Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

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Petitioner, a citizen and native of Nepal, seeks review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from an oral decision of the IJ denying petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that the IJ applied an incorrect and overly stringent legal standard in evaluating petitioner's claim of political persecution where petitioner may satisfy his burden for establishing eligibility of asylum by demonstrating that a statutorily protected ground, such as political opinion, was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant. The IJ erred when it determined that petitioner failed to show that political persecution was "the central reason" for his persecution by the Nepali Maoists. The court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. The pending motion for stay of removal was denied as moot.View "Acharya v. Holder" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Toviave immigrated to the U.S. in 2001, and, using false immigration documents, later brought four young relatives from Togo to live with him. He made the children cook, clean, and do laundry. He occasionally made the children babysit for his girlfriend and relatives. Toviave would beat the children if they misbehaved or failed to follow rules. Toviave provided for the children by working two jobs and did yard work. Toviave bought the children sports equipment and let them play soccer. The children exercised with him and went on family trips together. Toviave emphasized education; many of his punishments stemmed from problems related to schoolwork. He hired a tutor to teach the children English. He imposed mandatory study periods. The children always attended school. Teachers began to suspect abuse. Michigan authorities investigated. The children were removed from the house. The Department of Homeland Security obtained a warrant and discovered false immigration documents in Toviave’s home. Toviave pled guilty to visa and mail fraud charges, and the government dropped a human trafficking charge. Toviave was convicted of four counts of forced labor, 18 U.S.C. 1589. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that Toviave’s treatment of the children was “reprehensible,” but was not forced labor.View "United States v. Toviave" on Justia Law

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Ramirez-Coria illegally entered the United States in 1995. He was placed in removal proceedings in April 2009, and conceded removability at his initial hearing. At a second hearing in May 2009, Ramirez-Coria requested a continuance in order to complete his application for cancellation of removal (Form EOIR-42B). The instructions on Form EOIR-42B directed Ramirez-Coria to: (1) attend an appointment with a nearby immigration Application Support Center (ASC) to provide biometric information; (2) obtain a biometrics confirmation notice from the ASC and bring it to his hearing as evidence he had provided his biometrics; and (3) file the completed Form EOIR-42B application and all supporting documentation with the Immigration Court within the time period directed by the IJ. Because Ramirez-Coria had not included the biometric information with his application, the IJ rescheduled his hearing to October 2010, eighteen months away. The IJ later rescheduled the hearing to January 2012, but shortly before the hearing Ramirez-Coria’s counsel moved to withdraw, stating his client had “lost interest in his own case.” New counsel entered an appearance, and the hearing was rescheduled for March 2, 2012. Ramirez-Coria submitted his supporting documentation for the application two days before the March hearing, but without the biometric information. At the hearing, counsel told the IJ that Ramirez-Coria had gone to an ASC the day before and provided his fingerprints. Officials at ASC would not take Ramirez-Coria’s fingerprints without any identification or birth certificate, and counsel stated that Ramirez-Coria had lacked any form of identification for the past three years until the day before the hearing. The government stated that DHS had no record that Ramirez-Coria had provided his fingerprints. Counsel did not dispute the IJ’s observation that the DHS obviously had not had time to complete its required investigation. The IJ also noted that all of Ramirez-Coria’s supporting documentation for the application was untimely because the Immigration Court Practice Manual requires all filings to be submitted at least fifteen days in advance of the hearing. Counsel stated her office had been diligent in contacting Ramirez-Coria, but he had been working a lot and it had been difficult to get the documentation. The IJ determined that Ramirez-Coria’s application for cancellation of removal should have been deemed abandoned and concluded that he had not shown good cause for failing to complete the biometric requirement in over two years, nor had his counsel ever informed the IJ that he was having any problem obtaining his fingerprints. The IJ dismissed his application, but granted Ramirez-Coria voluntary departure. Ramirez-Coria appealed to the BIA, which concluded the IJ properly deemed his cancellation-of-removal application abandoned, and it dismissed his appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit denied Ramirez-Coria's petition. View "Ramirez-Coria v. Holder" on Justia Law

