Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. Plaintiff had petitioned under 8 U.S.C. 1421(c) for review of his denied naturalization application but the district court determined that he could not demonstrate good moral character as a matter of law, a prerequisite of naturalization. The court affirmed and held that a "hearing de novo" within the meaning of section 1421(c) encompassed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 review on summary judgment; consideration of prior conduct was appropriate where the conduct was relevant to assessing the applicant's moral character or present conduct indicated poor moral character; affidavit evidence of present conduct, without more, could not create a genuine issue of material fact as to moral character where it conflicted with probative evidence of prior conduct; and collateral estoppel applied to an applicant's testimony in naturalization proceedings where that testimony, if credited, attacked an essential premise underlying a prior criminal conviction. View "Kariuki v. Tarango, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Armenia, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of her asylum application as time-barred. Petitioner claimed that her untimely application should be excused because she suffered from a mental illness that constituted an extraordinary circumstance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(D) and 8 C.F.R. 1208.4(a)(5). To the extent that petitioner challenged the merits of the BIA's extraordinary circumstances determination, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction because the underlying facts were disputed. Further, the BIA did not err in its application of the regulations and therefore, the court rejected petitioner's claim to the contrary. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part. View "Gasparyan v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Immigration officials initiated removal proceedings against Chaidez in 2009 upon learning that she had pleaded guilty to mail fraud in 2004. To avoid removal, she sought to overturn that conviction by filing a petition for a writ of coram nobis, contending that her former attorney’s failure to advise her of the guilty plea’s immigration consequences constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. While her petition was pending, the Supreme Court held, in Padilla v. Kentucky, that the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to inform non-citizen clients of the deportation risks of guilty pleas. The district court vacated Chaidez’s conviction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla had declared a new rule and should not apply in a challenge to a final conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed. Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. A case does not announce a new rule if it merely applies a principle that governed a prior decision to a different set of facts. Padilla’s ruling answered an open question about the Sixth Amendment’s reach, in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions, breaking new ground and imposing a new obligation. View "Chaidez v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Philippines and a lawful permanent resident, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the IJ's order of removal, as well as the BIA's denial of petitioner's motion to reconsider. Petitioner was charged with removability for committing an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) when he pled guilty to violating Georgia Code 16-8-14, a statute that criminalized shoplifting. The court concluded that a section 16-8-14 conviction did not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony; petitioner's record of conviction did not establish that he committed an aggravated felony; and the court granted the petition and reversed the BIA's rulings. View "Ramos v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, sought review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony and was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court concluded that petitioner's New York state conviction under NYPL 220.39(1) constituted an aggravated felony, which deprived the court of jurisdiction to review the order of removal. The court also denied petitioner's additional motions as moot. View "Pascual v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order that he be deported because he was an alien convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude. Petitioner conceded that his 2010 conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude. At issue was whether his 2003 Florida conviction for resisting an officer with violence, was also a crime involving moral turpitude. Because the Florida statute required intentional violence against an officer, it criminalized conduct that exhibited a deliberate disregard for the law, which the court considered to be a violation of the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed to society. Therefore, the court concluded that the Florida conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude and that the BIA properly determined that petitioner was removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). View "Cano v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his Bivens action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleged that three US ICE agents violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights when they arrested and detained him in connection with the initiation of removal proceedings against him. Because all of plaintiff's claims challenged actions taken to commence removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) stripped the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Gupta v. McGahey, et al" on Justia Law

Yeremin, a Russian citizen, lawfully entered the U.S. in 1999; in 2004, he pled guilty to violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(f), for conspiracy to traffic in fraudulent identification documents in violation based on “unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification, and … possession of 5 or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced from, or obtained by the use of, another means of identification. Yeremin was sentenced to five months of imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. n 2005, DHS initiated removal proceedings, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), which allows removal of aliens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of admission to the U.S., if the crime is punishable by at least one year in prison, and second under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An IJ rejected an argument that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude, because he did not plead guilty to an offense which necessarily involved fraudulent or deceptive conduct. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied review, applying the “categorical approach” because the conduct prohibited by the statute he was convicted under inherently involves deceit. View "Yeremin v. Holder" on Justia Law

A Lithuanian national, Smykiene entered the U.S. in 1995 on a visitor’s visa. Six months after it expired, she was arrested by Border Patrol officers in New York. The officers gave her an order to show cause why she should not be deported and also told her to provide an address. The Immigration Court sent certified mail to the address that Smykiene with her hearing notice. The Postal Service returned the mail with the notation “Attempted—Not Known.” There was no follow-up. Smykiene did not appear and the immigration judge ordered her deported. A year later she married a man who, two years after that, became a naturalized U.S. citizen. In 2010, when authorities located her, Smykiene swore that she had not received the notice and that at the time she was handed the order to show cause she couldn’t understand English. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed an order of removal. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that: “The government cites no authority for the proposition that an innocent mistake, especially of the kind likely to be made by a newcomer … from a non-English-speaking country, forfeits the right to reopen an order of removal in absentia.” View "Smykiene v. Holder" on Justia Law

Mustafa, a citizen of Pakistan, and his family entered the U.S. legally as non-immigrant visitors in 2003. Two days before the expiration of his visa, Mustafa filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal. Mustafa claimed that as a member of the Nawaz faction of the Pakistani Muslim League political party, he fears if he were to return to Pakistan, he would be targeted for having cooperated with the opposition government by providing information about the financial affairs of his former employer, who is also a former Pakistani Senator. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of their applications, finding that Mustafa could not establish a fear of future persecution on account of a protected statutory ground because the threats and attacks Mustafa had experienced before coming to the U.S. were motivated solely by a personal dispute between Mustafa and his former boss and that he had not shown that the current government would persecute him on account of his membership in the PML-N. The Seventh Circuit remanded for further proceedings because the conclusion that Mustafa’s attackers were motivated solely by a desire for personal revenge was unsupported by substantial evidence. View "Mustafa v. Holder" on Justia Law