Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A Boston police officer witnessed Sylvain engaging in a sexual act with a prostitute. As the officer approached, Sylvain removed plastic baggies from his coat pocket and placed them in his mouth. Believing that the baggies contained "crack" cocaine and fearing overdose, the officer attempted to intercede. Although Sylvain ingested the drugs, a search of his jacket revealed an additional baggie of crack cocaine. The incident took place within 1,000 feet of a child care center. Sylvain, a noncitizen lawfully residing in the U.S., pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, subjecting him to automatic deportation. After the conviction the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the rule announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) regarding a criminal defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment to accurate advice about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, was not a "new" rule and applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. Sylvain sought to vacate his guilty plea, arguing that his attorney erroneously advised him that there would be no deportation consequences. The motion was denied. While Sylvain's appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Chaidez v. United States (2013), holding that Padilla did announce a "new" rule and does not apply retroactively to collateral challenges. The Massachusetts Supreme Court remanded, holding that, as a matter of Massachusetts law, the right enunciated in Padilla was not new and, consequently, defendants whose state law convictions were final after April 1, 1997, may attack their convictions collaterally on Padilla grounds. View "Commonwealth v. Sylvain" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the terms of a plea bargain, Defendant, who was an eighteen-year-old citizen of Mexico at the time, pleaded guilty to the sale or transportation of marijuana. After completing his probation, Defendant sought an adjustment in status to lawful permanent residency. Defendant's application was denied because of his conviction, and removal proceedings were initiated against him. Defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 1016.5, asserting that had he known the immigration consequences of pleading guilty, he would have rejected the plea offer. The only issue adjudicated at the hearing on Defendant's motion was whether he would have received a more favorable outcome had he rejected the plea bargain. The trial court denied the motion without considering the possibility Defendant might have rejected the plea bargain even if it were not reasonably probable he would have received a more favorable outcome. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) relief is available under section 1016.5 if the defendant establishes he would have rejected the existing bargain to accept or attempt to negotiate another; and (2) the trial court applied the incorrect test for prejudice in this case. Remanded. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Klever Miranda and Nancy Campoverde, entered the U.S. without documentation. Klever received a notice of removal order and was represented by attorney Michael Said. Said advised Klever and Nancy to leave the country and then file a document called a Form I-601 waiver, which permits an applicant who is otherwise ineligible to be admitted into the U.S. based on extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. Said told Plaintiffs that once their son Cesar obtained citizenship, he would be a qualifying relative. However, once Plaintiffs left the country and filed the Form I-601, the applications were denied. Plaintiffs later learned that Cesar was not a qualifying relative. Plaintiffs and Cesar brought a legal malpractice action against Said, including a claim for emotional distress damages and punitive damages. The district court allowed only the claim for economic damages to be considered by the jury and found Said negligent. The court of appeals reversed, finding the claims for emotional distress and punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that emotional distress and punitive damages were not available to Plaintiffs. Remanded for a new trial.View "Miranda v. Said" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was born in Zaire and immigrated to the United States after being granted asylum, pled no contest to two misdemeanors in 2010. Because of credit for time served, Defendant was released from custody on the same day he was sentenced. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not properly advise Defendant of the immigration consequences of conviction at the time he entered the pleas. The district court denied Defendant's motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because Defendant had completed his sentences and had been released from custody. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to decide Defendant's common-law motion to withdraw his pleas because (1) the statutory remedy under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02 did not apply and the motion asserted a constitutional issue which was not addressed under the Nebraska Postconviction Act; and (2) the fact that Defendant served his sentences was not relevant to the jurisdictional analysis. Remanded.View "State v. Yuma" on Justia Law

