Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Coyomani, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1997. In 2000, he was convicted in Illinois state court of domestic battery and of resisting a peace officer. DHS placed Coyomani in removal proceedings, charging him as an alien present without being admitted or paroled, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and as an alien who had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Coyomani denied that he had committed a CIMT but conceded removability and sought cancellation of removal as a non-lawful permanent resident. The IJ concluded that Coyomani was removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal, because he was present without being admitted or paroled. Although Coyomani was convicted of domestic battery, which qualifies as a CIMT, the IJ found that Coyomani “probably” satisfied the statutory exception due to the brevity of his sentence and that resisting a peace officer did not qualify as a CIMT. The IJ found that Coyomani was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of “an offense under” section 237(a)(2), “an aggravated felony.” The same crime—state domestic battery—had different implications for different sections of the INA. The Board of Immigration Appeals and Seventh Circuit upheld the determination.View "Coyomani-Cielo v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought discretionary relief from removal by way of a special rule cancellation under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (NACARA), 8 U.S.C. 1231 (b)(3)(i). Determining that petitioner's challenge was timely and that the court had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252, the court concluded that the BIA did not err in concluding that the persecutor bar rendered him ineligible for special rule cancellation of removal where petitioner oversaw the investigation and capture of twenty to fifty civilians and guerrillas, and where petitioner most likely understood that the individuals investigated or arrested would be tortured or killed. The court rejected petitioner's remaining contentions and denied the petition for review.View "Quitanilla v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an unauthorized alien, was injured while working for his employer (Defendant) and was later was laid off during Defendant’s seasonal reduction of workers. Plaintiff sued, alleging that Defendant violated the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for his disability and by retaliating against him for filing a workers’ compensation claim. During discovery, Defendant learned that Plaintiff had misrepresented to Defendant his eligibility under federal law to work in the United States. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s action was barred by the doctrines of after-acquired evidence and unclean hands; and (2) the application for those doctrines was not precluded by S.B. 1818, which extends state law employee protections and remedies to all individuals regardless of immigration status. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) S.B. 1818 is not preempted by federal immigration law; and (2) the doctrines of after-acquired evidence and unclean hands are not complete defenses to a worker’s claims under California’s FEHA.View "Salas v. Sierra Chem. Co." on Justia Law

In 1997, Martin Ramirez was arrested and charged with possession of up to one ounce of marijuana and two other misdemeanors. He appeared in metropolitan court for a custody arraignment two days later and pleaded guilty to all three charges on the advice of his public defender. In 2009, Ramirez learned that his guilty pleas in 1997 rendered him "inadmissable to the United States." Ramirez filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the district court, seeking to vacate his metropolitan court guilty pleas on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. In "New Mexico v. Paredez," (101 P.3d 799), the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a criminal defense attorney who represents a noncitizen client "must advise that client of the specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty" to pending charges. An attorney’s failure to do so will be ineffective assistance of counsel if the client is prejudiced. The question in this case was whether the holding in Paredez applied retroactively and, if it did, whether Ramirez has a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel that could justify withdrawal of his pleas. The Court held that Paredez applied retroactively to 1990, the year that the Court began to prohibit courts from accepting a guilty plea from a defendant without: (1) ascertaining that the defendant understood that a conviction may have an effect on the defendant’s immigration status; (2) obtaining an affidavit from the defendant that the judge personally advised the defendant of the possible effect of a conviction on the defendant’s immigration status; and (3) obtaining a certification from the defendant’s attorney that the attorney had conferred with the defendant and explained in detail the contents of the affidavit signed by the defendant. These requirements were not new in 1997 at the time Ramirez pleaded guilty, and they were "designed to ensure a guilty plea is made knowingly and voluntarily." View "Ramirez v. New Mexico" on Justia Law

