Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) against Petitioner. The notice asserted that Petitioner was removable on three separate grounds - child abuse, crime of violence, and sexual abuse of a minor. An immigration judge (IJ) ruled that Petitioner was removable on all three grounds asserted by DHS, and that, as an aggravated felon, Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. At issue was whether the endangerment offense to which Petitioner pled nolo contendere comprised an aggravated felony sexual abuse offense for purposes of the INA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the BIA's ruling insofar as it held that Petitioner was removable on the grounds that he was convicted of aggravated felony sexual abuse and that he was therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal, as Petitioner could not be held to have pled to an offense that fell within the sexual abuse rubric under the INA. View "Campbell v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 1989, Cruz entered the U.S. without inspection. In 2005 a Notice to Appear issued, initiating removal proceedings. Cruz applied for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b), which gives the Attorney General discretionary power to allow an alien to remain. The IJ concluded that Cruz met the requirement of 10 years’ continuous physical presence, that he was a person of good moral character, and that he had no disqualifying convictions on his record, but Cruz did not satisfy the final requirement: that the alien establish that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen. The Board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied several petitions, noting that his petition for asylum was untimely and that dangerous conditions in Mexico did not justify granting his petition in any event. There was no evidence of any improper motive directed personally against Cruz and there was a rational basis for the Board’s decision. View "Cruz-Mayaho v. Holder" on Justia Law

This opinion sets out a procedure for all immigration cases pending in this Court that will enable an interested petition and the Government to evaluate whether remand to the BIA, according to terms specified, is appropriate. View "In the Matter of Immigration" on Justia Law

Lam, a citizen of Senegal, entered the U.S. on a visitor’s visa in 1994. In 1995, he adjusted his status to that of student, and in 2000, he adjusted his status to become a lawful permanent resident based on marriage to a citizen. After being found inadmissible due to a 2002 conviction for fraud, Lam sought a waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)(1)(B), as a spouse of a U.S. citizen who would suffer extreme hardship if the noncitizen is removed. Lam presented evidence that his wife suffered from depression. Lam was also asked about the events leading to his 2002 conviction. The Immigration Judge found that Lam had not shown that his wife would suffer hardship that reached the level of “extreme,” and that he failed to show rehabilitation because his testimony conflicted with a document in the record related to an investigation of an incident at a car dealership. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit vacated the removal order and remanded. The IJ and BIA overlooked material evidence related to Lam’s wife’s depression and improperly relied on a report to determine that Lam failed to show rehabilitation. View "Lam v. Holder" on Justia Law

After a long history of arrests for drunken driving and other offenses, Duron-Ortiz, a citizen of Mexico who entered the U.S. illegally in 1989, was served a Notice to Appear by the Department of Homeland Security. He sought cancellation of removal, but the Immigration Judge denied his application on the grounds that, because Duron-Ortiz had served more than 300 days for two recent drunken driving arrests, he could not satisfy the good moral character requirement for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. The statute, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1), defines “good moral character” in the negative, stating that anyone who has been confined in a penal institution for an aggregate of 180 days or more during the 10-year period cannot satisfy the standard. The court deferred to the Board’s determination that the period terminates when the IJ or Board issues a final administrative decision. The court rejected an argument that the 10-year period to establish continuous physical presence and good moral character cuts off when an alien is served an NTA. View "Duron-Ortiz v. Holder" on Justia Law

Klene, a citizen of the Philippines, applied for U.S. citizenship. USCIS denied the application after concluding that Klene’s marriage to a U.S. citizen had been fraudulent. Klene asked a district court for relief under 8 U.S.C.1421(c), which allows a judge to make an independent decision about an alien’s entitlement to be naturalized. USCIS opened removal proceedings. The court dismissed Klene’s suit, based 8 U.S.C. 1429, which provides: “[N]o application for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this chapter or any other Act.” USCIS acts as the Attorney General’s surrogate. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. While a court cannot order the Attorney General to naturalize an alien, it can enter a declaratory judgment of entitlement to citizenship without violating section. A judgment declaring that Klene’s marriage was bona fide would bring the removal proceeding to a prompt close. This approach preserves the alien’s entitlement under section1421(c) to an independent judicial decision while respecting the limit that section 1429 places on the Attorney General’s powers. View "Klene v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

Petitioner Muhammad Saleem Sheikh, a native and citizen of Pakistan, sought review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The order came after the BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal of an immigration judge's denial of a continuance in his removal proceedings. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the decision to deny the motion for continuance under the standards set forth in Matter of Hashmi; and (2) Petitioner's hopes for immigration reform did not warrant forbearance in his removal proceedings. View "Sheikh v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged a Justice Department regulation, 8 C.F.R. 245.2(a)(2)(i)(B), governing the process by which religious workers could apply for adjustment of status pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1255(a). The court held that the regulation did not bar religious workers from applying for adjustment of status. The regulation has only the practical effect of making it necessary for religious employers to file visa petitions earlier. Therefore, there was no violation of plaintiffs' due process rights. View "Ruiz-Diaz, et al v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner Efren Neri-Garcia sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his applications for restriction on removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and for relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (the CAT). Years ago he was mistreated by government actors because of his homosexuality. At issue was whether conditions in Mexico, with respect to the treatment of gay men, changed sufficiently to overcome the presumption that he would be at risk were he to return. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the BIA: the IJ determined there had been fundamental changes with respect to the treatment of gays in Mexico such that Petitioner's life or freedom would not be threatened if removed to that country. The BIA appropriately considered whether the evidence of new incidents of violence against gay men was sufficient to justify a remand. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to remand. View "Neri-Garcia v. Holder" on Justia Law

This case required the First Circuit Court of Appeals to decide, for the first time, whether section 1101(a)(42)(B), a statute enacted to pave the way for asylum for victims of China's coercive population control policies, extends automatically to a spouse of a person forced to undergo an abortion. Petitioner, a Chinese national, petitioned for asylum, seeking to remain in the United States because of, among other things, his wife's forced abortion. Petitioner argued he was entitled to per se refugee status under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(B) "as a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy." The immigration judge rejected this argument, and the board of immigration appeals affirmed. The First Circuit Court denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review after joining several of its sister circuits in holding that, given the language of the relevant statute and the Attorney General's reasonable interpretation of it, the agency did not err in refusing to grant Petitioner's per se refugee status on the basis that the Chinese government had compelled his wife to undergo a forced abortion. View "Dong v. Holder" on Justia Law