Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Israel, entered the United States in September 2005. On September 21, 2006, the government commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner. In response, Petitioner submitted an application for asylum, claiming he feared persecution if he were to return to Israel. Because Petitioner submitted this application after removal proceedings were commenced, his application was also considered a request for withholding of removal. An immigration judge (IJ) found against Petitioner. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the BIA did not err in (1) accepting the IJ's conclusion that Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof for establishing his claim of asylum and withholding of removal; and (2) denying Petitioner's motion to reopen and remand. View "Salman v. Holder" on Justia Law

Vartelas, a native of Greece and permanent resident of the U.S. since 1989, pleaded guilty to a felony in 1994. At the time, lawful permanent residents were not regarded as making an “entry” when returning from “innocent, casual, and brief excursion[s] . . . outside this country’s borders.” An alien in Vartelas’s situation could travel abroad for brief periods without jeopardizing resident alien status. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, under which lawful permanent residents returning from a trip abroad are regarded as seeking admission if they have committed an offense under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), including the felony to which Vartelas had pleaded guilty. In 2003, Vartelas briefly traveled to Greece to visit family. Upon returning, he was treated as an inadmissible alien. An IJ denied ordered Vartelas removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and denied a motion to reopen based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Second Circuit held that Vartelas was not prejudiced by failure to raise nonretroactivity, since the IIRIRA could apply retroactively. In 2012, the Supreme Court reversed, “[g]uided by the deeply rooted presumption against retroactive legislation.” The Second Circuit remanded to the BIA to consider the performance of Vartelas’s attorneys. View "Vartelas v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) granted Petitioner's asylum application in 1996. In 2003, the INS ceased to exist, and its functions were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. One of the Department's agencies is the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). In 2004, the USCIS sent Petitioner a termination notice informing him that his asylum status had been terminated by the USCIS and that he was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner moved to terminate the removal proceedings on the ground that his asylum status had not properly been terminated. The immigration judge (IJ) concluded she lacked jurisdiction to review an asylum officer's termination of asylum status and ordered Petitioner removed to India. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's petition for review of the BIA's orders of removal, holding (1) asylum status can only terminate through the Attorney General; and (2) the regulations pursuant to which the Department of Homeland Security terminates asylum status are ultra vires because the governing statute confers that authority exclusively on the the Attorney General. Remanded. View "Nijar v. Holder" on Justia Law

From 1996 to 2001, while working as a licensed realtor, Mendoza helped borrowers obtain federally insured mortgages. He was charged with conspiring to fraudulently induce the Federal Housing Authority to insure mortgage loans, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 1001. Mendoza’s counsel, Cavanagh, explained that he could avoid prison by pleading guilty, but did not apprise Mendoza that, as an aggravated felony, his crime would lead to mandatory deportation to his home country, Ecuador, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Prior to sentencing Mendoza learned from his Presentence Investigation Report that his conviction might result in removal. The district court sentenced Mendoza to two years’ probation and ordered him to pay $100,000 in restitution. As a condition of his probation, Mendoza was required to cooperate with immigration officials. The government instituted removal proceedings. After completing his sentence, Mendoza moved, under 28 U.S.C. 2255, to vacate his sentence and withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Mendoza v. United States" on Justia Law

Marinov, a citizen of Bulgaria, entered the U.S. in 2005 as a nonimmigrant exchange visitor and remained beyond the date authorized. He applied for asylum. He was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). An attorney entered an appearance on Marinov’s behalf, conceded removability, and obtained transfer of venue. In December 2009, the immigration court served notice to Marinov’s attorney at the address provided on his appearance form, advising that a hearing was set for August 3, 2010. The attorney attended the hearing; Marinov did not. The IJ ordered removal in absentia. On September 24, Marinov, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to reopen based on a lack of notice, exceptional circumstances, and ineffective assistance of former counsel. He alleged that former counsel made misrepresentations to the IJ and included a copy of an attorney disciplinary complaint. The IJ denied Marinov’s motion, deciding that he received proper notice and had not shown that former counsel was informed of the allegations or afforded an opportunity to respond. The BIA rejected the argument that the ARDC complaint satisfied this requirement, concluding that the bar complaint and notice to counsel were two separate requirements. The Seventh Circuit denied review. View "Marinov v. Holder" on Justia Law

Rivas, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. in 1970 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2009, DHS charged Rivas with removability because of a 1980 conviction for statutory rape. At his hearing Rivas argued that the conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony and that he was not removable. The IJ rejected the argument and a subsequent motion to reopen. In 2010 Rivas was removed to Mexico. Two months later Rivas filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the claim barred by 8 U.S.C. 1252(g), which prevents courts from hearing challenges to the execution of removal orders, and also that Rivas was not “in custody” as required under 28 U.S.C. 2241(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Rivas’s situation is sympathetic, but consideration was precluded by multiple jurisdictional bars. View "Rivas-Melendrez v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

Petitioner was born in Czechoslovakia and was admitted as a permanent resident in the United States. After Defendant was convicted of racketeering, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal and applied for a waiver of inadmissibility. An immigration judge found Petitioner eligible for both of these forms of relief, denied Petitioner a waiver of inadmissibility, and granted Petitioner cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held Petitioner to be ineligible for both a cancellation of removal and a waiver of inadmissibility. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the BIA did not err in finding (1) Petitioner's racketeering conviction was an aggravated felony and that he was therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal; and (2) Petitioner was ineligible for a waiver because he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the time of his admission, and therefore, his aggravated felony disqualified him from seeking a waiver of inadmissibility. View " Spacek v. Holder" on Justia Law

Velez moved from Ecuador at age 16 to live with her half-sister, Sanchez, Sanchez’s sister Munoz, and their mother, Yolanda Munoz, and perform housework and babysitting. The relationship deteriorated and Velez believed that she was being isolated and that promises were not kept. She sued under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-19, and New York state law. The district court dismissed certain claims, including breach of contract claim, allowed the parties to complete discovery and submit additional materials, then found sua sponte that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over ATS claims and converted them to a claim for a civil remedy under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. 1595, but granted summary judgment to defendants on all federal claims. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the contract and ATS claims and vacated and remanded with respect to FLSA and state law claims. View "Velez v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Abdallahi entered the U.S. lawfully in 2000 as a visitor, remained longer than permitted, and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Those claims were withdrawn with his 2005 request for adjustment of status, following his marriage to a citizen. At a hearing, Abdallahi testified about his experience as a gendarme in the Mauritanian military, 1989 to 1998, stating that his duties required that he pour cold water on black prisoners, kick them, and ensure that they had no food or toilet access. Abdallahi witnessed others, including those ranked beneath him, mistreat prisoners. Abdallahi stated that he could not stop the acts, even though he thought them “against humanity,” because he feared they would torture him. Abdallahi was regarded as a black African. Abdallahi decided to leave Mauritania when his cousin disappeared, believing that the government would “eliminate” him. Over Abdallahi’s objections, the decision finding him inadmissible was made by an immigration judge who had not personally heard his testimony. The BIA affirmed, finding that he had “committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the commission of . . . any act of torture,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(E)(iii). The Sixth Circuit denied review. . View "Abdallahi v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant Alfredo Huizar pled guilty to reentering the United States illegally after an earlier deportation. The district court held that Defendant's 1995 California conviction for residential burglary qualified as a "crime of violence," triggering a sixteen-level enhancement. On appeal, Defendant argued the enhancement wasn't legally authorized and his sentence should have been reconsidered. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court erred in calculating Defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Huizar" on Justia Law