Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision upholding a final order of removal against him. The BIA held that petitioner's sexual battery conviction was a violent or dangerous crime and, on that basis, applied the Matter of Jean standard to guide the exercise of its discretion. The court upheld the BIA's decision not to apply the categorical approach in the context of its discretionary decisions, such as here; where the correct legal standard is applied, the ultimate determination of whether a crime was violent or dangerous under Matter of Jean is discretionary and unreviewable under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B); and the court upheld the BIA's extension of the Matter of Jean standard to adjustment of status applications under 8 U.S.C. 1255. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part the petition for review. View "Torres-Valdivias v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's final order of removal against him. The court concluded that possession of marijuana for sale under the California Health & Safety Code (CHSC) section 11359 contemplates a sale - that is, distribution of marijuana in exchange for remuneration. Further, aiding and abetting liability under California law is no different from aiding and abetting liability under federal law. Therefore, the court held that petitioner's conviction for possession of marijuana for sale under section 11359 is categorically an aggravated felony, namely "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance." Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Roman-Suaste v. Holder" on Justia Law

Khan is a Mohajir: his parents were immigrants into Pakistan when it was partitioned from the British Indian Empire in 1947. Some Mohajirs formed a political party—the Mohajir Qaumi Movement—in response to perceived repression by nonimmigrant locals. Khan joined in 1992 when he was 14 or 15 years old. He distributed flyers, attended meetings, and recruited people to the cause. The group became increasingly violent, however, and many Mohajirs, including Khan, left to join a new, supposedly more peaceful group, MQM-Haqiqi. But this party too resorted to violence, so Khan eventually left. Khan became a target and was repeatedly attacked, kidnapped, and tortured by members of the first party. He fled to the U.S. on a visitor visa, and when it expired, sought asylum and other forms of relief from removal. While his case was pending, he married a U.S. citizen, making him eligible for permanent residency through his marriage. An immigration judge accepted the government’s position, rejecting Khan under the “terrorism bar,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I); the BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review, declining to interpret the “knowledge exception” to the terrorism bar because Khan did not raise it before the BIA. View "Khan v. Holder" on Justia Law

Hernandez, a 34-year-old Mexican citizen, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1998. In 2009, he pled guilty to simple assault and endangering the welfare of a child, stemming from striking his 10-year-old stepson. DHS issued a Notice to Appear, charging that Hernandez was removable as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Hernandez conceded removability as an alien present without being admitted or paroled, but denied removability as an alien convicted of a CIMT and sought cancellation of removal, claiming that his children, U.S. citizens, would experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon his removal. The Immigration Judge concluded that the children would suffer hardship, but that Hernandez was removable. The IJ found that the assault conviction was not a CIMT, but that the conviction for child endangerment constituted a CIMT because the statute requires “awareness by the accused that his violation of his duty of care, protection and support, is practically certain to result in the endangerment to his children’s welfare.” The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit granted a petition for review, finding that the least culpable conduct criminalized under Pennsylvania’s child endangerment statute does not implicate moral turpitude. View "Hernandez-Cruz v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's order of removal on the ground that he failed to file an application for an adjustment of status concurrently with his application for a waiver. The court concluded that the BIA's interpretation of the waiver provision in 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) - which Congress amended after the BIA decided Matter of Sanchez, to require that an alien seek a waiver of inadmissibility when he applies for a visa, admission to the United States or an adjustment of status - was reasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Rivas v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Somalian national, was charged with removability as an alien present without having been admitted or paroled after inspection. Petitioner filed a second application, the first of which was deemed abandoned, requesting asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge denied relief and ordered Petitioner removed to Somalia, premising his decision on an adverse credibility determination stemming from Petitioner’s “pernicious pattern of prevarication.” The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed in all respects. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that BIA articulated specific and cogent reasons in support of its adverse credibility determination. View "Ahmed v. Holder" on Justia Law

Ruiz unsuccessfully applied for asylum in 1993 and was interviewed by an asylum officer in 2007. DHS initiated removal proceedings. Ruiz and his wife, who were in the country illegally, applied to cancel removal and, in 2011, appeared before an Immigration Judge. On direct examination Ruiz confessed that his asylum application contained an untrue statement and that he repeated the lie at his interview. He testified that a notary public had written his application because Ruiz could not then read or write English. Ruiz learned later that the notary had written that Ruiz had been threatened by guerillas in Guatemala. He had not. The government may only cancel removal if the applicant “has been a person of good moral character” during his time in the U.S. 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(B), which excludes a person who “has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter.” There is an exception under the doctrine of retraction. The IJ did not consider whether Ruiz had timely retracted his prior testimony, but found a “clear violation.” The BIA concluded that the exception did not apply because retraction was not timely. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded: timeliness is determined by whether the falsehood was retracted before it was or was about to be exposed. Ruiz chose, to his own detriment, to retract his statement at his first opportunity to testify after his interview and with no evidence that his lie would have been exposed. Ruiz should not be prejudiced by the BIA’s backlog. View "Ruiz-Del-Cid v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Burma, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of her motion to remand and her later motion to reopen her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that the BIA did not abuse its considerable discretion in denying petitioner's motions. In total, petitioner claimed that her additional evidence explains why she delayed reporting the sexual abuse that she suffered and supports her claim that she is a Burmese citizen. While these are two concerns that the IJ had about her credibility, the IJ found petitioner was not credible for several other reasons. The BIA concluded that the additional evidence presented would not have warranted overturning the IJ's credibility finding and, therefore, the BIA was within its discretion to issue the denials. The court denied the petitions for review. View "Lee v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Singh, a 51-year-old citizen of India, entered the U.S. in 2006 after egregious physical abuse by the police in Jullandar, Punjab, concerning his employment of a domestic servant alleged to be a Kashmiri terrorist. The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s decision to grant Singh relief under the Convention Against Torture, but held that an imputed political opinion was not a central reason for the police brutality and denied applications for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA concluded that the police had legitimate reasons for the arrest and detention. The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review and held that the evidence compelled a conclusion that Singh’s imputed political opinion was at least one central reason police targeted him. Although the REAL ID Act eliminated the presumption that persecution is politically motivated absent any evidence of a legitimate prosecutorial purpose, an applicant may meet his burden of establishing nexus by introducing evidence that he was wrongly accused of being a terrorist. Mixed-motives analysis applies to cases under the REAL ID Act, and, even if police are engaged in a legitimate investigation, an applicant may establish nexus by showing that he was persecuted both because of legitimate investigatory reasons and because of a protected ground, if a protected ground was at least one central reason for the harm.View "Singh v. Holder" on Justia Law

Yongguo Lai, a native and citizen of China, appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing Lai's appeal of an immigration judge's (IJ) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA relied on the IJ's finding that Lai's claim of persecution and torture on account of his Christian religion was not credible. The IJ based her ruling, in relevant part, on Lai's testimony during cross-examination that contained information the IJ found to be missing from and inconsistent with Lai's initial written application and direct testimony, and uncorroborated in one respect. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit concluded the BIA's adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Lai v. Holder" on Justia Law