Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture Act (CAT). In her applications, Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, claimed that she was persecuted, and faced future persecution, at the hands of Salvadorian gang members on account of her family membership. An immigration judge (IJ) credited Petitioner’s testimony as true but nonetheless denied relief. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner could not satisfy her claim for asylum, and therefore, she also could not satisfy her claim for withholding of removal; and (2) Petitioner provided no basis by which the court should reverse the BIA’s decision denying her protection under the CAT. View "Villalta-Martinez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The limitation imposed by 8 U.S.C. 1429 applies only to the executive branch's adjudication of naturalization applications, and only when removal proceedings are pending pursuant to an arrest warrant. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim of plaintiffs' complaint requesting adjudication of their naturalization applications under 8 U.S.C. 1447(b). In this case, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint where it was not the executive branch and there was no pending removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest. Therefore, section 1429 was not applicable. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Yith v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

The limitation imposed by 8 U.S.C. 1429 applies only to the executive branch's adjudication of naturalization applications, and only when removal proceedings are pending pursuant to an arrest warrant. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim of plaintiffs' complaint requesting adjudication of their naturalization applications under 8 U.S.C. 1447(b). In this case, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint where it was not the executive branch and there was no pending removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest. Therefore, section 1429 was not applicable. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Yith v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff in an action seeking derivative U.S. citizenship. The court held that plaintiff could not prove his derivative citizenship as a matter of law under the former Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 301(a)(7), 309(a). Plaintiff was born out of wedlock in Mexico and is the son of an U.S. citizen father and Mexican national mother. In this case, plaintiff could not prove as a matter of law that he was legitimated before turning twenty-one years old and thus could not claim derivative citizenship. View "Gonzalez-Segura v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, seeking relief from the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal (WOR) and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In his application, Petitioner claimed that he had experienced past persecution and faced a clear probability of future persecution in Honduras on account of his family membership. The IJ determined that Petitioner failed to establish that he had suffered - or was likely to suffer in the future - harm that was sufficient to constitute persecution and related to his family membership. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that none of Petitioner’s claims warranted relief from the decisions of the IJ and BIA. View "Ruiz-Escobar v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, sought review of the BIA's decision denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings so that he could apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In this case, petitioner filed his motion to reopen ten years after the immigration court issued his prior removal order, and thus failed to comply with the ninety-day statutory deadline. The Fifth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over petitioner's collateral challenge to the prior removal order; the court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's claim that conditions in his country of origin had materially changed; petitioner's contention that the BIA violated his due process rights was unavailing, because this court has held that an alien has no liberty interest in a motion to reopen and therefore cannot establish a due process violation in the context of reopening proceedings; and the court rejected petitioner's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part the petition for review. View "Mejia v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding petitioner eligible for deportation under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for possessing a controlled substance in violation of Oklahoma law. Petitioner challenged both the determination that the Oklahoma schedule of controlled substances was a categorical match to the federal schedule and that in order to terminate his order of removal he was required to show a "realistic probability" that Oklahoma actually prosecutes cases involving substances not included in the federal schedules. The Fifth Circuit has held that the realistic probability test applies whenever the categorical approach is employed. See United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc). The court held that petitioner waived this viable argument under Castillo-Rivera, because he never suggested that the realistic probability test was satisfied in this case. Because petitioner waived his only viable argument, the court denied relief. View "Rodriguez Vazquez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Appellate Court dismissed as moot Petitioner’s appeal from the judgment of the habeas court, which denied his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction of assault in the second degree. The Appellate Court concluded that the habeas appeal was rendered moot by Petitioner’s subsequent deportation to Haiti where any relief provided in relation to Petitioner’s assault conviction would have no effect on his ability to lawfully reenter the United States or to become a citizen. The court specifically ruled that a prior unchallenged conviction of threatening in the second degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-62(a), which the court concluded constituted a crime of moral turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act, would remain as an impediment to Petitioner’s reentry. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 53a-62(a) is a divisible statute because it lists potential offense elements in the alternative, not all of which constitute crimes of moral turpitude as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) of the Act; and (2) therefore, the Appellate Court improperly determined that Petitioner’s threatening conviction constituted a crime of moral turpitude that rendered moot his habeas appeal challenging his assault conviction. View "St. Juste v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. The DC Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part, holding that petitioner's constitutional claims challenging the order of removal itself and those addressing the sufficiency of the IJ's order denying the instant motion were not properly exhausted in immigration proceedings or were otherwise not properly before the court. In regard to petitioner's remaining claims challenging the BIA's decision, the court could not say that the BIA abused its discretion or that its opinion lacked reasoned consideration when it denied petitioner's motion to reopen. View "Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Correa-Diaz, born in 1986 and a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. as a minor without parole. In 2004, Correa-Diaz, age 18, was arrested, based on a police officer’s observation of his conduct, in an automobile, with a 14-year-old girl. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on an attempted sexual intercourse charge and six months’ imprisonment a sexual contact charge. The court suspended Correa-Diaz’s sentence. In 2015, Correa-Diaz pleaded guilty to counterfeiting in violation of Indiana law and was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A). The Seventh Circuit denied relief, rejecting arguments that the 2004 offenses did not constitute aggravated felonies. Because the Indiana law focused solely on the age of the participants, section 1101(a)(43)(A) requires the age of the victim to be less than 16. That condition was satisfied and “perform[ing] or submit[ing] to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct” in violation of Indiana law constitutes “sexual abuse,” defined by the BIA “[t]he employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children.” View "Correa-Diaz v. Sessions" on Justia Law