Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant illegally entered the United States in 2002. In 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings. Defendant applied for relief from removal based on his fear of harm in his native El Salvador. Defendant also sought review of DHS's denial of his application for Temporary Protected Status (TPS). The immigration judge denied Defendant's applications and ordered him removed to El Salvador. The BIA affirmed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Defendant's motion for stay of deportation and granted the government's motion for summary denial of Defendant's petition for review, holding that the Attorney General was not required to withhold Defendant's removal, and that Defendant was ineligible to receive TPS. View "Castillo-Enriquez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner Elias Jimenez-Galicia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought judicial review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). The BIA's order affirmed an immigration judge's ("IJ") order of removal and denial of Petitioner's request for cancellation of removal. The denial was based on a determination that Petitioner lacked good moral character. Because the Fourth Circuit was not presented with a genuine question of law, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary determination that Petitioner lacked good moral character. Therefore the Court dismissed the petition. View "Jimenez-Galicia v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Barahona, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the "BIA") which affirmed his ineligibility for a "special rule" cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (the "NACARA"). Petitioner contended that the BIA erred by deeming him ineligible for NACARA relief because he had provided material support to a terrorist organization in the early 1980s by allowing anti-government Salvadoran guerrillas of the so-called "FMLN" (the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Libercion Nacional) the use of the kitchen of his Salvadoran home. Upon review, the Court rejected Petitioner's contentions and denied his petition for review. View "Barahona v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Mirna Del Carmen Gomez, a citizen of El Salvador, pled guilty to unlawful reentry of a deported alien after an aggravated felony conviction. Although she agreed with the statement of facts submitted by the government in support of her guilty plea, Defendant objected to the government's assertion that her prior conviction for child abuse under Maryland law amounted to a crime of violence for purposes of the U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) sentencing enhancement. According to Defendant, because the relevant portion of the statute did not contain a division between forceful and nonforceful conduct, the district court could not use the modified categorical approach to determine that her prior child abuse conviction was a crime of violence. The district court employed the modified categorical approach to determine that Defendant's child abuse conviction constituted a crime of violence and added sixteen levels to her base offense level. Thereafter, the district court calculated her Guidelines range to be forty-one to fifty-one months, but made a downward variance and sentenced her to twenty-four months' imprisonment. Because the Fourth Circuit found that the district court's application of the modified categorical approach to the indivisible provision at issue was in error, it vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) order upholding an immigration judge's denial of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). In the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' original decision, the Court relied on Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder to hold that Petitioner could impute her father's legal status to herself to meet the five-year lawful permanent residence requirement under section 1229b(a)(1). The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez. On remand, the Ninth Circuit upheld the BIA's decision to deny cancellation of removal, holding (1) because Mercado-Zazueta was no longer valid precedent on the issue of imputation under section 1229b, Petitioner's imputation argument making use of her father's lawful permanent residence failed; and (2) Petitioner, on her own, lacked the requisite lawful permanent residence. View "Mojica v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant, an alien, was convicted of robbery under Cal. Penal Code 211 in 1994 and again in 1996. Defendant later pleaded guilty to a charge of unlawful reentry after he illegally reentered the United States. The presentence report recommended a sixteen-level enhancement in the offense level for Defendant's prior robbery convictions, which it identified as crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. Defendant objected to the enhancement, arguing that after a recent decision by the California Supreme Court, convictions under section 211 were no longer categorical crimes of violence. The district court rejected this argument and imposed the enhancement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a conviction under section 211 remains a categorical crime of violence under the "enumerated offenses" definition in section 2L1.2. View "United States v. Flores-Mejia" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Colombia, illegally entered the U.S. in 1982. In 1985, he was convicted of drug offenses, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), was sentenced to five years in prison; in 1987 he was deported to Colombia. About five years after his deportation, he reentered the U.S. and was arrested twice, but managed to avoid deportation. In 2010 he was arrested in Illinois for driving under the influence. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents were informed of his illegal status. Defendant was indicted on one count of illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and 6 U.S.C. 202(4) and pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court determined his criminal history category to be 3 and, after applying a 16-level enhancement (U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)), determined his offense level to be 21, resulting in a calculated Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. Neither the government nor defendant objected to this calculation. He was sentenced at the low-end of the Guidelines range to 46 months in prison, claiming that his 1985 conviction was stale and that the calculation overstated the seriousness of his current reentry offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Marin-Castano" on Justia Law

VLiranzo was born in 1955 in the Dominican Republic. He entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1965; in 1972 his mother became a naturalized citizen and he obtained derivative citizenship, 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3) Liranzo did not know he had become a citizen and continued to renew his "green card" through 2006.In 2006 Liranzo was released from incarceration in New York for possession of a controlled substance. Before his release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement erroneously identified him as a permanent resident alien, subject to removal. He was transported to a detention center in Louisiana pending removal. During removal proceedings, it was discovered that Liranzo is a U.S. citizen, and he was released. He filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that federal immigration officials had falsely arrested and imprisoned him. Following two years of discovery, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no private analogue to the immigration detention suffered by plaintiff. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of a Fourth Amendment claim, but held that the court had jurisdiction over the FTCA claim, because there is a private analogue: false imprisonment. View "Liranzo v. United States " on Justia Law

In 1991, petitioner, a Mexican national, falsely told a border inspector that he was a U.S. citizen. He pled guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. 1325, then returned to Mexico. In 1993 petitioner failed to disclose that same conviction on his application for an immigration visa as the spouse of a citizen. The INS granted the visa. The government then commenced removal under 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), which provides that “[a]ny alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa ... or admission ... is inadmissible.” Section 1227(a)(1)(H) gives the Attorney General discretion to waive the 1993 fraud as a ground for removal. The Attorney General claimed to lack discretion to waive the 1991 fraud. The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The Attorney General can waive section 1227(a)(1)(A) to the extent it renders petitioner removable as a result of both the 1991 and the 1993 misrepresentation View "Avila-Anguiano v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Waldron, a native and citizen of the United Kingdom, had his permanent resident status in the United States terminated because of his conviction for second degree assault. Petitioner sought an adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility. An immigration judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner was eligible for relief, granting both Petitioner's adjust of status and the waiver. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed and ordered Petitioner removed to the United Kingdom. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the BIA erred by failing to review the IJ's factual findings for clear error. Remanded. View "Waldron v. Holder" on Justia Law