Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose out of Defendant's attempt to illegally reenter the United States at the United States-Mexico border. A jury convicted Defendant of attempted illegal reentry and for making a false statement to Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not unconstitutionally direct a verdict by commenting on the evidence while delivering the jury instructions and by its response to the jury's note; (2) the district court did not constructively amend the indictment by commenting on the evidence while delivering the jury instructions and responding to the jury's note; and (3) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Jara-Favela" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review from the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). The BIA held that Petitioner did not demonstrate that he met the seven-year continuous residence requirement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petition, holding that the years of residence of Petitioner's mother were imputed to him based on Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales and Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. On remand, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) because Cuevas-Gaspar and Mercado-Zuzueta were no longer valid precedent, Petitioner's imputation argument concerning his mother's residence was without merit; and (2) the BIA correctly determined that Petitioner's 2002 conviction terminated his continuous residence. View "Sawyers v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, was convicted of armed robbery with a firearm in California in 1981. After serving most of his sentence, Rivera was deported in 1984. Since then, Petitioner twice reentered the country without inspection. The government began a removal proceeding against Rivera in 2004. Rivera admitted removability and sought adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, Because his 1981 conviction rendered him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), Rivera applied for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 1182(h)(1)(A) and (B). The immigration judge denied Rivera's application for wavier of inadmissibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that Rivera failed to satisfy the hardship standard of 8 C.F.R. 1212.7(d). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and denied the application, holding that the BIA properly applied section 1212.7(d) to Rivera. View "Rivera-Peraza v. Holder" on Justia Law

Bao Tai Nian (Bao), a native and citizen of China, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Bao arrived in the United States as an alien crew member. His asylum proceeding was thus limited in scope to a so-called "asylum-only" proceeding. The Immigration Judge (IJ) and BIA did not issue a final order of removal, and thus the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with the question of whether the BIA's denial of asylum in "asylum-only" proceedings was the equivalent of a final order of removal such that the Court had jurisdiction. The Court held that denial of an alien crew member's petition for asylum and other relief in "asylum-only" proceedings was the functional equivalent of a final order a removal, and thus, the Court had jurisdiction to review Bao's petition from the BIA's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. The Court then denied Bao's petition for review in a separate memorandum disposition. View "Nian v. Holder" on Justia Law

Rene Lopez-Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen, was paroled into the United States to face immigration and criminal charges following his initial detention at a port of entry when marijuana was discovered in a truck he was driving. No criminal charges were filed against Lopez-Rodriguez, but he was later charged with being ineligible for admission because there was "reason to believe" he was or had been an illicit trafficker of a controlled substance. After a hearing before an immigration judge (IJ), the IJ found (1) there was "no reason to believe" that Lopez-Rodriguez was an elicit trafficker in a controlled substance, and (2) Lopez-Rodriguez was admissible. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed, concluding that the IJ's decision to admit Lopez-Rodriguez was clearly erroneous. Lopez-Rodriguez petitioned for review. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petition, holding that the Board committed legal error by making its own factual determination and engaging in de novo review of the IJ's factual findings. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Ayala was born in 1957, shortly after Guatemala's president was assassinated. The decades that followed were tumultuous, with guerilla violence common until peace arrived in 1996. Her family suffered two deaths and two robberies. In 1993, Ayala fled to the U.S., leaving behind children, ages 10 and 14 and filed a petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In 2006, DHS charged her as removeable. An IJ found Ayala credible but denied her relief because she could not prove past persecution, establish a reasonable fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground, or meet the more difficult tests for withholding of removal and CAT protection. The BIA affirmed, rejecting her claim for asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A) because Ayala was unable to establish that past persecution was or the persecution she fears will be on account of a legally protected ground. The First Circuit affirmed. Asylum claims based on perceived wealth because of a petitioner's connections to the U.S. have consistently been rejected. View "Ayala v. Holder" on Justia Law

Salvadoran citizens Jose Orellana-Monson and his brother Andres entered the United States in 2005. They were charged with being in the United States without having been admitted or paroled. The Orellana-Monsons claimed asylum because of Jose's political opinions - specifically, opposition to gangs - and because they would be persecuted on account of their membership in a particular social group. Initially, an immigration judge rejected this argument, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case for the BIA to explain the basis for its decision. On remand, the BIA dismissed the appeal, determining that Salvadoran young adults who were subjected to, and who rejected, recruitment efforts of gangs did not possess the social visibility and particularity to constitute "membership in a particular social group" for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review of the BIA's decision, holding that the Orellana-Monsons did not demonstrate that they were eligible for status under the "particular social group" prong of the INA's eligibility criteria for asylum. View "Orellana-Monson v. Holder" on Justia Law

Lateef became a lawful permanent resident in 1991. Weeks later she returned to Pakistan to complete medical school. She returned to the U.S. in 1993. She married in Pakistan in 1995. Her daughter obtained LPR status as “born during [a] temporary visit abroad.” Her husband and children obtained immigrant visas in 2000, but did not attempt to enter until 2001. Although she had not been in the U.S. since November 1999, Lateef stated that she was last present in July 2000. During secondary screening Lateef admitted the truth. Lateef’s only ties to the U.S. are LPR parents and brothers. She had never been employed or owned property in the U.S. From 1991 until February 2001, she spent 40 months in the U.S. and 76 months in Pakistan. All were charged with attempting to enter without valid documentation, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Lateef was charged with misrepresenting a material fact, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); her husband was charged with attempting to enter to work without certification, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(5)(A). In 2004, the IJ ordered removal, finding that Lateef had abandoned LPR status. The BIA affirmed. On remand, the IJ held that once Lateef had abandoned LPR status it was imputed to her daughter. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied review. View "Lateef v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Portuguese national, was admitted into the U.S. in 1984 as a lawful permanent resident. Roughly a quarter-century later, Massachusetts authorities charged him with shoplifting and larceny, arising out of separate crimes allegedly committed at separate times and places. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the shoplifting charge and was fined $250. He pleaded guilty to the larceny charge and was sentenced to 18 months of probation. The shoplifting fine was never paid, but was vacated. DHS commenced removal proceedings based on convictions for two independent crimes of moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The IJ rejected petitioner's argument that he had not been "convicted," and ordered removal. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied appeal. A "conviction" can occur if there is "a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court," 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), which occurred in this case, despite the fact that petitioner was never punished. View "Viveiros v. Holder" on Justia Law

Aponte, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to the U.S. as a Lawful Permanent Resident in 1996. In 1999, she pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance. After she sought to reenter in 2003, DHS charged Aponte as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Aponte conceded removability, but obtained a continuance to attempt to have her conviction expunged. After three years, she had not succeeded and, in 2007, the IJ ordered removal. Having received no brief, the BIA dismissed her appeal and, later, declined to reopen, finding insufficient proof of inadequate notice. On remand, Aponte claimed that her attorney before the IJ provided ineffective assistance. The BIA found that Aponte was not eligible for cancellation of removal because she did not establish seven years of continuous residence as she could not properly impute her father's residency; that she did not show prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding, or CAT protection; and that she could not establish ineffective assistance because she had not demonstrated probability of prejudice. The First Circuit denied appeal with respect to eligibility for cancellation of removal, but remanded with respect to eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, CAT protection, and ineffective assistance of counsel. .View "Aponte v. Holder" on Justia Law