Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of Peru, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of his asylum and withholding of removal claims. Petitioner feared persecution if he returned to Peru on account of his political opinion. Petitioner asserted that the BIA erred by affirming the IJ's determination that he failed to show that the Peruvian authorities were unable or unwilling to protect him from the Shining Path. Considering the police efforts, the substantial evidence in the record did not indicate that the government condoned the actions of the Shining Path or demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect petitioner. Thus, petitioner failed to establish a harm amounting to persecution. For the same reason, petitioner failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Because petitioner failed to satisfy the lower burden of proof required for asylum, it followed that he failed to satisfy the higher, clear probability standard for withholding of removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Gutierrez-Vidal v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's decision holding that there was no "realistic probability" that California would apply California Penal Code 243.4(e) to conduct that was not normally turpitudinous and the BIA's decision denying his motion to reconsider. The court held that section 243.4(e)(1)'s requirement that defendant specifically intended to damage his victim psychologically evidenced the malicious intent that was the essence of moral turpitude. The BIA's decision that this kind of behavior was per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong was persuasive. Because the court agreed that there was no "realistic probability" that California courts would apply section 243.4(e) to conduct falling outside the generic federal definition of moral turpitude, the court denied the petitions. View "Gonzalez-Cervantes v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Rodriquez entered the U.S. illegally in 1988 and came to the attention of the Department of Homeland Security in 2005, following a misdemeanor DUI conviction. He subsequently pleaded guilty to using a fraudulent social security card, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). He sought cancellation of removal based on hardship to his children, who are U.S. citizens, but failed to timely comply with the IJ’s request for biometrics. The IJ deemed the petition abandoned and ordered removal, after which Rodriguez provided the information. Following a remand, DHS notified the BIA that Rodriguez had been removed. BIA withdrew the remand. The Seventh Circuit remanded. An IJ then held that Rodriguez was ineligible for cancellation of removal, based on his conviction of a crime of moral turpitude (8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C)). The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, holding that fraudulent use of a social security card is a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizen and national of Iran, filed suit seeking relief under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 704 and 706, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a), when plaintiff's application to obtain lawful permanent residence status was denied by USCIS ten years after he filed the application. Because the government had not demonstrated a significant change in the law between 1999 and 2010 as applied to plaintiff's petition for permanent resident status, USCIS was collaterally estopped from concluding that plaintiff was ineligible for an adjustment to permanent resident status on the basis of his provision of support to the mujahedeen movement. USCIS's denial of application was set aside under 5 U.S.C. 706. Accordingly, the court reversed, rendered summary judgment to plaintiff, and remanded to the agency for further proceedings. View "Amrollah v. Napolitano, et al" on Justia Law

When her car was stopped, Villega, then pregnant, failed to produce a valid driver’s license. At the jail, an agent of the U.S. through Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 287(g) program, 8 U.S.C. 1357(g), determined that Villega was not lawfully in the U.S. A detainer was imposed, so that federal immigration officials would delay action until resolution of pending state charges. Unable to post bond, she was classified as a medium-security inmate because of the detainer and held for two days, until she informed a guard that she was about to have her baby. For transportation, Villega was placed on a stretcher with her wrists handcuffed in front of her body and her legs restrained together. At the hospital, the handcuffs were removed, but one of Villega’s legs remained shackled to the stretcher before and after the birth. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment on her shackling and denial-of-breast-pump claims; a jury awarded $200,000. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, noting material factual disputes surrounding whether Villega was shown to be a flight risk, whether officers had any knowledge about a doctor’s no-restraint order, and the conflicting expert testimony about the ill effects of shackling. View "Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of a final order of the BIA affirming the IJ's denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner asserted that he was targeted for persecution because of his membership in a particular social group consisting of family members and local business owners. The court concluded that petitioner had not shown that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA did not abuse its discretion because it gave a rational explanation for its decision, did not distort the record, followed its established policies, relied on no impermissible factors, and committed no legal error. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Quinteros v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nigeria, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the denial of his application for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h). The court concluded that it was unclear whether the BIA's current interpretation of section 212(h) - that an alien seeking section 212(h) relief who had not filed an adjustment of status application must remain "outside our borders while applying for relief" - overruled Matter of Sanchez or if the BIA's current interpretation essentially functioned as a continuation of its precedent under Sanchez, in which case the BIA would treat an alien satisfying the conditions of Sanchez as if the alien were "outside our borders while applying for relief." Therefore, the court remanded to the BIA for the purpose of allowing it to consider petitioner's case in light of the court's intervening decision in Poveda v. U.S. Att'y Gen. and to apply Sanchez to petitioner's case if the BIA finds it applicable. On remand, the BIA should also reconsider petitioner's case in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Judulang v. Holder. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lawal v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, born in Mexico, petitioned for review of the government's reinstatement of a prior order of removal, following his illegal reentry into the United States after having been removed. The court rejected, as unsupported and as contrary to the text of 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), petitioner's assertion that the 1989 removal order was "superseded" or otherwise invalidated simply because a later removal order existed. The court held that petitioner's substantively illegal reentry met the requirements of section 1231(a)(5) that he had "reentered the United States illegally," notwithstanding the fact that he tricked the border official into allowing him physically to enter. The government's decision to arrest and remove petitioner when he showed up for his interview did not prejudice him. Accordingly, the court need not decide whether there was a due process violation. View "Tamayo-Tamayo v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Moral, a citizen of Ecuador, was admitted to the U.S. in 1988 as an immigrant. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings in 2011 because of his multiple criminal convictions, including unlawful use of a weapon and sexual abuse of a minor. The Immigration Judge granted five continuances, four of which allowed Moral to pursue state-court post-conviction proceedings seeking to set aside his guilty plea for sexual abuse of a minor occurring in 2002. After the state criminal court dismissed his petition, the IJ denied his request for another continuance and ordered removal. The BIA denied an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). The court reasoned that the provision, which is phrased more broadly than subsection (B), applies to denial of a continuance. View "Moral-Salazar v. Holder" on Justia Law

Vahora is a Muslim citizen of India. In 2002, a train caught fire in Gujarat, India. Many Hindu pilgrims and activists were killed, and violence between Hindus and Muslims followed. Vahora testified that he and several Muslim friends were shot and that Hindu leaders continued to pursue him during the four years he remained in India before travelling to Guatemala, then to the U.S. He applied for asylum one year after arriving. An immigration judge ruled that, assuming the application was timely, and even accepting Vahora’s testimony as true, Vahora had not presented a cognizable claim of past persecution or shown that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution because he did not demonstrate that the Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding that the persecution of which Vahora complains was not carried out by persons the government of India was unable or unwilling to control. The Seventh Circuit denied review, noting that Vahora never sought help from any authorities. View "Vahora v. Holder" on Justia Law