Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

An immigration statute, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a), authorized the Attorney General to cancel the removal of an alien from the United States who, among other things, has held the status of a lawful permanent resident (LPR) for at least five years, and has lived in the United States for at least seven continuous years after a lawful admission. Respondents both sought to impute their parents' years of continuous residence or LPR status to themselves. At issue was whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) could reasonably conclude that an alien living in this country as a child must meet those requirements on his own, without counting a parent's years of residence or immigration status. The Court held that the BIA's approach was based on a permissible construction of the statute under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.View "Holder v. Gutierrez; Holder v. Sawyers" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Greece and a lawful permanent resident (LPR) of the United States, plead guilty to a felony in 1994. Petitioner later traveled to Greece in 2003 to visit his parents and on his return to the United States, he was treated as an inadmissible alien and placed in removal proceedings. Under the law governing at the time of petitioner's plea, an alien in his situation could travel abroad for brief periods without jeopardizing his resident alien status, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13). This case presented a question of retroactivity not addressed by Congress: As to an LPR convicted of a crime before the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) and 1182(a)(2), which regime governed, the one in force at the time of the conviction, or IIRIRA? Guided by the deeply rooted presumption against retroactive legislation, the Court held that section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) did not apply to petitioner's conviction. The impact of petitioner's brief travel abroad on his permanent resident status was therefore determined not by IIRIRA, but by the legal regime in force at the time of his conviction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.View "Vartelas v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioners, natives and citizens of Japan who have been lawful permanent residents of the United States since 1984, appealed a removal order after husband pleaded guilty to one count of willfully making and subscribing a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) and wife pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). At issue was whether aliens who commit certain federal tax crimes were subject to deportation as aliens who have been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Court held that violations of section 7206(1) and (2) were crimes "involv[ing] fraud or deceit" under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) and were therefore aggravated felonies as that term was defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., when the loss to the Government exceeded $10,000. Because petitioners were subject to deportation as aliens who have been convicted of aggravated felonies, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.View "Kawashima v. Holder" on Justia Law

This case concerned the BIA's policy for deciding when resident aliens could apply to the Attorney General for relief from deportation under a now-repealed provision of the immigration law. The Court held that the BIA's policy for applying section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), in deportation cases was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). The Court concluded that the BIA's comparable-grounds rule was unmoored from the purposes and concerns of the immigration laws. It allowed an irrelevant comparison between statutory provisions to govern a matter of the utmost importance -whether lawful resident aliens with longstanding ties to this country could stay here. And contrary to the Government's protestations, it was not supported by text or practice or cost considerations. Therefore, the BIA's approach could not pass muster under ordinary principles of administrative law.View "Judulang v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and various business and civil rights organizations (collectively, "Chamber") filed a federal preenforcement suit against those charged with administering the Legal Arizona Workers Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23-211, 212, 212.01, which provided that the licenses of state employers that knowingly or intentionally employed unauthorized aliens could be, and in certain circumstances, must be, suspended or revoked. The law also required that all Arizona employers use E-Verify, an internet-based system employers could use to check the work authorization status of employees. At issue was whether federal immigration law preempted those provisions of Arizona law. The Court held that Arizona's licensing law fell within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the states and therefore, was not expressly preempted where the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(2), prohibited states from imposing civil or criminal sanctions on those who employed unauthorized aliens but preserved state authority to impose sanctions through licensing and similar laws. The court also held that Arizona's requirement that employers use E-Verify did not conflict with the federal scheme and in no way obstructed achieving the aims of the federal program.View "Chamber of Commerce of United States of America, et al. v. Whiting" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a national and citizen of Kenya, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of her appeal from an IJ's order concluding that she was removable and denying her petition for adjustment of status. Petitioner argued that the IJ erred by denying her motion to suppress her I-9 forms and her Hutchison Community College (HCC) applications. The court concluded that INA 274A(b)(5) allows the admission of I-9 forms into evidence in removal proceedings; absent an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment or other liberty which transgresses the fundamental fairness of the removal proceedings or affects the probative value of the evidence obtained, the exclusionary rule is not available in the removal context to remedy a mere statutory violation of Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. 1232g; and, therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Downs v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without being admitted or paroled. The next year, Petitioner was detained after an Immigration and Customs Enforcement raid at her place of employment. Petitioner filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, asserting that she would be a target of a prominent gang’s violence if she were to return to El Salvador because of the gang’s unsuccessful efforts to recruit her son. An immigration judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decision, concluding that Petitioner failed to show that she would be persecuted as a result of her kinship. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence of future persecution based on Petitioner’s membership in her nuclear family was too speculative to show a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "De Abarca v. Holder" on Justia Law

