Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A Kenyan national, lawfully admitted to the United States, was convicted in 2014 and 2019 of felony vehicular fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing police officer under Pennsylvania law. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removability based on these convictions, arguing they constituted crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the removal orders.In 2017, DHS charged the petitioner with removability based on his 2014 fleeing-or-eluding conviction and 2016 simple assault convictions. The Immigration Judge found that simple assault did not constitute a CIMT and terminated the proceedings. However, the judge noted that the fleeing-or-eluding conviction could be a CIMT if combined with another CIMT. In 2019, after the petitioner’s second fleeing-or-eluding conviction, DHS again charged him with removability. The Immigration Judge rejected the petitioner’s res judicata defense and concluded that both fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs, sustaining the charge of removability. The BIA affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA misapplied the categorical approach by relying on a realistic-probability analysis to determine that the fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs. The court held that the Pennsylvania statute under which the petitioner was convicted is divisible and that one of the felony subsections does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, concluding that the petitioner’s convictions did not qualify as CIMTs under the categorical approach, and thus, he was not removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). View "Ndungu v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Emerson Levi Godoy-Aguilar, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 as a permanent resident. In 2015, he was charged and subsequently convicted under California Penal Code (CPC) § 136.1(c)(1) for dissuading a witness by force or threat. He was sentenced to 365 days in Los Angeles County Jail. Following his conviction, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for having committed an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), relating to obstruction of justice.An Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction under CPC § 136.1(c)(1) constituted an aggravated felony of obstruction of justice and issued a removal order. Godoy-Aguilar appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the state offense categorically fell within the federal definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court analyzed whether CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is a categorical match for the generic federal offense of an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The court concluded that CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is indeed a categorical match, as it involves specific intent conduct aimed at obstructing justice, and no pending investigation or proceeding is required. The court found that the elements of the underlying crimes in CPC § 136.1(a)(1)-(2) and (b)(1)-(3) do not sweep more broadly than the generic federal offense. Consequently, the court held that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction and sentence constituted an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice and denied the petition for review. View "GODOY-AGUILAR V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Rasheed Akinsanya, a Nigerian citizen, petitioned for review of the administrative denial of his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Akinsanya argued that he would be tortured by Boko Haram if returned to Nigeria. He had previously served in the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) of the Nigeria Police Force and cooperated in an investigation against his unit for corruption and ties to Boko Haram. After receiving threats and learning of attacks on his family, Akinsanya overstayed his visa in the United States. He was later convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft, leading to his identification as a removable noncitizen.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Akinsanya and his witnesses credible but concluded that he was ineligible for deferral of removal under the CAT. The IJ determined that Akinsanya failed to prove that he would be tortured with the acquiescence of Nigerian officials. The IJ noted the Nigerian government's efforts to combat Boko Haram, including designating it a terrorist organization and engaging in counterterrorism efforts, but found these efforts insufficient to establish government acquiescence.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the Nigerian authorities' inability to protect Akinsanya did not amount to acquiescence. The BIA emphasized that the Nigerian government was taking some measures to combat Boko Haram, and the potential ineffectiveness of these measures was not enough to prove government acquiescence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA did not adequately analyze whether Nigerian authorities would likely acquiesce in Akinsanya's torture. The court noted that the BIA failed to apply the correct legal standard for acquiescence, which requires identifying the government's legal duty and considering whether the steps taken by officials satisfy that duty. The court granted the petition and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Akinsanya v. Garland" on Justia Law

