Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a Peruvian citizen, sought review of the decision of the BIA that he was not eligible for special rule cancellation of removal under Section 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2). The BIA denied the petition because petitioner failed to show that he was "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" by his American citizen spouse. The court concluded that the BIA had discretion to make this determination, and therefore lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision that petitioner was not a battered spouse. View "Bedoya-Melendez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Brazil, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1994 with his wife. They had two children, both U.S. citizens, then separated. In 2006 petitioner kicked open the door to his wife’s house, broke some glass, and threw furniture. He was arrested and admitted to facts supporting a finding of malicious destruction of property (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 127), believing that doing so would not cause immigration problems. He was sentenced to and completed 11 months of probation and an anger management program. The Department of Homeland Security took him into custody and instituted removal. He applied for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The Immigration Judge denied the application. The Board of Immigration Appeals remanded for consideration of additional evidence regarding his wife's mental health and ability to care for their children and whether petitioner could qualify as "a person of good moral character" for purposes of cancellation of removal. The IJ concluded that malicious destruction of property under Massachusetts law is a crime involving moral turpitude and that he was statutorily barred from eligibility for cancellation of removal. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied review. View "Da Silva Neto v. Holder, ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, born in 1946 in Mexico to a U.S.-citizen mother and a Mexican national father, allegedly entered the U.S. in 1949. It is disputed whether the entry was legal. His mother remarried a U.S. citizen in 1960. Plaintiff alleges that he has lived in the U.S. continuously for 60 years, has been married to a U.S. citizen since 1967, and is the primary caretaker of his son, who has spinal meningitis and requires constant care. In 2003 plaintiff requested a Certificate of Citizenship based on his mother’s citizenship (8 U.S.C. 1401); he separately claimed citizenship through his stepfather. The Administrative Appeals Office denied both, ruling that plaintiff’s mother did not meet the physical presence requirement of law in effect at the time because she gave birth at age 16 and there was no evidence that his stepfather had adopted him. Plaintiff had not proven that he had been admitted as a lawful resident prior to age 18, as required to establish prima facie eligibility. The district court dismissed claims that the Nationality Act of 1940 violates the equal protection clause and that this interpretation of the Act creates an arbitrary and inequitable outcome. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the language of the statute is clear.View "Guzman v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

This case was about the government’s repeated efforts to remove Petitioner Kairi Abha Shepherd from the United States on the ground she is a criminal alien. In the initial removal proceeding, the government did not effectively contest Petitioner's claim to automatic citizenship under the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (CCA), and the Immigration Judge (IJ) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The next day, the government initiated a new removal proceeding, explaining to the same IJ that it had made a mistake and now realized that Petitioner was too old to qualify under the CCA for citizenship. The IJ eventually decided that his initial ruling precluded the government from relitigating Petitioner's citizenship or alienage status, and he terminated the proceeding. The government successfully appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which held that collateral estoppel did not apply and remanded to the IJ, who ordered removal. Petitioner then appealed to the Tenth Circuit for review. Upon review, the Court found that Petitioner's alien status precluded the Court's jurisdiction: "[Petitioner's] issue preclusion argument based on the IJ’s first decision is unavailing because administrative collateral estoppel does not apply to our sec. 1252(b)(5) analysis." Accordingly, the Court dismissed her petition for review. View "Shepherd v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Emmanuel Huitron-Guizar entered a conditional guilty plea to being an illegal alien in possession of firearms transported or shipped in interstate commerce, and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. Defendant was to be delivered upon release to an immigration official for deportation. On appeal, he argued that 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(5)(a) was unconstitutional and that the district court committed various sentencing errors in applying the Sentencing Guidelines. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found the applicable statute constitutional, and that the district court committed no errors in arriving at Defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Huitron-Guizar" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of an order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his immigration proceeding based upon new evidence. The court held that the BIA was within its discretion in determining that the new evidence of changed circumstances - the Individual Education Plan (IEP) evidencing his son's developmental delay - did not warrant reopening where petitioner merely disagreed with the weight the BIA ascribed the new evidence; the BIA's mislabeling of his son's developmental delays alone did not show that the BIA improperly distorted the substance of the child's IEP; and where the IEP contained no information about how petitioner's absence would adversely affect his son's developmental delay, much less how his absence could cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" nor does the IEP show how diminished educational opportunities in Mexico were "exceptional and extremely unusual" to a child with a developmental delay. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Camarillo-Jose v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Zundel entered the U.S. in 2000 under the Visa Waiver Program, 8 U.S.C. 1187. He married a citizen, and applied for permanent residency (8 U.S.C. 1255). He did not attend his INS interview; the INS denied the application. In 2003 he was presented with a Warrant of Deportation. He filed a “Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Complaint for Constitutional Violations, Petition to Set Bond.” The district court and Sixth Circuit denied relief. Zundel was removed with notice that he was prohibited from returning for 20 years, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9). Zundel filed amended petitions for habeas corpus, mandamus, and injunctive relief, and a Bivens claim for damages. The district court dismissed habeas claims. The Sixth Circuit converted to a petition for review under the REAL ID Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 231 and denied review. The district court dismissed remaining claims and denied amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Challenge to a determination that Zundel entered under the VWP (thereby waiving appeals) is barred by res judicata. The court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a challenge to the bar of inadmissibility. A claim for loss of consortium fails to state a claim and a Bivens claim is time-barred.View "Zundel v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Hong Kong, came to the U.S. in 1999 and overstayed his visa. In 2010, an immigration judge ordered him removed after determining that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had not maintained 10 years of continuous physical presence as required by section 240A(b)(1)(A)-(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act . He was five days short. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied his appeal, rejecting an argument that the notice to appear was defective and "stopped time" for purposes of the 10-year calculation.View "Cheung v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner met a U.S. citizen, 28 years her senior, when he visited St. Petersburg, Russia in 1991. The two married in 1998, and petitioner moved to the U.S. and became a lawful permanent resident on a conditional basis, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(a)(1). To allow her to stay in the country permanently, husband and wife were required to submit a joint petition two years after her initial entry, swearing that their marriage was legal, that it had not been annulled or terminated, and that they had not married each other for immigration purposes. They submitted the required joint petition, but divorced before it could be processed. Petitioner sought a hardship waiver, for unconditional permanent residency as an alien whose marriage to a citizen has ended if the alien demonstrates that the marriage was entered into in good faith. After a hearing, an immigration judge found that petitioner had not married in good faith but had done so only to enter the U.S. and ordered her removed to Russia. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied review, stating that it lacked jurisdiction to consider most of petitioner's claims. View "Johns v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Romania, petitioned for review of an order of the BIA determining that his state conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia in a motor vehicle rendered him ineligible for waiver of inadmissibility under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 212h, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h). The court denied the petition, concluding that the BIA's interpretation of section 1182(h)'s waiver for a "single offense of simple possession of... marijuana" as not including the possession of drug paraphernalia in a vehicle was not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. View "Popescu-Mateffy v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law