Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Board, the County Sheriff, and two deputy sheriffs, alleging that the deputies violated her Fourth Amendment rights when, after questioning her at her workplace, they arrested her on an outstanding civil warrant for removal issued by ICE. The court concluded that the deputies did not seize plaintiff until one of the two deputies gestured for her to remain seated while they verified that the immigration warrant was active; the civil immigration warrant did not provide the deputies with a basis to arrest or even briefly detain plaintiff; the individual defendants were immune from suit because at the time of the encounter neither the Supreme Court nor the court had clearly established that local and state law enforcement officers could not detain or arrest an individual based on a civil immigration warrant; and qualified immunity did not extend to municipal defendants. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Santos v. Frederick County Board" on Justia Law

KDS petitioned for review from the summary decision of an ALJ in favor of ICE on 225 out of 271 alleged violations of 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b) and the resulting civil penalty. Section 1324a(b) requires employers to verify that their employees are legally authorized to work in the United States. The court held that compliance required that the relevant information from the documents be transcribed onto the I-9 Form, regardless of whether copies of the documents were retained. The court concluded that it was neither arbitrary nor capricious to require that employers actually complete their I-9 Forms; applying Skidmore deference, the court rejected KDS's alternative argument that even if it had not complied with all of its verification and documentation obligations under section 1324a(b), its non-compliance should be treated as compliance under section 1324a(b)(6)(A); and the court found no error in the ALJ's penalty calculations. Accordingly, the court denied KDS's petition for review. View "Ketchikan Drywall Servs. v. ICE, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners, a married couple from Jordan, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision that extraordinary circumstances did not excuse their untimely applications for asylum. According to petitioners, their delay in filing asylum applications was reasonable because of various barriers they encountered after their lawful status elapsed, including ineffective assistance of counsel and their inability to file asylum applications due to having been served Notices to Appear. The court concluded that, even assuming that petitioners could demonstrate extraordinary circumstances, they did not file their applications within a reasonable period given those circumstances. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Al Ramahi, et al. v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner and his family, Kenyan citizens, petitioned for review of the BIA's order denying them asylum and withholding of removal. The court held that Mungiki defectors constituted a "particular social group" and that the record compelled the conclusion that the Kenyan government was unwilling or unable to control the Mungiki. Therefore, the BIA erred in denying petitioner's claims on the merits. Further, the BIA abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to remand to allow petitioner's sister to testify in person because her testimony, if credited, was likely to change the IJ's credibility findings and thus change the outcome of the case. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Gathungu, et al. v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Papazoglou, a citizen of Greece, entered the U.S. on a visitor’s visa in 1986. In 1987, he married a U.S. citizen, Hariklia, and adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident in 1990. He has four children. In 2008, Papazoglou pled guilty to third-degree sexual assault and physical abuse of a child and was sentenced to 2 ½ years’ imprisonment and 4 ½ years of probation. DHS began removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C.A. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Papazoglou sought adjustment of status based on his marriage, 8 U.S.C. 1255(a), and a waiver of inadmissibility arising from that aggravated felony conviction, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h). The IJ granted the waiver and the adjustment of status. The Board of Immigration Review found Papazoglou statutorily ineligible for waiver and that, even if he were eligible for waiver, he would not be entitled to it as a matter of discretion. The Seventh Circuit denied review, upholding the Boar’s interpretation of the statute as applied to Papazoglou and finding that judicial review of discretionary removal decisions based on commission of an aggravated felony is precluded by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). View "Papazoglou v. Holder" on Justia Law

Canadian immigration officers refused to allow Margulis to “enter” Canada, but when he attempted to return, U.S. customs officers discovered that he had a criminal record and placed him in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2) even though his crimes had resulted in only 30 days of jail time. A lawful permanent resident is removable if he commits nontrivial crimes in the U.S.; if he leaves the U.S. he cannot be readmitted for at least five years, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9), (a)(9)(B). Immigration authorities can waive inadmissibility if the crimes that made the alien deportable are minor, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) (section 212(h)). Margulis asked that the removal proceedings be terminated and that he be placed in admissibility proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals refused, finding that Margulis had never “entered” Canada and so could not have returned to the U.S. The Seventh Circuit remanded, reasoning that immigration officers did not treat Margulis as a lawful entrant, but deemed him already present in the U.S.; if they had thought he was seeking admission they would have placed him in admissibility proceedings rather than removal proceedings. View "Margulis v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2006, Shearson, the executive director of the Cleveland chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, was stopped by U.S. Customs and Borders Protection as she and her daughter were returning from Canada, removed her from her car, handcuffed her, and detained her for about 2-1/2 hours. Shearson claims that an officer swiped her passport and an “armed and dangerous” warning came up. After being allowed to enter the U.S., Shearson filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act for documents related to her detention. Following a suit, she obtained documents indicating that her name returned “an Armed and Dangerous” designation in Customs’ terrorist database and was a positive match to the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File. The FBI declined to discuss the matter and recommended that Shearson use an administrative remedy, the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, 49 U.S.C. 44926. Shearson did not seek redress through that Program, but filed suit claiming due process, First Amendment, Privacy Act, Administrative Procedures Act, and equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Shearson v. Holder" on Justia Law

Reyes, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. in 1979 and was granted lawful permanent resident status in 1989. In 1993, he pled guilty to two felony counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. He was sentenced to six months in prison and four years of probation. As a result, he was ordered removed in 2000. He later reentered unlawfully. In 2011, he was arrested and the 2000 removal order was reinstated. He asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen his removal proceeding, arguing that his initial removal was in error because he was prevented from seeking discretionary relief from removal in 2000, but intervening Supreme Court decisions show that discretionary relief should have been available at that time. The Board denied the motion, finding it untimely and that the 90-day statutory deadline should not be equitably tolled. The Board also found that the discretionary relief he sought was not available to him, despite changes in the law, because he had reentered the country unlawfully. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, citing 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5); Reyes is barred from section 212(c) discretionary relief and his removal proceedings may not be reopened because of his illegal reentry. View "Zambrano v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, filed an asylum application in 1997. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal in 2000. In 2012, Petitioner, who allegedly converted to Christianity in 2011, filed a motion with the BIA to reopen proceedings, claiming that, since the time of his hearing in 1998, circumstances surrounding the practice of Christianity had changed insofar as persecution of unregistered Christian groups had increased. The BIA determined that Petitioner had failed to establish changed circumstances in China and so his untimely motion did not qualify for an exception to the statutory deadline for a motion to reopen. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioner failed to demonstrate changed country circumstances, and therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny his motion to reopen. View "Zhao-Cheng v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Kenya, married a U.S. citizen in 2002. The couple divorced in 2006. Later, Petitioner Petitioner filed a Form I-751 petition to remove the conditions on his residency. Petitioner did not file the petition with his ex-wife but argued that he was entitled to a removal of the conditions despite his marriage to a U.S. citizen ending in divorce. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied the petition. Petitioner was later charged with being removable. Petitioner conceded removability but requested relief in the form of a review of his petition for removal of conditions. The immigration judge (IJ) found that Petitioner had failed to meet his burden of showing that his marriage had been in good faith, therefore concluding that Petitioner's I-751 petition had to be denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the IJ's decision to deny Petitioner's I-751 petition. View "Kinisu v. Holder" on Justia Law