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After a sting operation involving two confidential informants and substantial audio and video surveillance, federal law enforcement officers caught Jesus Cabral-Ramirez ("Mr. Cabral") and Defendant-Appellant Maria Gutierrez de Lopez ("Ms. Gutierrez") attempting to transport an undocumented alien from El Paso, Texas to Denver, Colorado. A federal grand jury indicted Ms. Gutierrez on one count of conspiring to transport undocumented aliens. At trial, the Government elicited testimony from Border Patrol Agent Brian Knoll about the immigration status of the individual Ms. Gutierrez allegedly conspired to smuggle. Agent Knoll also provided expert testimony that transporting undocumented aliens away from U.S./Mexico border regions to the interior of the United States significantly reduced the odds of apprehension by law enforcement. The confidential government informants testified anonymously about several conversations they had with Ms. Gutierrez tending to support the charges against her. Although the Government provided the defense with the informants’ general criminal backgrounds, compensation records from federal agencies, and immigration status, it did not disclose their actual identities. Defense counsel cross-examined both witnesses in light of the disclosures provided by the Government, but was unable to conduct adequate independent pre-trial investigation. The jury convicted Ms. Gutierrez as charged, and the district court sentenced her to three years of probation. She appealed, arguing: (1) Agent Knoll’s testimony about the smuggled individual’s immigration status introduced inadmissible testimonial hearsay in violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause; (2) Agent Knoll’s expert testimony about the alien-smuggling trade was not helpful to the jury under Federal Rule of Evidence 702(a); and (3) the Government’s use of anonymous testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Gutierrez De Lopez" on Justia Law

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Ernest McKenzie’s Canadian birth certificate listed the wrong birth date. Because he used that birth certificate to become a naturalized United States citizen, his United States Certificate of Naturalization also listed the wrong birth date. After he was naturalized, he got his birth certificate corrected; he tried to amend his naturalization certificate so that his paperwork listed the correct date. Relying on 8 C.F.R. 334.16(b) (2011) to establish the district court’s jurisdiction, he filed suit requesting that the district court order United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to issue a naturalization certificate with his correct date of birth. "The request seems fair and simple enough," but the Tenth Circuit could not help: "With limited exceptions not applicable here, Congress has withdrawn jurisdiction over naturalizations from the district courts. In addition, the district court lacked jurisdiction because Dr. McKenzie’s invocation of 334.16(b) is not a colorable claim." The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).View "McKenzie v. US Citizenship & Immigration" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, an Indonesian citizen, unsuccessfully applied for asylum eight years ago and now seeks to reopen that earlier request. The court concluded that petitioner failed to show changed country conditions - the threshold requirement she must satisfy because she was late in filing her motion to reopen. Because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner failed to make this threshold showing, the court denied the petition for review.View "Sugiarto, et al. v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. However, the IJ committed a clear error of fact in its factfinding, and this erroneous finding was recited in the BIA’s order denying Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and remanded for further proceedings, holding that, in light of principles of exhaustion, it was for the BIA to address in the first instance Petitioner’s arguments that the error affected the BIA’s ruling both as to whether he had a well-founded fear of future persecution and as to whether there was a nexus between the persecution and a protected ground.View "Perez v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, came to the United States on a tourist visa and later conceded removability. Petitioner sought relief, including withholding of removal, claiming that she had a problem in Guatemala with a group of people known as guerillas. An immigration judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, concluding that Petitioner had not established past persecution or a clear probability of future persecution, and therefore, Petitioner was not eligible for withholding of removal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner was not eligible for withholding of removal, where the BIA’s determination that Petitioner had not suffered past persecution was not erroneous, and substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner had not established a likelihood of future persecution.View "Bedoya Lopez de Zea v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a Guatemalan national residing in the United States, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his application for "special rule" cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), 8 U.S.C. 1229b. The court concluded that petitioner did bear the burden of proving that he entered the United States free from official restraint; but he met that burden by relying on a border patrol agent's written report, which, the BIA expressly found, constituted the only credible and reliable evidence in the record that showed that the agent first saw petitioner at milepost nine, seventeen miles beyond the border; and, applying the principle in United States v. Hicks and numerous other cases, the court concluded that a party may rely on its opponent's evidence to make its own case. The Attorney General offered no reason why this principle does not apply in the immigration context and the court saw none; petitioner came under restraint as soon as the agent spotted him at milepost nine; the BIA failed to provide a reasoned explanation for departing with its own precedent; and every circuit to consider the issue has concluded that an alien first observed by a government agent miles beyond the border has entered free from official restraint - regardless of whether the party bearing the burden of proof has offered evidence of the circumstances of the alien's entry. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded to the BIA to consider petitioner's application for NACARA relief in light of the proper legal standard. View "De Leon v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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In 2002, Appellant, a Mexican native and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to felony theft. Eight years later, deportation proceedings were initiated against Appellant, in part due to Appellant’s 2002 felony theft conviction. Appellant filed a petition asking the district court to vacate his 2002 plea under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) or, alternatively, through a writ of coram nobis. In his petition, Appellant claimed that his counsel was ineffective during the plea process by failing to disclose the possible immigration consequences related to his plea. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition and writ of coram nobis, concluding (1) Appellant’s petition was time barred by the PCRA, and (2) Appellant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel, as Appellant knew or should have known that there were potential immigration consequences related to his plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to preserve his argument that his attorney affirmatively misrepresented the immigration consequences of his plea; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s petition for a writ of coram nobis, as Appellant had a remedy available to him through the PCRA. View "Oseguera v. State" on Justia Law