Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Kenya, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision to affirm the IJ's denial of her application for cancellation of removal as a battered spouse of a United States citizen. The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination that petitioner had not met the extreme hardship element required for cancellation. Consequently, the court did not reach her other arguments. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "Hamilton v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Canada, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal because petitioner's previous convictions were for crimes involving moral turpitude. Petitioner argued that his crime, for providing a false name to a peace officer, was not "inherently base, vile, or depraved" and therefore the BIA should have "looked behind his conviction." The court agreed and concluded that the IJ and the BIA departed from the methodology mandated In Matter of Silva-Trevino in not requiring the Government to meet its burden. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bobadilla v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Somalia, was convicted of unlawful wounding and grand larceny. 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) required the mandatory federal detention, without the possibility of bond, of certain deportable criminal aliens "when" those aliens were released from other custody. At issue was whether, as the district court held, defendant, a deportable criminal alien who was not immediately taken into federal custody upon his release from other custody, was exempt from section 1226(c)'s mandatory detention provision and therefore was entitled to a bond hearing. The court held that the BIA's interpretation of section 1226(c) in In re Rojas was reasonable, and must be afforded deference. Moreover, the Government's supposed failure to comply with a statutory immediacy requirement - when the statute did not specify a consequence for such noncompliance - did not bestow a windfall upon criminal aliens. Therefore, defendant remained subject to mandatory detention. View "Hosh v. Lucero" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Moldova, was admitted to the U.S. in on a non-immigrant cultural exchange visa. 2006. Instead of departing, he applied for asylum, citing his Roma descent and his membership in Moldova's pro-democratic political party. An Immigration Judge found petitioner's hearing testimony generally credible, considered the most recent State Department country conditions report, but found that petitioner had not carried his burden of proving past persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A). The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied an appeal. View "Gilca v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of China, petitioned for review of the BIA's determination that his motion to reopen should be considered withdrawn because of his departure, relying upon Matter of Armendarez-Mendez. At issue was whether the "departure bar" regulation - stating that the BIA could not entertain a motion to reopen filed by or on behalf of a person who has departed the United States - impermissibly conflicted with the Immigration and Nationality Act's provision permitting an alien to file one motion to reopen, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(A). The court concluded that the plain language of the statute, the statutory structure, and the amendment scheme all pointed to one conclusion: the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Publ. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-549, guaranteed an alien the right to file one motion to reopen and the departure bar impermissibly undercutted that right. Therefore, the court granted the petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lin v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Sudan, petitioned for review of the BIA's final order affirming the IJ's order of removal and denial of petitioner's application for waiver of inadmissibility under section 209(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1159(c). The court held that the IJ and the BIA committed no error in determining that petitioner was a violent or dangerous individual subject to In re Jean's heightened, "extraordinary circumstances" standard for determining whether to grant a discretionary section 209(c) waiver of inadmissibility. The court held, however, that the IJ and the BIA erred by failing to consider evidence of the country conditions in Sudan and the hardship petitioner individually would suffer upon removal to Sudan. Accordingly, the petition was granted in part, denied in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Makir-Marwil v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

In 2010 defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and without a license. He admitted that he had reentered the U.S. without permission in 2007, having been removed to Mexico in 2003. The 2003 removal followed a conviction in New Mexico for aggravated assault involving a deadly weapon. He pled guilty to reentering the U.S. after being removed following a conviction for an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2). The presentence report utilized U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, which provides for a 16-level enhancement if the defendant previously was deported after conviction for a felony that is a crime of violence. The PSR subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility. The recommended guidelines range was 57-71 months of imprisonment. The court departed downward one criminal history level, which reduced the range to 46-57, and, reasoning that the offense was a relatively minor crime of violence and that defendant would not be able to take advantage of certain rehabilitative programs while confined, the district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 36 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Aggravated assault under New Mexico law is not categorically a crime of violence and available documents do not reveal what version of the offense defendant committed. View "United States v. Rede-Mendez" on Justia Law

An immigration statute, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a), authorized the Attorney General to cancel the removal of an alien from the United States who, among other things, has held the status of a lawful permanent resident (LPR) for at least five years, and has lived in the United States for at least seven continuous years after a lawful admission. Respondents both sought to impute their parents' years of continuous residence or LPR status to themselves. At issue was whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) could reasonably conclude that an alien living in this country as a child must meet those requirements on his own, without counting a parent's years of residence or immigration status. The Court held that the BIA's approach was based on a permissible construction of the statute under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. View "Holder v. Gutierrez; Holder v. Sawyers" on Justia Law

In 1997 Javier unlawfully entered the U.S.; he married in 2001. In 2007 the bank hired wife. Husband, attempting to start a business, could not open a bank account without a social security number. He obtained an individual tax identification number. Wife named him a joint owner on her account and helped use his ITIN to open accounts of his own. The business failed. Husband returned to Mexico to deal with his citizenship. Wife revealed the situation to her supervisor, requesting time off to help husband obtain citizenship. The supervisor agreed and called the bank security officer, who was concerned that the accounts might implicate bank fraud laws. During a meeting, the security officer became angry and berated wife. Wife refused to attend another meeting without her attorney The bank terminated her employment and reported her activity to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and a consortium of area banks. Wife sued, claiming blacklisting, defamation, emotional distress, and employment discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the bank summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any discrimination was not based on race or national origin, but on an unprotected classification, husband’s status as an alien lacking permission to be in the country. View "Cortezano v. Salin Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners, citizens of the Philippines, entered the U.S. under nonimmigrant visas in 2003 and 2004. Wife’s employer petitioned on her behalf for alien-worker status, and she applied for adjustment of status She is a nurse, a skilled worker under 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(3)(A)(i) or (ii). Husband applied for adjustment of status as her spouse. The petition for worker status was granted in late 2004. Subsequent applications for adjustment of status were denied because wife had not submitted evidence of certification to practice nursing; results of an English exam were pending. They reapplied for adjustment of status a few months later. The applications were denied. An IJ ordered removal, finding wife ineligible for adjustment of status under her second application because she filed it after living in the U.S. unlawfully for more than 180 days. The BIA dismissed an appeal and denied reconsideration. Petitioners moved to reopen in 2011, contending that they were newly eligible for adjustment of status because their daughter, a U.S. citizen age 21, had petitioned to adjust status on their behalf; those petitions had been approved. The Board denied the motion as untimely. The Seventh Circuit denied review, finding the Board’s interpretation of the statute and regulation reasonable.View "Sarmiento v. Holder" on Justia Law