Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed her conviction of one count of conspiracy to transport aliens who unlawfully came to or entered the United States and three counts of transporting such aliens, in each case for financial gain. The court held that the admission of the forms filled out by Border Patrol agents did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court held, however, that the district court erred in admitting the forms under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay because this exception did not apply to records of government agencies. Here, the aliens' statements that they were in the United States illegally did not qualify as public records. The district court's error in admitting such statements did not substantially affect the verdict and, therefore, was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Morales" on Justia Law

Petitioner Arturo Montano-Vega admitted to remaining in the United States illegally, and requested permission to leave voluntarily. Petitioner wanted to avoid a ten-year bar on readmission for aliens who had been "ordered removed." The immigration judge hearing petitioner's case refused the request. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration appeals: if he continued the appeal, he would have to stay in the U.S. for the duration; if he left, the BIA would consider his appeal abandoned and subject petitioner to the ten-year ban. Petitioner elected to leave, and the BIA dismissed his appeal. Petitioner appealed the BIA's decision to the Tenth Circuit challenging the application of 8 C.F.R. 1003.4 to his case in addition to the immigration judge's refusal to allow him to leave voluntarily. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit denied petitioner's challenge to the BIA order because by leaving, his appeal was deemed withdrawn, leaving the court without jurisdiction to hear the case. View "Montano-Vega v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner Elia Ibarra was ordered removed by the Department of Homeland Security for a Colorado conviction on child abuse. The events leading up to her conviction were unclear, but it was undisputed that petitioner's children were unintentionally left home alone while she was at work. No child was injured. Petitioner requested discretionary relief from removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). The immigration judge hearing petitioner's case decided that she was ineligible cancellation of removal. Petitioner then appealed to the Tenth Circuit to review the immigration judge's decision that found her Colorado conviction for "child abuse-negligence-no injury" was the same as (or close enough to be categorically considered) "child abuse, neglect or abandonment" as codified under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with petitioner that the Board of Immigration Appeals' then-current interpretation of "child abuse, neglect and abandonment" extended the full range of conduct criminalized by the Colorado statute. Accordingly, the Court reversed the BIA's decision rendering petitioner ineligible for discretionary cancellation of removal. View "Ibarra v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to unlawful reentry and subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because neither defendant's identity nor his INS file were suppressible, although the court concluded that the agents lacked reasonable suspicion and clearly violated the Fourth Amendment in stopping defendant. Accordingly, the court was bound by precedent and affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Hernandez-Mandujano" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming an IJ's decision finding her removable, denying her temporary protective status (TPS) relief, and granting her voluntary departure in lieu of removal. Petitioner argued that she was denied due process when the government placed her in removal proceedings without her husband but she did not raise this argument before the IJ or the BIA. The court concluded that petitioner's claim did not fall within the exception to the exhaustion requirement because the IJ or BIA could have addressed petitioner's claim if she had raised it. The court did not have jurisdiction to consider the issue because she failed to exhaust her claim. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Sola v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico admitted to the United States in 1976 as a lawful permanent resident, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming an IJ's decision that he was ineligible for relief from removal under former Immigration and Naturalization Act 212(c), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), because his conviction for an aggravated felony was the result of a trial. The court concluded that Vartelas v. Holder made it clear that the essential inquiry of retroactivity analysis was to determine whether the new law attached new legal consequences to completed conduct and that evidence regarding reliance was not required to prove that a new law was impermissibly retroactive. The repeal of section 212(c) relief impermissibly attached new legal consequences to the trial convictions of aliens like petitioner by rendering these aliens ineligible for relief as a result of convictions that pre-dated the repeal of section 212(c). Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cardenas-Delgado v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the district court's holding affirming the USCIS's denial of several of plaintiff's petitions for Q-1 visas for foreign applicants to its cultural exchange program. USCIS denied the petitions because it interpreted its regulation to require sponsors of a cultural exchange program to pay wages to the participating aliens and plaintiff admittedly did not pay its participants any wages. Given 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(Q)'s specific references to "employed," "wages," and "workers," the court agreed with USCIS that the statute was best read to require that the foreign citizens receive wages and that those wages be equivalent to the wages of domestic workers. Given 8 C.F.R. 214.2(q)(4)(i)(D)'s references to "employer," "wages," "workers," and "remunerate," the court agreed with USCIS that the regulation was best read to require that foreign citizens receive wages and that those wages be comparable to those of local workers. Finally, when USCIS denied plaintiff's petitions in 2010, the agency did not trigger the notice-and-comment procedures in the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 603(a), 604, 605(b), or the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 533(b)-(c), because the denials were not rules under either act; rather, they were informal adjudications. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Int'l Internship Program v. Napolitano, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners, Lebanese citizens, were raised Muslim. While visiting the United States in 2005, Petitioners converted to Christianity. When they returned to the Ivory Coast, where they were living at the time, Petitioners received a number of threats, which they attributed to the Muslim population's reaction to their conversion to Christianity. Petitioners subsequently began living in the United States on expired visas, and the United States began removal proceedings against them. Petitioners filed challenged the proceedings, asserting that they had a well-founded fear of future persecution in Lebanon, based on their belief that Lebanon's majority Muslim population would carry out the threats made in the Ivory Coast. The immigration judge (IJ) rejected petitioners' claims, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding that Petitioners failed to prove they had a well-founded fear of future persecution in Lebanon in order to qualify for asylum; (2) the BIA did not err in rejecting Plaintiffs' claim for withholding of removal; and (3) the Convention Against Torture did not require the BIA to forestall Petitioners' return to Lebanon. View "Darwich v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Jordanian national who entered the United States illegally. Once Plaintiff was placed in removal proceedings, he married his first cousin, a marriage that lasted one year. Plaintiff subsequently married his second wife. Both marriages were to United States citizens. Plaintiff's second wife filed an I-130 petition on Plaintiff's behalf. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the petition, concluding that Plaintiff previously entered into his first marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Plaintiff and his wife filed an amended complaint in the district court seeking to set aside the BIA's decision. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the district court without reaching the merits of the appeal, holding (1) the district court erred in invoking the plausibility standard in deciding that this case did not warrant either discovery or trial, as the plausibility standard does not apply to a complaint for judicial review of a final agency action; and (2) the methodologic error was not harmless where the parties failed to file the administrative record with the court. View "Atieh v. Riordan" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, pleaded guilty to robbery after illegally reentering the United States. At issue on appeal was whether the district court plainly erred by sentencing defendant to, inter alia, a three-year term of supervised release even though U.S.S.G. 5D1.1(c) provided that district courts "ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release in a case in which... the defendant is a deportable alien who likely will be deported after imprisonment." The court held that the district court adequately explained why it sentenced defendant to a term of supervised release where "an added measure of deterrence and protection" was needed in defendant's case. Even assuming arguendo that the district court erred by not adequately explaining its reasons for imposing a term of supervised release on defendant, in the circumstances presented here, it did not "plainly err" because the alleged error did not affect his substantial rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Alvarado" on Justia Law