Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from an order of removal. The court concluded that, although petitioner now claims that he only accepted the order of removal in order to expedite this court's hearing of his citizenship claim, that would not render his waiver unknowing or involuntary. The court also concluded that, if petitioner can show that the INS arbitrarily and intentionally obstructed his application, his right to due process has been violated. The government has also violated petitioner's right to due process if it has been deliberately indifferent to whether his application was processed. The court transferred this claim to the district court so that it may make the necessary findings of fact to establish whether petitioner's constitutional rights were violated. Further, the court held that pledging an oath of allegiance in or after an interview with an INS officer as part of the naturalization process does not satisfy the "public ceremony" requirement of 8 U.S.C. 1448(a). Accordingly, the court denied petitioner's challenge to his removal order on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction. The court transferred the matter to the district court for further proceedings. The court dismissed petitioner's claim that he is already a citizen by having already taken an oath of citizenship. View "Brown v. Holder" on Justia Law

Syblis, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the U.S. in 2000 as a non-immigrant visitor. He remained beyond three months without seeking additional authorization. In 2004 he was charged with possession of marijuana. The charges were later amended and he was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia. In 2008, in an unrelated incident, Syblis was convicted of possession of marijuana. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Syblis, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B) for overstaying his visa authorization, and under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for his paraphernalia and marijuana convictions. He contested his removability on the grounds that he was convicted of an offense relating to a controlled substance and renewed a previous application for an adjustment of status and requested a waiver of criminal inadmissibility grounds. The IJ concluded that both of Syblis's convictions related to "controlled substances" and found him ineligible for a waiver of criminal inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h). The BIA upheld the decision. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that Syblis failed to meet his statutorily prescribed burden of demonstrating eligibility for relief from removal. View "Syblis v. Att'y Gen of the U.S/" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the discretionary denial of his application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The court concluded that petitioner's argument that the IJ and the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard is without merit and the court lacked jurisdiction to review this claim. Further, petitioner's claim that the BIA's failure to analyze two significant hardship factors violated his due process rights failed because cancellation of removal is a discretionary remedy. Because adjustment of status including cancellation of removal amounts to a power to dispense mercy, an alien can have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in such speculative relief and cannot state a claim for a violation of due process rights. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Nunez-Portillo v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's revocation of his supervised release, arguing that his supervised release expired prior to the date the United States Probation Office petitioned the district court for revocation - thereby divesting the district court of jurisdiction over his supervised release. The court concluded that defendant's term of pretrial detention did not toll his supervised release where neither period of detention was in connection with a conviction and the immigration detainer imposed during defendant's Texas pretrial detention was an administrative hold that did not amount to imprisonment in connection with a conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3624(e). Therefore, the court held that the district court did not have jurisdiction to revoke defendant's supervised release. The court vacated the revocation and the sentence imposed. View "United States v. Juarez-Velasquez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-hospital engaged Defendant to undertake demolition in a basement room at the hospital. Defendant hired brothers Luis and Gerardo Lema, undocumented aliens not legally employable in the United States. The Lemas were injured while performing the work and sued the hospital for violations of the state’s Labor Law. Supreme Court granted the Lemas summary judgment on liability. The hospital, meanwhile, brought this action for common-law and contractual contribution and indemnification against Defendant to recover damages incurred in the Labor Law litigation with the Lemas. Supreme Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action, reasoning that N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law 11 barred the hospital’s action. In so holding, the court determined that non-compliance with the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) did not deprive Defendant of the protection of section 11. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant was entitled to the safe harbor in section 11 because the Lemas did not suffer grave injuries, there was no preexisting agreement for contractual contribution or indemnification, and the hospital did not contend that IRCA preempts section 11.View "N.Y. Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Microtech Contracting Corp." on Justia Law

In separate cases, several defendants were arrested and detained. The initial appearance documents indicated that the defendants were in the country illegally or had an Immigration and Customers Enforcement (ICE) detainer filed against them. Appellant, Big Louie Bail Bonds, reviewed the initial appearance documents and posted bail bonds for the defendants. After the bail bonds were posted, the defendants were taken into federal custody by the ICE and deported. Because the defendants failed to appear for trial, the trial court forfeited the bail bonds. The circuit court denied Appellant's amended petitions to strike the forfeitures, determining that the posted bail bonds were properly forfeited because Appellant knew, or should have known, that the defendants were subject to deportation when it posted the bonds. At issue on appeal was Maryland Rule 2-417(i), which provides that the decision to strike a forfeiture is conditioned upon a showing by the defendant of "reasonable grounds" for the defendant's nonappearance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the act of deportation constitutes reasonable grounds under Rule 4-217(i)(2). View "Big Louie Bail Bonds, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

On May 8, 2012, defendant Rosa Lugo Marquez was charged by bill of information with being an alien student and/or a nonresident alien who operated a motor vehicle in the parish of Lafayette without documentation demonstrating that she was lawfully present in the United States. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 (which punished as a felony the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien without documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States), was preempted by federal law under the Supreme Court's recent decision in "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)). Finding that the statute operated in the field of alien registration and was, therefore, preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in "Arizona," the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and rendered judgment granting defendant's motion to quash.View "Louisiana v. Marquez" on Justia Law

On August 2, 2012, defendant Bonifacio Ramirez was arrested during a traffic stop in for operating a motor vehicle without documentation demonstrating that he was lawfully present in the United States. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 (which punished as a felony the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien without documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States), was preempted by federal law under the Supreme Court's recent decision in "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)). Finding that the statute operated in the field of alien registration and was, therefore, preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in "Arizona," the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and rendered judgment granting defendant's motion to quash.View "Louisiana v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Louisiana legislature enacted a series of laws titled "Prevention of Terrorism on the Highways." One of the statutes proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien who does not possess documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States. Violation is a felony that carried a fine of not more than $1,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than one year, with or without hard labor. Following a nolo contendere plea to the charge of violating La. R.S. 14:100.13, in which he reserved the right to appeal a claim that the statute was preempted by federal law, defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal. The appellate court reversed defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that La. R.S. 14:100.13 was indeed preempted. After review of the relevant law, the Supreme Court found that based on "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)), La. R.S. 14:100.13 was preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeal.View "Louisiana v. Sarrabea" on Justia Law

In his initial application for habeas relief, applicant Erick Alberto Oranday-Garcia alleged his guilty for possession of cocaine was involuntary because trial counsel rendered deficient performance by advising him that conviction for that offense would not result in deportation. Applicant was deported as a result of his offense. He contended that had he understood the effect that the guilty plea would have on his immigration status, he would not have pled guilty but insisted on going to trial. Applicant's trial counsel filed an affidavit with the convicting court specifically refuting the applicant's allegations and maintaining that he had informed the applicant that his conviction would result in deportation. Based on the affidavit, the convicting court recommended denying relief. In a subsequent writ application, applicant argued that the same circumstances in support of his claim that his plea was given involuntarily due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel was supported under the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Padilla v. Kentucky." Applying the requirement of an allegation of prima facie facts to this petition, the Supreme Court dismissed it as non-compliant with Article 11.07, Section 4. The new law that applicant invoked was Padilla, but the Court concluded he did not establish that Padilla applied to the facts of his case because of Texas precedent "Ex parte De Los Reyes," and the United States Supreme Court's opinion in "Chaidez v. United States." Because the applicant's conviction was final before the Supreme Court announced the rule in Padilla, it could not apply to him in any event.View "Ex parte Oranday-Garcia" on Justia Law