Appellee, an undocumented alien seeking to remain eligible for "cancellation of removal" from the United States, filed a motion to vacate his 1998 deferred-adjudication misdemeanor judgment for possession of less than two ounces of marijuana. The motion alleged that appellee's guilty plea had been involuntary because it was made without an attorney giving appellee advice regarding deportation. After hearing from appellee's current counsel, the trial judge granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, pointing to "evidence" that appellee did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The Supreme Court granted the State Prosecuting Attorney's (SPA's) petition to answer two questions: (1) could counsel's statements be considered "evidence"?; and (2) was appellee's 1998 waiver of counsel constitutionally invalid because he was not informed of the possible deportation consequences of his plea? After a brief note on the nature of the pleading filed here, the Court answered both questions no. Therefore the Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's original judgment.View "Texas v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Jesus Gonzalez is an undocumented immigrant, coming to this country from Mexico for the first time in 2003 and again in 2005. In early February of 2006, he was hired by Performance Painting, Inc. as a painter's helper. By all accounts, Gonzalez was a good employee and worked without incident until August 31, 2006. On that day, he fell off a ladder, injuring his shoulder. As a result of the injury, Gonzalez was temporarily totally disabled and unable to work. The injury required multiple surgeries and months of physical therapy. While all workers are encouraged to return to work when medically feasible, federal law may preclude some employers from extending rehire offers to undocumented workers once they learn of their status. Because an offer to rehire must be a legitimate offer, the Supreme Court held that employers who cannot demonstrate such good faith compliance with federal law in the hiring process cannot use their workers' undocumented status as a defense to continue payment of modifier benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. View "Gonzalez v. Performance Painting, Inc." on Justia Law

A court cannot terminate a person's rights unless the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent engaged in certain proscribed conduct, as specified in the Family Code, and that termination is in the best interest of the children. In this case, an immigrant convicted in another state of unlawful conduct with a minor and given a probated sentence years before his children were born was later deported to Mexico. The State relied on these facts in petitioning to terminate this father's parental rights, yet put on no evidence concerning the offense committed years earlier, nor the circumstances of his deportation. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment in part, holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support termination of this father's parental rights under these facts. Remanded.View "In re E.N.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that Davidson County Sheriff's officers arrested and wrongfully interrogated and detained them while officers investigated Plaintiffs' immigration status pursuant to the October 2009 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered into between the Davidson County Sheriff's Office (DCSO) and the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The MOA authorized selected DCSO personnel to perform certain immigration officer duties after being trained and certified by ICE. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer whether the MOA violated the Charter of Nashville and Davidson County. The Court held (1) the MOA did not violate the Charter or any other state law cited by Plaintiffs; and (2) the Sheriff of Davidson County had authority under the Charter to perform the duties enumerated in the MOA.View "Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County " on Justia Law

These appeals arose from the ruling of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), that defendant Rashad El Badrawi was entitled, under the Freedom of Information Act (act), to the disclosure of a document that the plaintiff, the commissioner of correction (commissioner), obtained from a file in the National Crime Information Center, which is maintained by the FBI. The commissioner and the intervenor, the United States, appealed from the commission's ruling, claiming that the commission improperly ordered disclosure of the document because, among other reasons, disclosure was barred by a federal regulation, and therefore, the document was exempt from the act in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 1-210(a). The trial court dismissed in part and sustained in part the appeals and ordered that a redacted version of the document be disclosed to El Badrawi. The commissioner and the United States appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the document fell within an exemption to the act set forth in section 1-210(a), and therefore, El Badrawi was not entitled to disclosure of the document.View "Comm'r of Corr. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n " on Justia Law

Erick M., a juvenile, requested that the juvenile court enter an order finding that under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), he was eligible for "special immigrant juvenile" (SIJ) status. SIJ status allows a juvenile immigrant to remain in the United States and seek lawful permanent resident status if federal authorities conclude that the statutory conditions are met. The conditions include a court order determining that the juvenile's reunification with "1 or both" parents is not feasible because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The juvenile court found Erick did not satisfy that requirement. At issue on appeal was the meaning of the phrase "1 or both" parents. Erick lived only with his mother when the juvenile court adjudicated him as a dependent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when ruling on a petitioner's motion for an eligibility order under section 1101(a)(27)(J), a court should generally consider whether reunification with either parent is feasible; and (2) therefore, the juvenile court did no err in finding that because reunification with Erick's mother was feasible, he was not eligible for SIJ status. View "In re Interest of Erick H." on Justia Law