Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

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The First Circuit upheld the finding of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that Petitioner was eligible for removal because third-degree larceny under Connecticut law is an aggravated felony. Removal proceedings were commenced against Petitioner on the basis that his conviction was for a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43) (G) and was therefore an “aggravated felony” that rendered him eligible for removal. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit upheld the BIA’s decision, holding that Petitioner’s Connecticut conviction is a conviction for a “theft offense” because the range of conduct sufficient to sustain a conviction for third-degree larceny under Connecticut law is not broader than that which constitutes a “theft offense” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. View "De Lima v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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Petitioner sought review of the BIA's order finding him both removable and inadmissible on the basis of his North Carolina deferred prosecution agreement for soliciting a child by computer to commit a sex act. The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that the BIA properly found petitioner removable and inadmissible for being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, petitioner's deferred prosecution agreement was a "conviction" under the Immigration and Nationality Act; the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" was not void for vagueness in the removability and admissibility contexts; and, even if petitioner's crime was not considered "violent or dangerous," his application would still be denied. View "Boggala v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of petitioner's application for asylum after an IJ granted her application for withholding of removal. The court held that the interplay between 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) and 1158 was unambiguous: Congress intended that aliens subject to reinstated orders of removal be precluded from applying for asylum. Furthermore, barring illegal reentrants from applying for asylum did not violate international law. The court also held that, because the petition was not timely filed as to the underlying order of removal, the court lacked jurisdiction to address petitioner's objections to the June 2015 hearing. View "Calla Mejia v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction for petit theft in Idaho was a crime involving moral turpitude. The panel held that the record of conviction was inadequate to determine whether petitioner was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude because the record did not identify any particular statute of conviction and Idaho's petit theft statute was overbroad under the categorical approach. Under the modified categorical approach, the record contained insufficient information to determine whether petitioner was convicted under one of the Idaho petit theft provisions meeting the generic federal offense. The panel also held that the BIA erred by deciding at Chevron step one that an "offense under" 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) did not include the within-five-years element. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Lozano-Arredondo v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion granting the petition for review of the BIA's decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal based on his conviction for delivery of a controlled substance under Oregon Revised Statutes 475.992(1)(a). The panel held that because the Controlled Substances Act does not punish soliciting delivery of controlled substances, section 475.992(1)(a) could not be a categorical match to an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Furthermore, because section 475.992(1)(a) was indivisible, the modified categorical approach does not apply. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Sandoval v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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DLS petitioned for review of the ALJ's decision finding DLS liable for numerous violations of sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b), which requires employers to verify that their employees are legally authorized to work in the United States. The ALJ also ordered DLS to pay civil money penalties. In regard to the ALJ's finding that DLS was liable for section 504 violations, the panel held that one charge was untimely under the applicable statute of limitations, so that violation could not stand. The panel denied the petition for review as to the ALJ's finding of the other 503 violations because DLS was not entitled to good faith defenses, and as to the ALJ's determination of the penalty amount. View "DLS Precision Fab LLC v. ICE" on Justia Law

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Ildefonso-Candelario, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. unlawfully, allegedly in 1996. In 2015, he pled guilty in Pennsylvania state court to a misdemeanor count of obstructing the administration of law or other governmental function. Immigration and Customs Enforcement took Ildefonso-Candelario into custody, charging him with being removable as an alien present without admission or parole, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). At his first hearing, Ildefonso-Candelario stated his intention to seek cancellation of removal. Counsel for ICE suggested that Ildefonso-Candelario’s prior conviction might qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude, which would render him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C). The Immigration Judge issued an initial holding that the offense was “categorically” a crime involving moral turpitude. ICE added a charge of removability for committing a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge then ordered Ildefonso-Candelario removed to Mexico. A single member of the BIA upheld the ruling “[f]or the reasons given by the Immigration Judge.” The Third Circuit remanded to the BIA, holding hold that 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5101 is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The offense encompasses non-fraudulent as well as fraudulent conduct, such as obstruction by “physical interference or obstacle.” View "Ildefonso-Candelario v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

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After the IJ denied petitioner's motion to reopen her removal proceedings as untimely, the BIA dismissed her appeal. The Fifth Circuit denied her petition for review, holding that she has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating she was entitled to equitable tolling. The court explained that it could not consider the BIA's or the IJ's refusal to reopen sua sponte, and the court rejected petitioner's claim that her removal proceeding was a gross miscarriage of justice. View "Gonzalez-Cantu v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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After USCIS discovered that an employee had illegally issued nearly 200 certificates of naturalization to individuals who had not satisfied the requirements to become U.S. citizens, the government canceled certificates of naturalization to individuals, including plaintiffs here, without seeking a court order. The State Department then administratively revoked or refused to renew their passports. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims that the government's revocations of their certificates of naturalization and their passports violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and due process because they took place through administrative rather than judicial process; affirmed the dismissal of their claims of ethnicity or national origin discrimination; and reversed insofar as the district court held that any plaintiff was barred by failure to exhaust administrative remedies from challenging under the Administrative Procedure Act the government's failure to afford plaintiffs the review the law requires, and pursuing 8 U.S.C. 1503 claims in the correct venues. Accordingly, the court remanded in part. View "Xia v. Tillerson" on Justia Law

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Victoria‐Faustino, a Mexican national who entered the U.S. illegally in 1991, is the father of five U.S. citizens. He returned to Mexico to visit his family in 1999 but re‐entered illegally in January 2000. During a 2000 traffic stop, Victoria‐Faustino provided the police with a false identity; he then served a term of two years’ imprisonment for obstruction of justice.In 2015, he was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol. DHS instituted removal based upon his 2000 conviction, which DHS determined constituted an aggravated felony such that he was subject to expedited removal procedures. Victoria‐Faustino indicated that he wished to contest or to request withholding of removal, based on his fear of persecution and torture upon removal to Mexico. He never challenged DHS’s determination that he was removable based upon his 2000 Illinois conviction. An Asylum Officer determined that while Victoria‐Faustino was credible, he had not established that he was entitled to asylum. The Seventh Circuit remanded. While the statute generally strips courts of jurisdiction to consider an appeal of a Final Administrative Removal Order, they retain jurisdiction to determine whether the underlying conviction upon which it is based is an aggravated felony. Victoria‐Faustino’s 2000 conviction was not properly classified as an aggravated felony. View "Victoria-Faustino v. Sessions" on Justia Law