Beata Zarzecki, a Polish national, entered the United States on a six-month tourist visa in 1989 and remained in the country illegally. In 1998, she married a U.S. citizen, and they have a daughter who is also a U.S. citizen. In 2013, removal proceedings were initiated against her, and she applied for adjustment of status based on her marriage. Her application was complicated by a 2005 conviction for felony aggravated driving under the influence, resulting in a fatal accident. She was sentenced to nine years in prison and served over eight years. Additional incidents included a 2003 arrest for aggravated assault and a 2004 charge for driving without insurance.The immigration judge denied her application for adjustment of status, citing the severity of her criminal record and insufficient evidence of addressing her mental health issues. The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) reviewed the case de novo and upheld the immigration judge's decision, emphasizing the egregious nature of her offense and finding that her mitigating factors did not outweigh the adverse factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Zarzecki's petition, focusing on whether the Board committed legal or constitutional errors. Zarzecki argued that the Board failed to properly consider her mental health evidence and did not apply the correct standard of review. The court found that the Board did consider her mental health evidence and applied the appropriate standard of review. The court concluded that the Board did not commit any legal or constitutional errors and dismissed Zarzecki's petition for lack of jurisdiction, as discretionary decisions regarding adjustment of status are not subject to judicial review. View "Zarzecki v. Garland" on Justia Law

Lorenzo Vazquez-Alba, a Mexican citizen, lawfully entered the United States in 1986 and became a legal permanent resident in 1987. In 2008, he was arrested in Dallas, Texas, for using a juvenile as a paid prostitute and supplying her with drugs. He pleaded guilty to aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury and was sentenced to five years of probation. In 2011, he pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 and was sentenced to eight years in prison for both the 2008 and 2011 offenses. He lost his permanent resident status and was deported to Mexico in 2017. He later unlawfully reentered the U.S. and was arrested in 2022 for driving a stolen vehicle and failing to register as a sex offender.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas indicted Vazquez-Alba for illegal reentry and failure to register as a sex offender. He pleaded guilty to both counts. The presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated an advisory guideline range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment. Vazquez-Alba objected to the PSR’s grouping determination and the indictment’s failure to allege a prior aggravated felony. The district court overruled his objections and sentenced him to 45 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Vazquez-Alba argued that his 2011 conviction was not an aggravated felony and that his counts should be grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. The court held that his 2011 conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). The court also found that the district court correctly declined to group the counts and properly treated his state-court sentences separately. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence. View "USA v. Vazquez-Alba" on Justia Law

A Brazilian family of three, William Reginaldo Rodrigues, Debora Soares Gomes Rodrigues, and their son, W.T.S.R., entered the United States without inspection and were charged with being in the country without admission or parole. They sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming fear of persecution from drug traffickers due to a debt owed by Mr. Rodrigues's brother-in-law, Daniel, and from the Gardingo family, a powerful political family in Brazil. Mr. Rodrigues testified that drug traffickers threatened Daniel and that the Gardingo family coerced employees to support their political candidates, but admitted that neither group had directly harmed or threatened his family.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Mr. Rodrigues's testimony credible but concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ determined that the Petitioners had not shown that they would be singled out for persecution by either the drug traffickers or the Gardingo family. Consequently, the IJ denied their applications for asylum and withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, finding no clear error or compelling reason to overturn it.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found that the IJ's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence, noting that generalized country conditions reports and Mr. Rodrigues's testimony did not demonstrate a specific threat to the Petitioners. The court also agreed that the Petitioners failed to show an objectively reasonable fear of persecution based on their political opinion, as there was no evidence that the Gardingo family was aware of or would target Mr. Rodrigues for his political beliefs. The petition for review was denied. View "Rodrigues v. Garland" on Justia Law

