Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, challenged the reinstatement of an order of removal by ICE, contending that the original order of deportation must be rescinded as unconstitutional. Alternatively, petitioner argued that the order could not be reinstated because he legally reentered the United States. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear petitioner's due process claim. Alternatively, petitioner's challenge to the reinstatement order was without merit where he illegally crossed the border and then applied for a new immigration card with a different identity and number. Successfully deceiving immigration officials into providing one with a new immigration card did not constitute either permission to reenter from the Attorney General or legal reentry. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Martinez v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, requested that the Attorney General withhold removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3). Petitioner claimed that as a former member of the violent Mara Salvatrucha gang (MS-13), he is a member of a particular social group and that he would be killed if sent back to El Salvador because he renounced his membership in MS-13. The court concluded that petitioner's proposed particular social group of former MS-13 members from El Salvador was immutable for withholding of removal purposes in that the only way that petitioner could change his membership in the group would be to rejoin MS-13. Accordingly, the court held that the BIA erred in its ruling on immutability and reversed and remanded. The court affirmed the district court's denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture because it was not supported by sufficient evidence. View "Martinez v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, admitted to the United States on a B2 visitor visa, petitioned for review of the BIA's order dismissing her appeal, contending that the BIA erred in determining that the statutory language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)("212(h) waiver"), excludes her from eligibility to apply for an inadmissibility waiver under section 212(h). The court concluded that the plain language of section 212(h) unambiguously demonstrated that petitioner's post-entry adjustment of status to an LPR after her admission to the United States as a visitor did not constitute an admission in the context of section 212(h). Only noncitizens who entered in the United States as LPRs are barred from eligibility to apply for the 212(h) waiver. Accordingly, petitioner was not barred from applying for the waiver and the court granted the petition for review. View "Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with removability based on the termination of her conditional permanent resident status. Petitioner conceded removability but filed multiple I-751 forms with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and requested waivers of the joint-filing requirement for removal of conditions on permanent residency. The USCIS denied the petitions. An immigration judge (IJ) ordered removal and denied Petitioner’s waiver requests because Petitioner failed to establish either good faith or extreme hardship. Also, in an exercise of the IJ’s discretion, the IJ separately denied Petitioner’s requests for a waiver because of moral character concerns due to Petitioner’s having been convicted of theft. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) adopted the decision of the IJ. The First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review for want of jurisdiction because Petitioner raised no colorable legal or constitutional claims upon review. View "Lopez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a native of Brazil, sought to adjust her immigration status to become a legal permanent resident. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DHS. The court concluded that the remarriage bar in the second sentence of the "intermediate relatives" definition of 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) did not apply to plaintiff's renewed application to adjust her status under the recently enacted section 1154(l). Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff. View "Williams v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, et al." on Justia Law

Hanna, born in 1979, is a citizen of Iraq. Hanna and his family left Iraq in 1990, moving to Canada, with permission to live and work in that country. In 1993 Hanna’s parents obtained U.S. permanent resident status through Hanna’s sister, a citizen. In 1993, Hanna entered the U.S. as a nonimmigrant. Hanna’s parents sought permanent resident status for Hanna. While the petition was pending, Hanna attended school in Canada. By overstaying his visitor’s visas, Hanna attended a U.S. high school, worked at the family business, and obtained a Michigan driver’s license. Hanna was admitted as a lawful permanent U.S. resident in1998. His Canadian permanent resident status expired. In 1996, Hanna, then 17 years old, was arrested for threatening a man with a three-inch folding knife during an argument. Charges were twice dropped, but the state reinstated charges of felonious assault and driving with a suspended license. The court sentenced him to 30 days in jail and two years of probation. The government commenced removal proceedings, charging him as having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), with Iraq as the country of removal. Hanna sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that being a Chaldean Christian placed him at risk in Iraq. After reopening, an IJ stated that an alien who “firmly resettled” in another country before arriving is not eligible for asylum and that Hanna was bound to his first attorney’s concession of removability. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit reversed the holding that Hanna’s admission-concession was binding and remanded for determination of whether Hanna’s offense was a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Hanna v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Tanzanian national who suffers from severe bipolar disorder, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his application for asylum. Petitioner argued that he faced severe persecution because of his membership in the social group of individuals with bipolar disorder who exhibit erratic behavior. The court vacated the BIA's social visibility finding because it rests on legal error; the BIA also committed legal error in concluding that petitioner's group lacked particularity; and petitioner's proposed group is immutable. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded for further consideration. View "Temu v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Guatemala, illegally entered the United States in 2003. In 2006, Petitioner was charged as removable. Petitioner conceded his removability and applied for withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and voluntary departure from the United States. At a merits hearing before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner testified that he feared being the victim of gang violence in Guatemala because he taught and counseled students to avoid joining gangs. The IJ denied Petitioner’s applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection and granted him voluntary departure. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner subsequently moved to reopen removal proceedings on the basis of new evidence he claimed showed that teachers who opposed gang practices were being persecuted. The BIA denied the motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding the new evidence did not warrant a different outcome in Petitioner’s case or in finding the new evidence was not material. View "Rosales-Perez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being voluntarily present and found in the United States, arguing that he was not in the United States when he was found. The court concluded that, although defendant had indisputably been present in the United States illegally for nearly a decade, defendant was not "found" while has in the country. When he was found - admittedly not long after his departure from the United States - defendant had neither a physical nor a legal presence in the country. When defendant had been "found" at the Canadian border, he had been returned involuntarily with neither a desire to enter, nor a will to be present in, the United States. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, concluding that defendant was not "found in" the United States within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1326. View "United States v. Vasquez Macias" on Justia Law

Eid, a Lebanese national, entered the U.S. as a non-immigrant under an H1-B visa issued based on a petition by Eid’s employer Pickett, a U.S. citizen. Eid married Pickett and they began living together. Pickett’s I-130 Petition to have Eid legally established as her husband for immigration purposes was granted in 1999. Eid filed an I-485 Application. During his 2001 INS interview for permanent residence, Eid withdrew his application. Pickett was allowed to withdraw her petition. Both gave sworn affidavits, indicating that they married to enable Eid to stay in the U.S., but the marriage was never consummated, and that they did not intend to live together as husband and wife. Their marriage was annulled. Removal proceedings began against Eid. In 2003, he married Packard, an American citizen, with whom he had a son in 2006. Packard filed an I-130 Petition in 2004. CIS determined the marriage to be genuine, but denied the petition. The BIA affirmed, based on 8 U.S.C. 1154(c), which requires denial of petitions of aliens who previously received or attempted to receive immigration benefits based on a marriage “entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.” The district court ruled in favor of the government. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that, because Eid did not intend to break the law by his first marriage, section 1154(c) should not apply. View "Eid v. Thompson" on Justia Law