Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

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Camarena, a Mexican citizen, was admitted to the U.S. for permanent residence in 1977, at age 10. He did not become a citizen. After a felony conviction for indecent solicitation of a minor, his permanent-residence status was revoked, and he was ordered removed. Camarena is homosexual and HIV positive and claims that gays are persecuted in Mexico and that gays infected by HIV face extra risk. Although he is not eligible for asylum, he applied for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge granted his application, finding, on the basis of statistics and expert testimony that Camarena probably would be killed or injured in Mexico as a result of his sexuality and disease. The BIA remanded; the IJ adhered to his position. The BIA then reversed and, after a remand, adhered to its position. The BIA accepted the IJ’s findings of historical fact but disagreed about the risk implied by those facts. The Seventh Circuit again remanded, for the BIA to consider, not whether aggregate data imply that Camarena is likely to be killed, but whether the IJ clearly erred in finding that he is more likely than not to be persecuted. View "Rosiles-Camarena v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Rachak, a citizen of Morocco, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 2002. In 2006, he was charged with possession of marijuana and was placed on probation with supervision under Pennsylvania’s “Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition” program. He did not comply with the conditions of the program and pled guilty to the charge. In 2011, Rachak pled guilty to charges of possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 12 months of probation. The Department of Homeland Security charged Rachak with being removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Rachak then filed a Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act petition attacking his 2011 conviction. For a time, he obtained immigration continuance, but when Rachak’s attorney advised the Immigration Judge that his PCRA petition had been denied at the trial level and was on appeal, the IJ denied further continuances, ordered Rachak removed, and noted that his 2006 conduct rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a) because he had not accrued seven years of continuous residence. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit rejected a petition for review. View "Rachak v. Att'y General of the United States" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a native and citizen of Peru, was found removable because he had committed a theft offense that qualified as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). At issue was whether the government proved that petitioner was convicted of a qualifying felony theft offense. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court concluded that petitioner was clearly and unambiguously charged as a principal who personally drove or took the vehicle of another, without consent and with the intent to deprive the owner of it under California Vehicle Code section 10851(a). Further, the BIA has held that section 10851(a) was a categorical theft offense even though, in some circumstances, it criminalizes taking a vehicle temporarily. The court has also defined a "theft offense" to include taking property without consent and with the intent to deprive the owner of the property, even if the deprivation is less than total or permanent. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Duenas-Alvarez v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Al-Sharif is a lawful U.S. permanent resident. He and others arranged to connect callers in Israel to callers in countries with no direct phone service to Israel, for a fee, by routing the calls through a New Jersy apartment. Al-Sharif rented the apartment and set up phone service using a false name and Social Security number. He later abandoned the apartment without leaving a forwarding address or paying the phone bill. As a result, in 1993 Al-Sharif pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, with a stipulation that his fraud caused loss to the victim of between $120,000 and $200,000. He was sentenced to six months’ home confinement and five years’ probation, and was ordered to pay $128,838 in restitution to the phone company. In 2004, Al-Sharif applied to become a naturalized citizen and truthfully disclosed his conviction. His application was denied by USCIS, which treated the conviction as for an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), which precluded him, under 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(8), from demonstrating “good moral character,” as required for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1427(a)(3). The district court granted summary judgment to USCIS. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Al-Sharif v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv." on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States illegally in 2000. Petitioner later admitted removability but sought cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), alleging that he was a child "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" by a parent who acquired lawful permanent resident status under the NACARA. An immigration judge found Petitioner was not "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" and therefore decided Petitioner was not eligible for special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Because Petitioner did not raise any legal or constitutional issue on appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "Castro v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Boika, a Belarusian citizen, entered the U.S. legally in 2006, but overstayed. At her removal proceedings, she applied for asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1158, withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. Her husband, Zhits, made parallel claims, derivative from Boika’s claims based on their marital status, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(3)(A). Boika claimed that she could establish a well‐founded fear of future persecution upon return to Belarus, based on past persecution for her political involvement in Belarus, between2004 and 2006. An immigration judge denied her asylum application based on an adverse credibility finding. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. Boika moved to reopen based on materially changed country conditions, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), claiming that after Belarusian President Lukashenko’s election in 2010,the Belarusian government’s severe crackdown on political opposition resulted in widespread human rights abuses. She submitted new corroborating evidence about her activity in the Belarusian opposition movement while she has been in the U.S. The Board denied Boika’s motion. The Seventh Circuit granted their petition and remanded. View "Boika v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Ward, a 50-year-old man from the United Kingdom, obtained lawful-permanent-resident status in 1995. Ward left the U.S. in 2003 to take care of his mother, who suffered from dementia. When he returned in 2006, Ward presented an expired green card and was charged as subject to removal under 8 U.S.C.A. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). The government asserted that Ward had abandoned permanent resident status.” At a hearing, the government called Ward to testify, but called no other witnesses. Ward testified in his behalf and his brother also testified. Both sides also introduced documentary evidence. The Immigration Judge held that removability had been sustained by the requisite clear and convincing evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the Immigration Judge erred in applying the wrong degree of proof and in assigning the burden of proof to the immigrant. View "Ward v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Verde, a native of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident in 1991. After several DUI convictions, he was sentenced to more than two years in prison. In 1998, Verde was charged with removability as an “aggravated felon.” He appeared before an immigration judge with seven other Mexican nationals, was deported, returned, and was removed for a second time in 2000. In 2011 the removal order was reinstated and he was charged with illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326. The government dropped that charge and allowed him to plead guilty to use of a false Social Security number, 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B). He was sentenced to time served and supervised release. Verde filed a habeas corpus petition seeking to be reinstated as a permanent resident or to be granted cancellation of removal, arguing that his initial removal was a gross miscarriage of justice because of procedural shortcomings and that, because the Supreme Court has decided that a DUI conviction is not an aggravated felony, his conviction was not a valid basis for original removal. The district court dismissed Verde’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. 1101, eliminated habeas relief in district courts for aliens challenging orders of removal. The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Verde-Rodriguez v. Att'y Gen of the United States" on Justia Law

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Petitioner sought review of the government's reinstatement of a removal order issued in 1997. Petitioner contended that ICE could not deport him on the basis of his prior removal order because a federal district court found that due process violations in his 1997 immigration hearing rendered the removal order invalid as a predicate for criminal prosecution under 8 U.S.C. 1326. The court concluded that petitioner was prejudiced by ICE agents' misinformation or lack of information regarding his criminal prosecution, as well as by the absence of an opportunity to contest the reinstatement determination at a meaningful time. Accordingly, the court remanded to ICE to provide that opportunity and to reconsider its reinstatement determination in light of the district court's findings regarding petitioner's 1997 removal proceedings. The court expressed no view as to that determination on remand. Accordingly, the court granted the petition. View "Villa-Anguiano v. Holder" on Justia Law

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In these consolidated appeals, at issue was whether landowners could form the basis for membership in a particular social group for purposes of eligibility for asylum. The court granted petitioners', landowners, petition for review as to their asylum claim based on their membership in a particular social group; remanded for the BIA to reconsider its determinations that the particular social group offered by petitioners were not cognizable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in light of en banc decision in Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder; the BIA should address in the first instance whether the harm suffered by petitioners constituted persecution and whether that persecution was "on account of" a protected basis; and because the BIA denied petitioners' removal claims on the same basis as their asylum claims, the court reversed and remanded those determinations. Finally, the court granted Medina-Gonzalez's petition for review as to his Convention Against Torture claim, remanding for reconsideration of that claim in light of the court's recent decision in Tapia-Madrigal v. Holder. View "Cordoba v. Holder" on Justia Law