Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision finding that his conviction for possession of marijuana for sale in violation of California Health & Safety Code 11359 was categorically a crime relating to a controlled substance. The court concluded that petitioner failed to met his burden of proving a "realistic probability" that Cailfornia would apply section 11359 to conduct not related to a controlled substance. Just as section 11359 was categorically a controlled substance offense for sentencing purposes, it was categorically a crime relating to a controlled substance for immigration purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Macias-Carreon v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged his conviction and sentence under 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b) for being an alien found in the United States after removal. The court held that the district court correctly rejected defendant's collateral challenge to the validity of the removal order underlying his section 1326(b) sentencing enhancement; rejected defendant's arguments that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by admitting documents from his immigration file; and rejected defendant's claims that the district court erred procedurally and substantively in imposing a sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rojas-Pedroza" on Justia Law

A native of Ecuador, Espinoza became a lawful permanent resident of the U. S. in 1980. In 1994, he was charged with deportability based on a 1993 conviction for selling cocaine. Espinoza sought waiver of deportation. Prior to his hearing, Espinoza was paroled into the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and his proceedings were administratively closed in 1994. As a result, Espinoza's application for relief was never adjudicated. In 2004, he was arrested again; in 2007, Espinoza was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A), and was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. The Department of Homeland Security reopened deportation proceedings and supplemented the 1994 charges. After several delays, in 2010 the deportation hearing proceeded, although Espinoza still had not obtained counsel. He was ordered removed. The BIA remanded. The judge held that Espinoza was ineligible for relief under former INA section 212(c) and entered a second order of deportation. The BIA affirmed and Espinoza was deported. The Third Circuit agreed that an alien who has spent more than five years in prison for an aggravated felony is not eligible for a waiver of deportation under former section 212(c). View "Lupera-Espinoza v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Pakistani native, fled Pakistan in 1993 as a result of threats against him from a subsidiary of the ruling Pakistan Mulsim League. Petitioner entered the United States as a non-immigrant visitor in 1999 but remained in the country beyond the time authorized. In 2005, Petitioner appeared before the Immigration Judge (IJ), conceded removability, and applied for withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. In support of his applications, Petitioner testified to the threats he received, which continued even in his absence. The IJ denied Petitioner's applications. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted in part and denied part Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the Board's withholding-of-removal decision was contrary to the evidence; and(2) the IJ and BIA's CAT rulings were supported by the record. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Javed v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a United States citizen, filed a visa petition on behalf of her husband, a citizen of Afghanistan, but the visa was denied under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B). Section 1182(a)(3)(B) is a broad provision that excludes aliens on a variety of terrorism-related grounds. The court concluded that the Government's citation to section 1182(a)(3)(B), in the absence of any allegations of proscribed conduct, was not a facially legitimate reason to deny the visa. Because the Government had not offered a facially legitimate reason, plaintiff's claims for a writ of mandamus directing the Government to adjudicate the visa application and for a declaratory judgment survived dismissal. Accordingly, the court also concluded that plaintiff had standing to challenge 8 U.S.C. 1182(b)(3) as it had been applied to her. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Din v. Kerry" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Jamaica, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of his petition to defer removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and dismissal of his appeal. To the extent petitioner challenged the legal standard used by the BIA, the court rejected that challenge on the merits. Petitioner's remaining challenges, including his factual dispute with the BIA's application of the "willful blindness" standard, were foreclosed by the criminal alien bar in 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C) and were beyond the court's jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Gallimore v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Colombian national, petitioned for review of a final order of the BIA affirming the denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101, and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA concluded that petitioner provided material support to a designated terrorist organization, the AUC, in the form of six annual payments of $300 in war taxes. Alternatively, the BIA found that petitioner's claims for relief failed on the merits. The court concluded that the BIA's factual finding that petitioner paid $1,800 to a designated terrorist organization was supported by substantial evidence; the fact that the AUC was demobilized in 2006 did not render the material support bar inapplicable; it was not relevant whether petitioner knew, or should have known, that the AUC was deemed a terrorist organization; the BIA's legal determinations that the funds provided by petitioner constituted "material support" within the meaning of the statutory bar and that the statute did not contain a duress exception were permissible constructions of the INA to which the court must defer; and the BIA reasonably concluded that the statutory bar did not exempt material support provided to a terrorist organization under duress. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Alturo, et al v. US Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Panama, petitioned for review of the BIA's determination that he was not eligible for relief pursuant to former Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 212(c), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), because he was an aggravated felon, who filed his application for relief after November 29, 1990. The court held that the aggravated felony bar applied to petitioner's attempt to seek section 212(c) relief and denied the petition for review. View "Lawrence, et al v. Holder" on Justia Law

Husband, Sirbu, and wife, Prodan, entered the U.S. as nonimmigrant tourists in 2009 and overstayed their visas. They then filed a timely application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Sirbu’s persecution claim is based on politically motivated mistreatment that occurred in Moldova between 2000 and 2009; he claims to fear prosecution based on his active opposition to the Communist Party. The government responded by charging them as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). An immigration judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted their petition for review and remanded, finding that the immigration judge and the Board applied the wrong legal standard in holding that the facts did not “compel” a finding of past persecution. If the Board concludes that Sirbu has demonstrated past persecution, the burden will shift to the government to prove that changed circumstances mean that Sirbu’s fear of persecution in Moldova is no longer well-founded. View "Sirbu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident charged with removal based on his alleged conviction of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs), petitioned for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner's conviction for endangerment under Arizona law constituted a CIMT. The Attorney General held in Matter of Silva-Trevino that an IJ could rely on evidence outside the record of conviction to determine whether a petitioner had been "convicted of" a CIMT. The court joined the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that Silva-Trevino was wrongly decided. The court held that a CIMT was a generic crime whose description was complete unto itself, such that "involving moral turpitude" was an element of the crime. Because it was an element of the generic crime, an IJ was limited to the record of conviction in determining whether an alien had been "convicted of" a CIMT. In this case, the court concluded that the IJ and BIA improperly considered evidence beyond the record of conviction in holding that petitioner was "convicted of" a "crime involving moral turpitude." Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Olivas-Motta v. Holder" on Justia Law