Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a Canadian, was ordered removed when customs officials determined that he planned to work in the United States as a photographer/cameraman without documentation. At issue was whether a Canadian arriving at the border and subjected to expedited removal but never detained was entitled to habeas relief, under either the traditional habeas structure, 28 U.S.C. 2241, or the more limited regime applicable to expedited removal orders, 8 U.S.C. 1252(e)(2). The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's claims under the traditional habeas statute because petitioner was never in custody. Determining that it had jurisdiction under the limited review provisions of section 1252(e)(2), the court held that petitioner was not entitled to relief because, as applied to the narrow facts of this case, section 1252(e)(2) did not permit the court to consider any further collateral damage. View "Smith v. U.S. Customs & Border Protection" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a former special forces member of the El Salvador military, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision denying him withholding of removal. The court concluded that the IJ did not deprive petitioner of a fundamentally fair hearing where the IJ provided him an opportunity to examine the documents at issue and respond to them. The court also concluded that petitioner failed to show that a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that he would be persecuted in El Salvador where, among other things, petitioner and his family were not harmed based on his former military membership. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Constanza-Martinez v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Jordanian citizen, appealed the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's request for adjustment of status. Petitioner contended that the unpublished BIA decision in his case was not entitled to Chevron deference. The court need not address whether Chevron deference was required because the BIA decision could be affirmed under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. The court concluded that the BIA's conclusion that petitioner was not entitled to adjustment of status was a persuasive interpretation of section 245(i) and was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 8 C.F.R. 245.10. Under the deference afforded by Skidmore and Auer v. Robbins, the court affirmed the judgment of the BIA and denied the petition for review. View "Mansour v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Chavarria, born in Mexico, became a legal permanent U.S. resident in 1982. In 2009, Chavarria pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine. One year later, the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, imposing a duty on defense attorneys to inform noncitizen clients of deportation risks stemming from plea agreements, and held that legal advice, or the lack thereof, involving the prospect of deportation resulting from guilty pleas can support a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Chavarria filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his trial counsel stated that “the attorney had checked with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement … and they said they were not interested” in deporting him. Chavarria was deported before counsel was appointed. The district court denied a motion to dismiss, holding that Padilla could be applied retroactively. Shortly thereafter, the Seventh Circuit decided, in Chaidez v. U.S., that Padilla was a new rule and not retroactive. The district court vacated its ruling and dismissed. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court affirmed Chaidez, foreclosing Chavarria’s argument that Padilla was retroactive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Chaidez distinguished between providing no advice (actionable under Padilla) and providing bad advice (actionable under pre‐Padilla law). View "Chavarria v. United States" on Justia Law

Flores, an alien who returned to the U.S. without permission following removal, was charged with illegal reentry and other crimes arising from his armed drug dealing. Flores, who maintained that U.S. law did not apply to him and that the court had no jurisdiction to try him, refused to consider a guilty plea. He was convicted on all counts and was sentenced to concurrent 96-month sentences on all counts but one. His conviction, for possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking felony, led to a consecutive term of 360 months’ imprisonment, which was compulsory because of Flores’s earlier conviction of the same crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that trial counsel furnished ineffective assistance by telling the jury that Flores indeed had distributed cocaine after reentering the U.S. without permission, while arguing that the prosecution did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the weapons-related charges. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

Darif, a citizen of Morocco, married Kirklin, a U.S. citizen and by virtue of the marriage was admitted into the U.S. as a conditional permanent resident in 2001. It was later determined that he had paid $3000 for the marriage and Darif was convicted of marriage fraud and related charges, and DHS initiated removal proceeding. An immigration judge found Darif removable and rejected all arguments for relief. The BIA and Seventh Circuit denied relief. The court stated that it lacked jurisdiction to review his claims of entitlement to an extreme-hardship waiver pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c)(4) and that the IJ was biased and otherwise denied him a full and fair hearing. The determination of extreme hardship was a discretionary decision and Darif’s due-process argument could not succeed because an alien has no protected liberty interest in discretionary immigration relief. Even if the due-process claim was considered as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of Darif’s hearing under the governing, he was not prejudiced because the BIA gave his hardship claim plenary and independent consideration. View "Darif v. Holder" on Justia Law

Orabi, an Egyptian citizen, was admitted to the U.S. in 1990. He became a lawful permanent resident without conditions in 1996. In 2010, he was convicted, in federal court, of conspiracy to commit fraud in connection with access devices, possession of counterfeit access devices, possession of counterfeit and forged checks, and aggravated identity theft, and was sentenced to 70 months in prison. Appeal to the Second Circuit is pending. DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on conviction for an aggravated felony. Orabi notified DHS and the Immigration Court that he was appealing the conviction, and DHS moved to withdraw the removal charge. At a subsequent removal hearing, Orabi appeared pro se. Following an ambiguous exchange, removal charges were reinstated, although there is no documentary evidence that Orabi withdrew his appeal. Orabi was ordered removed. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Third Circuit reversed. A conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until direct appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted or waived. View "Orabi v. Att'y Gen. of U.S." on Justia Law

Hoping to remain in the United States from her native Jamaica, Defendant-Appellant Shannakay Hunter married a United States citizen. The government regarded the marriage as a sham and charged defendant with conspiracy and participation in a fraudulent marriage. A jury found her guilty on both charges. Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) the district court should have required proof that defendant had married solely to evade the immigration laws; (2) the evidence of guilt was insufficient; (3) the marriage was “void” under state law; (4) the application of 8 U.S.C. 1325(c) resulted in a denial of equal protection, and (5) section 1325(c) is overbroad. Rejecting each argument, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of China of Korean and Chinese descent, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). At issue was whether an IJ could use the maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" (i.e. false in one thing, false in everything) to find that material inconsistencies in testimony regarding one claim supported an adverse credibility determination on another claim. The court denied the petition for review, holding that Ninth Circuit precedent permitted the BIA to use an adverse credibility finding on one claim to support an adverse finding on another claim in a pre-REAL ID Act case. View "Li v. Holder" on Justia Law

An immigration judge found petitioner Nadia Maatougui removable for marriage fraud in 2004. Petitioner then asylum and four other forms of relief from removal. The Immigration Judge denied the requests, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Petitioner claimed on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that the IJ and BIA erred in denying her a hardship waiver and cancellation of removal based on their credibility determinations and the weight they gave the evidence in her case. Under case law, the Tenth Circuit determined it did not have jurisdiction to overturn their credibility determinations or evidence weighing, and thus could not grant relief on that claim. Petitioner also claimed that changed conditions in her native Morocco and the ineffective assistance of her prior counsel at a hearing in 2004 merited reopening her case. The Tenth Circuit concluded petitioner failed to present new, material, previously unavailable evidence that justified reopening her case. View "Maatougui v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law