Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Neither the Due Process Clause nor the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., creates a categorical right to court-appointed counsel at government expense for alien minors. The Ninth Circuit held that, to the extent the IJ failed to provide all the trappings of a full and fair hearing in this case, any shortcomings did not prejudice the outcome because the IJ adequately developed the record on issues that were dispositive to petitioner's claims for relief. The panel also held that the IJ was not required to advise petitioner of a separate state court process that could ultimately form the predicate for petitioner's application for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status with the IJ. Finally, the panel declined to reversed the Board's denial of petitioner's asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims, because substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination that petitioner was ineligible for relief. View "C.J.L.G. v. Sessions" on Justia Law

A California conviction for carjacking under Penal Code section 215(a) does not qualify as a crime of violence. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of a final order of removal. The panel held that Nieves-Medrano v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2010), which held that a conviction for carjacking under section 215 is categorically a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), cannot stand in light of Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010), which held that the physical force that a crime of violence entails must be violent force. Because section 215 did not require the use of violent force that Johnson required, the California statute was not a crime of violence. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Solorio-Ruiz v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition filed by Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, seeking judicial review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT).At the conclusion of a removal hearing, an immigration judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner was ineligible for either asylum or withholding for removal because she was unable to show that the harm she suffered in Guatemala was on account of a statutorily protected ground. The IJ also concluded that Petitioner did not qualify for CAT protection. After the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision, Petitioner sought judicial review. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, as to Petitioner’s application for asylum and for withholding of removal, the IJ and BIA supportably found that Petitioner failed to establish a nexus between the claimed harm and a statutorily protected ground. View "Perez-Rabanales v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition filed by Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, seeking judicial review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT).At the conclusion of a removal hearing, an immigration judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner was ineligible for either asylum or withholding for removal because she was unable to show that the harm she suffered in Guatemala was on account of a statutorily protected ground. The IJ also concluded that Petitioner did not qualify for CAT protection. After the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision, Petitioner sought judicial review. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, as to Petitioner’s application for asylum and for withholding of removal, the IJ and BIA supportably found that Petitioner failed to establish a nexus between the claimed harm and a statutorily protected ground. View "Perez-Rabanales v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Zhakypbaev, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, was admitted to the U.S. in 2012 as a nonimmigrant student to attend the Computer Systems Institute. His wife and three daughters were admitted based on his status. He did not attend the Institute after February 4, 2013, and in April 2013, filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. His claims were premised on the events surrounding the ouster of president Bakiev in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010. Zhakypbaev claimed that based on his connections with the Bakiev family and with Bakiev’s political party, he was persecuted and had a well‐founded fear of future persecution in Kyrgyzstan. The Immigration Judge denied relief, holding that Zhakypbaev failed to demonstrate that his persecution was connected to his political opinion or social group and that he had failed to establish a threat of torture. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The IJ and BIA could properly conclude that Zhakypbaev’s claimed persecution, a beating and questioning, did not result from his political affiliation but from his potential as a witness because of his employment. View "Zhakypbaev v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Zhakypbaev, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, was admitted to the U.S. in 2012 as a nonimmigrant student to attend the Computer Systems Institute. His wife and three daughters were admitted based on his status. He did not attend the Institute after February 4, 2013, and in April 2013, filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. His claims were premised on the events surrounding the ouster of president Bakiev in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010. Zhakypbaev claimed that based on his connections with the Bakiev family and with Bakiev’s political party, he was persecuted and had a well‐founded fear of future persecution in Kyrgyzstan. The Immigration Judge denied relief, holding that Zhakypbaev failed to demonstrate that his persecution was connected to his political opinion or social group and that he had failed to establish a threat of torture. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The IJ and BIA could properly conclude that Zhakypbaev’s claimed persecution, a beating and questioning, did not result from his political affiliation but from his potential as a witness because of his employment. View "Zhakypbaev v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Perez-Montes, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. in 1989 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2001 he joined the Army and served two tours in Afghanistan. He received a general discharge under honorable conditions. He did not apply for citizenship. In 2010, he was convicted of a cocaine offense, which led to removal proceedings. Aliens convicted of aggravated felonies remain eligible for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Perez-Montes contended that he was at risk of being tortured or killed in Mexico because his military training would lead drug gangs to recruit him; that the police would fail to protect him; and that the Mexican government tortures its citizens who return after serving in the U.S. military. An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected his argument. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting an argument that the Board and the IJ erred by asking, instead, whether he faced a “substantial risk” of torture in Mexico. “More likely than not” is the standard burden in civil litigation and does not impose a statistical or quantitative requirement; “substantial risk” means nothing more than the “more likely than not” standard. It was designed, rather, as a non-quantitative restatement of that standard. View "Perez-Montes v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protections under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner argued that his diagnosis with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder should have been taken into consideration when determining whether inconsistencies in his statements rendered his testimony not credible. The court held that petitioner failed to show that no reasonable fact-finder could make an adverse credibility finding and thus the court must defer to the determinations of the IJ and BIA that his testimony was not credible. View "Singh v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Williams, a citizen of Guyana and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, immigrated to this country in 1970, when he was 13 months old. He has no family in Guyana; his relatives are all U.S. citizens. In 2006, he pleaded guilty to five counts of first-degree forgery under Georgia Code 16-9-1(a). Williams was charged as removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The IJ denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Georgia forgery statute is broader than generic forgery because it criminalizes the use of a fictitious name when signing a document and because the statute does not require a showing of prejudice. The BIA later denied a motion for reconsideration under the Supreme Court’s 2016 "Mathis" decision, arguing that Georgia’s forgery statute is indivisible under Mathis and is overbroad in criminalizing some conduct that does not relate to forgery--false agency endorsements. The Third Circuit denied relief. Employing a “looser categorical approach,” the court considered the “logical connection” between the federal offense the state law and concluded that concerns about the inauthenticity or unauthorized nature of a written instrument establish a logical relationship between common law forgery and false agency endorsement. The intent elements are “directly analogous” and target the “same core criminal conduct.” View "Williams v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's orders of removable and denial of cancellation of removal based on petitioner's felony conviction for battery of a child by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling blood, seminal fluid, urine, or feces, in violation of Florida Statute 784.085. The court held that petitioner was removable because his conviction was a crime of child abuse within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i); petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); and the IJ did not deprive petitioner of due process by granting the government's motion to pretermit his application for cancellation of removal. View "Pierre v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law