Harmon was born in Liberia in 1984, shortly before the start of the Civil War. She was separated from her parents at four-years-old and recently learned that her parents were killed in that conflict. Harmon was repeatedly sexually molested and raped. In 1992, Harmon’s aunt, Barroar, took Harmon to the Liberian embassy in Gambia, where Barroar worked. Harmon was 10 years old when her aunt brought her to the U.S. on a visitor’s visa to live with Harmon’s brother Herbert. She now has no family or connections in Liberia. Harmon turned 18 in 2002. Months later, Herbert assisted her in obtaining Temporary Protected Status (TPS). When Harmon turned 19, she left Herbert’s home, and was unsuccessful without his assistance. She missed the TPS deadline while trying to collect money for the application fee, had her next application denied, and sent her appeal to the wrong address. In 2007, Harmon tried to enter Canada, thinking that she could get refugee protection, but was stopped by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. She received notice that she was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B) and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ denied relief on the merits, approved the denial of TPS, and ordered removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Harmon’s appeal and her subsequent motion to reopen. While appeal was pending, Harmon entered Canada and applied for the equivalent of lawful permanent resident status. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Harmon v. Holder" on Justia Law

Sanchez, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1989. Sanchez is now 47, married to a lawful permanent resident, and has four children, all U.S. citizens. Sanchez sought asylum and withholding of removal and applied for special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment & Central American Relief Act (NACARA), 111 Stat. 2160, 2644 and under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b), based on exceptional hardship to his children. While removal proceedings were pending, the government submitted evidence that Sanchez was not eligible for NACARA relief because he had assisted in the persecution of others while serving in the El Salvador military. Sanchez asked for a continuance. At Sanchez’s next hearing, in August 2009, Sanchez stated that he had been arrested in 2008 for leaving the scene of an accident where serious bodily injury occurred. The government argued that Sanchez’s conduct constituted a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). Sanchez submitted a docket sheet showing that he was charged with a Class D felony, although the court entered the conviction as a misdemeanor and imposed a sentence of 365 days in jail with 363 days suspended. Sanchez claimed that, because of weather conditions, he thought that he had merely hit “a post or a small object” and only learned that he had hit a person when police arrived at his residence the next day. The IJ ordered removal; the BIA dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that the Board did not properly conduct the three-step inquiry prescribed in Matter of Silva-Trevino. View "Sanchez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, was charged with removability for being convicted, after his admission into the United States, of two crimes involving moral turpitude. The crimes were committed in 2009 and 2011. During a hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ) Petitioner’s attorney admitted that Petitioner was removable as charged. Petitioner proceeded to collaterally attack his previous two convictions and succeeded in securing a new trial with respect to his 2011 conviction. Petitioner was subsequently charged with removability on the basis of his 2009 conviction for having been convicted of a single crime involving moral turpitude. Petitioner denied that he was removable and challenged his removability on grounds that his 2009 conviction was not for a crime involving moral turpitude. The IJ found Petitioner removable, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, noting that Petitioner’s prior counsel had already conceded that both the 2009 and 2011 convictions were for crimes involving moral turpitude, rendering Petitioner removable. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in holding Petitioner to his attorneys’ concessions of removability and in determining that Petitioner was removable based upon his 2009 conviction. View "Lima v. Holder" on Justia Law