Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around an appeal by Karnail Singh, who was charged with using a fraudulently procured passport and making false statements to immigration officials. Singh pleaded guilty to using a fraudulently procured passport in exchange for a lower sentencing range and the dismissal of the false-statement count. After his plea, the government initiated proceedings to revoke his citizenship. In response, Singh petitioned for a writ of coram nobis, requesting the district court to set aside his conviction, arguing he would not have pled guilty had he known his plea could affect his citizenship. The district court denied his petition, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court ruled that Singh's plea was knowing and satisfied due process, regardless of whether he understood it could impact his citizenship. They found that the district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the court to inform the defendant that a conviction may have immigration-related consequences.Singh also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing his attorney incorrectly informed him that his plea would only affect his citizenship if he committed another crime. The court rejected this claim, citing lack of evidence that Singh would have chosen to go to trial if he had received different advice from his counsel.Finally, the court rejected Singh's argument that the district court should have held a hearing before ruling on his coram nobis petition, stating that the record clearly showed Singh was not entitled to coram nobis relief. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) regarding whether a money laundering conspiracy conviction constitutes a "particularly serious crime" that would bar withholding of removal under immigration law.The petitioner, David Annor, a citizen of Ghana and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, had pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, related to a romance fraud scheme. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Annor, who sought withholding of removal and deferral under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the BIA both determined that Annor's conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime", thus barring his eligibility for withholding of removal.Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found that the BIA had erred in two ways. Firstly, it had incorrectly applied its own precedent by analysing the elements of the wrong statute, instead of the correct one under which Annor was convicted. Secondly, it failed to consider whether the nature of Annor's offense indicated that he posed a danger to the community, a key factor in determining if a crime is "particularly serious".Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion. View "Annor v. Garland" on Justia Law

Jesus Gabriel Navarro Guadarrama, a Mexican citizen, pursued a review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision dismissing his appeal for adjustment of status and the subsequent denial of his motion to reconsider. Navarro Guadarrama contended that the Board used an incorrect legal standard in considering his application.Navarro Guadarrama entered the U.S. in 1995 and was later convicted of several crimes. His criminal record led to the initiation of removal proceedings against him. Navarro Guadarrama applied for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), which enables an alien illegally in the U.S. to seek relief from removal if they meet certain requirements. His application was denied by an Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board due to his criminal record and evidence of bad character.Navarro Guadarrama petitioned the court to review the Board's decision. He argued that the Board used the legal standard from a previous case, Matter of Mendez-Moralez, which applies to aliens requiring waivers, instead of Matter of Arai, which applies to those who don't require waivers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to consider Navarro Guadarrama’s petitions for review and that the Board did not apply the wrong legal standard. The court found that even if the Board cited the "wrong" case, there was no indication that, in substance, it applied the wrong standard. Therefore, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Guadarrama v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, Melchor Orozco-Orozco, was appealing his conviction for being a previously removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Orozco had previously been removed from the U.S. following a conviction for carjacking under California Penal Code § 215, which had been classified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).The appellate court examined whether this classification was correct. It found that the California Supreme Court had determined that a person could commit carjacking under § 215 without the intent to steal required by a generic theft offense. This court held that Orozco's carjacking conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the INA because § 215 was not a categorical match for a “theft offense.”The appellate court reversed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) and sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment on equal protection grounds. View "USA V. OROZCO-OROZCO" on Justia Law

Edgardo Vasquez Castaneda, a citizen of El Salvador, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his ongoing civil detention during his ongoing withholding-only proceedings was unlawful. He had been ordered removed to El Salvador but had instigated withholding-only proceedings claiming a fear of torture if returned to El Salvador. The length of his detention, pending the resolution of those proceedings, had exceeded the six-month period deemed presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas v. Davis. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition.Vasquez Castaneda failed to show that his removal from the U.S. was not significantly likely to happen in the foreseeable future. The court reasoned that ongoing withholding-only proceedings, even lengthy ones, do not present the same risk of "indefinite and potentially permanent" detention at issue in Zadvydas. Furthermore, the court rejected Vasquez Castaneda's assertion that due process requires another bond hearing before an immigration judge given his circumstances. The court emphasized that Vasquez Castaneda's ongoing detention was directly tied to the proceedings he voluntarily initiated and that these proceedings would eventually conclude. The court also noted that Vasquez Castaneda had received ample process since his detention began, including a bond hearing, numerous custody reviews by ICE, and the very habeas proceedings in question. View "Castaneda v. Perry" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the asylum petition of a Zambian woman, Milly Kalulu. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had previously dismissed her appeal of a removal order. Kalulu, who identifies as a lesbian, claimed past persecution in Zambia on account of her sexual orientation.