner's claim that aliens who are rendered ineligible for relief from removal by the material support bar have a due process right to some means of obtaining an exemption based on duress, other than the currently‐available procedure for obtaining a discretionary waiver from the Department of State or the Department of Homeland Security. View "Hernandez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied petitions for review of a precedential decision of the BIA finding petitioner ineligible for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act based on the ground that she provided "material support" to a terrorist organization, notwithstanding that she acted under duress. The court held that Chevron deference was warranted in this case and joined several other circuits in holding that the material support bar does not except aliens who acted under duress. The court rejected petitioner's claim that aliens who are rendered ineligible for relief from removal by the material support bar have a due process right to some means of obtaining an exemption based on duress, other than the currently‐available procedure for obtaining a discretionary waiver from the Department of State or the Department of Homeland Security. View "Hernandez v. Sessions" on Justia Law