Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

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Defendant appealed his conviction of illegal reentry. The court concluded, inter alia, that the district court violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2); the district court abused its discretion in granting the government's motion to reopen its case-in-chief to introduce defendant's mother's naturalization certificate; and defendant was clearly prejudiced by the district court's leniency in allowing the prosecution to fill the gaps it had left in its case. Accordingly, the court vacated the conviction and remanded for an evidentiary hearing into whether the prosecution's failure to disclose the certificate in discovery or at any point before the proofs had closed was willful; and, if it was willful, the district court shall impose appropriate sanctions. View "United States v. Hernandez-Meza" on Justia Law

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In 1996, Singh fled India to escape police officers allegedly trying to kill him. In 1997 he was charged as removeable. He sought asylum based on his religion and political beliefs and withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In 2009 an Immigration Judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the agency’s conclusions about past persecution “problematic,” but agreeing that Singh does not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Singh v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Defendant and his wife were indicted on charges of marriage fraud, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325(c), and making a false, fictitious or fraudulent statement to DHS, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2). On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's motion to dismiss his marriage fraud indictment on statute of limitations grounds. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss and reversed the judgment because the plain meaning of section 1325(c) dictated that the crime of marriage fraud was complete on the date of marriage and, as a result, the government's indictment was time-barred. View "United States v. Roja" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a national of India and lawful permanent resident in the United States, pled guilty to one count of receiving Medicare kickbacks and one count of income tax evasion. On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate his tax evasion conviction on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his criminal defense attorney's advice as to the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to that count. The court concluded, based on the entire record, that the district court did not err in concluding that petitioner failed to establish that, if counsel had recommended withdrawal of the plea, petitioner would have accepted that recommendation in order to go to trial. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the petition was untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chhabra v. United States" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed his sentence stemming from his conviction for illegal reentry after deportation. The court held that it was error to rule that defendant's third degree aggravated assault conviction constituted a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) and apply the 16-level increase to the base offense level. The error was not harmless where the district court did not clearly state that it would impose the same sentence if there had not been a 16-level enhancement based on the prior crime of violence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Martinez-Flores" on Justia Law

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Defendant, a Mexican citizen, appealed his conviction for being an alien who, after having been removed on five occasions, was "found in" the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. Defendant had already been convicted in 2009 for violating section 1326 based on the same 2006 removal order that formed the predicate for the conviction in this case. The court concluded, inter alia, that the government introduced sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction where it introduced ample proof of the statutory elements at trial and defendant did not contend otherwise; the court rejected defendant's contention that, in analyzing his double jeopardy defense, the court was limited to reviewing the evidence presented by the jury; there was no error, much less plain error, in the district court's refusal to vacate defendant's conviction based on a double jeopardy defense he never raised; and an immigration officer's failure to inform him of his ability to request withdrawal of his application for admission did not violate his due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Sanchez-Aguilar" on Justia Law

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Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of her habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241. At issue was whether aliens who were removable, but not yet subject to a removal order, were "in custody" for purposes of section 2241. The court held that they were not. In this case, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's habeas petition because she was not in custody for purposes of section 2241. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying the petition and dismissed the case. View "Veltmann-Barragan v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the constitutionality of Arizona's Proposition 100. Proposition 100 commands that Arizona state courts could not set bail for serious felony offenses as prescribed by the legislature if the person charged has entered or remained in the United States illegally and if the proof was evident or the presumption great as to the charge. After reviewing the record, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and partial dismissal, concluding that plaintiffs have not raised triable issues of fact as to whether Proposition 100 and its implementing procedures violated the substantive and procedural due process guarantees of the United State's Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, nor whether the Proposition 100 laws were preempted by federal immigration law. The court concluded that the Arizona Legislature and Arizona voters passed the Proposition 100 laws to further the state's legitimate and compelling interest in seeing that those accused of serious state-law crimes were brought to trial. View "Lopez-Valenzuela v. County of Maricopa" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision to deny his request for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ and BIA concluded that petitioner was subject to removal and that he was not entitled to relief under the CAT because he had failed to prove that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured in Mexico. The court denied the petition for relief, concluding that the BIA committed no error of law; rejected defendant's argument that his removal to Mexico would violate his right to due process; and directed the court to seal records of petitioner's guilty plea and those portions of the record that contained information about the identity and whereabouts of petitioner's family. View "Perez-Guerrero v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

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Defendant, a citizen of El Salvador, pled guilty to possession of a concealed dangerous weapon and possession of marijuana in 2004, in violation of Maryland law. In 2008, defendant was found guilty of driving without a valid license. Two years later, defendant pled guilty to assault in the second degree and was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement shortly after sentencing. In 2011, defendant pled guilty to unlawful reentry after removal. The parties disputed whether defendant's 2004 probation-before-judgment disposition triggered a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(D). The court held that diversionary dispositions arising from guilty pleas - including defendant's probation before judgment disposition at issue here - constituted predicate convictions under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(D). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Medina" on Justia Law