Lucila Magana-Magana, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States unlawfully in 1995. She faced a series of abusive relationships, including with Rafael Camacho and later Clyde Wakefield, whom she married in 2017. Wakefield's abuse led to their separation and eventual divorce. In 2007, Magana-Magana was arrested by U.S. Border Patrol, and the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. She applied for cancellation of removal, citing hardship to her U.S. citizen children, but her request was denied by an immigration judge (IJ) and later by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Her appeal to the Ninth Circuit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.In January 2022, Magana-Magana filed a motion with the BIA to reopen her removal proceedings, citing new evidence of abuse by Wakefield and her application for benefits under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The BIA denied her motion, stating it was untimely and that she had not demonstrated "extraordinary circumstances" to waive the one-year filing deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded it had jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination of "extraordinary circumstances" under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), as it involved applying a legal standard to undisputed facts. The court found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that the abuse suffered by Magana-Magana did not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" and that there was no basis to conclude that such circumstances caused the delay in filing her motion. The court also rejected her other arguments, including her unexhausted equitable-tolling claim and the BIA's discretionary decision not to reopen the case sua sponte. The petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "MAGANA-MAGANA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Ranjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, arrived in the United States without documentation in May 2013 and sought asylum, claiming persecution due to his political opinions and association with the Mann Party. An immigration judge (IJ) found inconsistencies in Singh's testimony regarding his political affiliations and the circumstances of his father's death, leading to an adverse credibility determination. Consequently, the IJ denied Singh's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, and the Ninth Circuit denied Singh's petition for review.In July 2021, Singh filed a motion to reopen his case, citing new fears of persecution due to India's passage of agricultural reform laws. He claimed eligibility for relief based on his religion as a Sikh, his membership in a particular social group of farmers, and his political opinions opposing the new laws. Singh submitted new evidence, including a sworn statement detailing threats and assaults against his family by the police and members of the BJP Party, medical records, photos of protests, land ownership papers, and news articles about the persecution of farmers and Sikhs.The BIA denied Singh's motion to reopen, concluding that the new evidence was immaterial due to the prior adverse credibility determination. The BIA found that Singh's new affidavit and documentary evidence did not sufficiently establish an individualized risk of persecution or torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA improperly relied on the prior adverse credibility determination to discredit Singh's new evidence. The court held that the BIA must credit evidence supporting a motion to reopen unless the facts asserted are inherently unbelievable. The Ninth Circuit granted Singh's petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the BIA to address Singh's new factual assertions independently of the prior adverse credibility finding. View "SINGH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Eulalia Mateo-Mateo and her two minor children, all Guatemalan citizens, sought asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. Mateo claimed that the mother of her children's father had physically and verbally abused her and would continue to do so if she returned to Guatemala. Mateo and her children were apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol upon arrival, and the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. They conceded removability, and Mateo applied for asylum and related relief.An Immigration Judge (IJ) held a hearing and found Mateo credible but denied her applications. The IJ concluded that Mateo did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. The IJ also found that Mateo did not establish that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect her. Mateo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), which affirmed the IJ's decision, finding no clear error in the IJ's findings and deeming Mateo's claim for CAT relief waived due to lack of meaningful identification of error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed both the IJ's and the Board's opinions. The court found that Mateo's claims for asylum, humanitarian asylum, and withholding of removal failed for two independent reasons: she did not challenge the finding that the Guatemalan government was not unable or unwilling to protect her, and substantial evidence supported the finding that she did not experience persecution on account of a protected ground. The court also concluded that Mateo's CAT claim failed on exhaustion grounds, as she did not challenge the Board's finding of waiver. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Mateo-Mateo v. Garland" on Justia Law

Vitaliy Chmukh, a native and citizen of Ukraine, came to the United States as a refugee in 2001. In 2017, he was involved in using a stolen vehicle to steal packages from porches, leading to his arrest. He pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen vehicle under RCW § 9A.56.068 and possession of heroin under RCW § 69.50.4013. He was sentenced to 43 months for the stolen vehicle charge and 24 months for the controlled substance charge, serving 38 months in total.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Chmukh with removability based on these convictions, alleging that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and that the controlled substance conviction violated the Controlled Substances Act. An immigration judge (IJ) found him removable and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime, making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Chmukh’s conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) because it matched the generic federal offense of possession of stolen property, requiring possession, actual knowledge that the property was stolen, and intent to deprive the owner of the property. The court also found that the conviction was a particularly serious crime, barring withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). The court rejected Chmukh’s arguments that the statute was overbroad and that the agency erred in its analysis. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Chmukh’s petition for review. View "CHMUKH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law