Defendant, a noncitizen of the United States, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and received a sentence of probation. Defendant was subsequently arrested for driving without a license and taken into custody by immigration authorities. Contending that his defense counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. A superior court allowed the motion, concluding that Defendant’s counsel gave Defendant constitutionally deficient advice when he told Defendant he would be “eligible for deportation” if he pleaded guilty to the drug possession charges. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the conviction of a noncitizen with intent to distribute cocaine makes deportation or removal from the United States presumptively mandatory, counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient in that it did not convey what is clearly stated in federal law.View "Commonwealth v. DeJesus" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen. Immigration officials had failed to properly record petitioner's correct address and, instead, recorded another outdated address. Petitioner's notice to appear for her deportation hearing was sent to the outdated address. Consequently, petitioner failed to appear and was ordered removed in absentia. Upon learning about the order, petitioner moved to reopen. The court concluded that the BIA abused its discretion when it decided that petitioner was not entitled to notice under the immigration statutes. The BIA concluded that petitioner "did not" provide her current address after acknowledging that she claims she did. The BIA acted arbitrarily because it gives not reason for discounting petitioner's claim where the claim was facially plausible and supported by her declaration. Further, the BIA abused its discretion in concluding that petitioner was required to "ensure that the correct address was written down" instead of that she was required to "ensure that the correct address was supplied." Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "De Jesus Velasquez-Escovar v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, pleaded guilty to patronizing prostitution and was granted judicial diversion. Petitioner successfully completed his diversion, and his criminal record was subsequently expunged. Approximately three years after the entry of his plea, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was entitled to relief under Padilla v. Kentucky because his trial counsel failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was time-barred. The court of criminal appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition, concluding that a petitioner whose record has been expunged may not obtain post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act may not be used to collaterally attack a guilty plea that has been expunged after successful completion of judicial diversion. View "Rodriguez v. State" on Justia Law

A removable alien who has lived in the U.S. for seven years (including five as a permanent resident) is entitled to seek cancellation of removal unless he has committed an “aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3). Velasco, a citizen of Mexico who was admitted for permanent residence, became removable after multiple criminal convictions. An immigration judge concluded that one of these convictions was for “sexual abuse of a minor”, which 8 U.S.C.1101(a)(43)(A) classifies as an aggravated felony, and that Velasco was, therefore. ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA affirmed, citing the definition of “sexual abuse” in 18 U.S.C. 3509(a)(8) rather than the one in 18 U.S.C. 2243(a). The conviction at issue was under Cal. Penal Code 261.5(c), which makes it a crime to engage in sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 18, if the defendant is at least three years older. Velasco was 18 at the time; the girl was 15. Deferring to the BIA, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Velasco-Giron v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to suppress evidence and terminate removal proceedings, and his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that where, as here, an alien voluntarily concedes facts supporting his removeability, such concessions constitute independently admissible removability evidence, notwithstanding the allegedly egregious and illegal search and seizure that led to the initiation of the removal proceedings. Therefore, the agency did not err in denying the suppression motion. The court also concluded that the agency did not err by denying the asylum application based on the failure of petitioner's testimony to establish a well-founded fear and, by extension, a clear probability of prosecution. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Vanegas-Ramirez v. Holder" on Justia Law

DHS initiated removal proceedings, charging Antia with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present without being admitted or paroled and alleging that Antia had been convicted of “indecent liberties with a child,” a crime of moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The Form I‐213, a “Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien” prepared by DHS “typically a record of an immigration inspector’s conversation with an alien who will probably be subject to removal,” stated that Antia “voluntarily admitted” that he was not a citizen or U.S. national and was a citizen of Columbia. Chicago Police Department rap sheets indicated that Antia was born in Puerto Rico. Antia retained counsel and, before an IJ, declined to admit or deny the allegations against him or to designate Colombia as the country of removal. The IJ scheduled a contested hearing, but denied Antia’s request for subpoenas for the makers of “all Government documents that are coming in.” As the only witness, Antia refused to answer questions. Antia’s counsel reiterated his request to subpoena the preparers of the documents. The IJ again denied the request as overly broad; denied a request to cross‐examine the preparer of the I‐213; and rejected Antia’s challenge to the government’s failure to produce any other witnesses. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding none of the challenged rulings erroneous. View "Antia-Perea v. Holder" on Justia Law