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the BIA that substantial evidence supported the agency’s adverse credibility determination, meaning that the agency was justified in not believing Kalulu’s testimony. The court found that Kalulu had been inconsistent in her testimony regarding when she made plans to remain in the United States and her alleged fear of future persecution if she returned to Zambia. Her demeanor during the removal hearing also contributed to the adverse credibility determination.However, the Ninth Circuit identified errors in the agency’s evaluation of the documents Kalulu provided as evidence to support her claims of past persecution. The court found that the agency had misread some of these documents and had improperly discounted their evidentiary value based on these misreadings.The court therefore granted Kalulu's petition for a review of the BIA's decision and instructed the agency to reconsider whether the documents, when properly read, independently prove Kalulu’s claims of past persecution. The court made no determination as to whether these documents do provide such proof or whether Kalulu merits any of the relief for which she applied. View "KALULU V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Kwok Sum Wong, a citizen of China and Hong Kong native, petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming a decision by an Immigration Judge (IJ) that found him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The IJ had found Wong removable because he had been “convicted” of “two crimes involving moral turpitude.” Wong's offenses were theft by deception under New Jersey law and second-degree forgery under New York law. The BIA determined that a "conviction" under immigration law hinges on whether the offenses were criminal proceedings with “minimum constitutional protections”, including proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and certain rights such as the right to a speedy trial and protection against double jeopardy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the BIA’s interpretation of “conviction” was not arbitrary or capricious and that the “minimum constitutional protections” test to ascertain a “conviction” retroactively applies to Wong’s case. The court further held that second-degree forgery under New York law is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), and that the statutory phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is not unconstitutionally vague. The court thus denied the petition for review. View "Wong v. Garland" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Loing Yar, a native and citizen of South Sudan who entered the United States as a refugee, appealed an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that denied his claim under the Convention Against Torture for deferral of his removal to South Sudan. Yar was convicted of distributing methamphetamine in the United States, which is considered an aggravated felony, leading to the initiation of removal proceedings against him. Yar sought relief from removal, claiming he would be likely tortured if he was returned to South Sudan due to his membership in the minority Nuer tribe and his relationship to his father, an advocate for South Sudanese independence who died under suspicious circumstances.An immigration judge initially granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, but the BIA vacated this decision, concluding that the potential harm identified by the immigration judge did not rise to the level of torture, as defined by the law. The BIA further asserted that the likelihood of detention or imprisonment alone does not amount to torture, and the indeterminate "chance" of future upheaval or ethnic cleansing did not meet the legal standard of "more likely than not" under the regulations implementing the Convention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied Yar's petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision. The court found no error in the BIA's legal conclusion that Yar failed to establish a likelihood of torture upon return to South Sudan. The court agreed with the BIA's interpretation of the Convention Against Torture, emphasizing that the definition of torture is a legal issue and whether a predicted factual outcome meets the definition of "torture" is a question of law. View "Yar v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a father, Rene S., who appealed against the jurisdictional and dispositional orders which removed his daughter, F.V., from his custody. F.V. had traveled to the United States from Honduras with her father when she was nine years old, but when they were unable to cross the border together, she entered the United States alone. She was placed with her maternal uncle in California by immigration authorities, who obtained her mother's consent for the placement. The juvenile court sustained allegations that F.V.'s uncle sexually abused her. The court asserted jurisdiction based on the parents allowing F.V. to enter the U.S. unaccompanied with no plan in place for her care.At the disposition stage, the juvenile court indicated it was inclined to return F.V. to her mother in Honduras. However, the court declined to place F.V. with her father, finding his housing situation was unstable and F.V. did not want to relocate to Texas, where her father now lived. As a result, F.V. remained in foster care.The California Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's orders, holding that there was insufficient evidence of future risk to F.V. to support jurisdiction. The court noted that at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, F.V. was no longer in her uncle's custody, and there was no indication that her mother and father would allow her uncle access to her. Given that the father was now in the U.S. and able to care for her, and the mother wanted her back in Honduras, the court found it unlikely that the circumstances leading to F.V.'s entry into the U.S. alone would recur. View "In re F.V." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Sandeep and Sarvani Thigulla, were lawful nonimmigrant workers seeking to become lawful permanent residents (LPRs) in the United States and had applied for approval of their Form I-485 applications with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). When the Department of State decreased the number of applications it would adjudicate, the Thigullas sought a temporary restraining order against the Director of USCIS, compelling the prompt adjudication of their applications under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied this order, and the Thigullas appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dismissed the case due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the decision to delay adjudicating the Thigullas' applications falls under the Attorney General’s discretionary authority as stated in 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) and that this authority is protected from judicial review by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that this interpretation went against congressional intent, citing clear textual evidence in the statute. The court concluded that it lacked the jurisdiction to review the decision to delay adjudication of the applications, even under the Administrative Procedure Act. Consequently, the court dismissed the case and remanded it to the district court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Thigulla v. Jaddou" on Justia Law