Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Jamaica, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his requests for cancellation of removal and a waiver of inadmissibility. The court held that a conviction for witness tampering under Connecticut General Statutes 53a-151 constituted an "offense relating to obstruction of justice" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S), and that petitioner was therefore ineligible for relief. His conviction stemmed from allegations that petitioner sexually assaulted a minor and later instructed her that, if she talked to the police, she should tell them that "nothing ever happened." Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Higgins v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2000, a citizen of Lebanon and a lawful permanent resident of the U.S., filed a Form I-130 relative visa petition on behalf of her son, as an unmarried, adult child of a permanent resident, under 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2). USCIS approved the petition. Five years later, the son married a U.S. citizen and was admitted as a conditional permanent resident; several months later, the marriage was annulled. In response to notice of intent to terminate his conditional permanent resident status, he indicated that he had separately applied to adjust his status based on the approved visa petition his mother had previously filed on his behalf. USCIS indicated that the status had been automatically revoked on the date of marriage to a citizen. DHS initiated removal. In a suit claiming that, under Michigan law, annulment voids a marriage ab initio, so that USCIS should treat him as though he were never married, the district court determined that the decision of the Secretary of Homeland Security to revoke a visa petition is discretionary and not subject to judicial review. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Mehanna v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv." on Justia Law

Petitioner and his wife, natives and citizens of China, petitioned for review of the denial of their third motion to reopen removal proceedings. After the Board denied their motion, petitioners had 30 days to file their petition for review in the court but they filed their petition one day late. Petitioners urged the court to rule that their petition was timely because they paid a commercial parcel service to provide overnight delivery 29 days after the Board issued its decision and, but for a delay caused by inclement weather, the petition would have reached the court on the day it was due. The government argued that the Board did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners' third motion to reopen. Because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider an untimely petition for review and the court was accessible on the day the petition was due, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Lin v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Singh, born in Jamaica, has been a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. since 1975, married a U.S. citizen and raised three children. In operating a construction firm that bid on public works projects as a Minority Business Enterprise, Singh accepted kickbacks for falsely certifying that his business was serving as a subcontractor on government projects when, in fact, another did the work. When the company filed for bankruptcy in 2005, the scheme came to light. Singh was charged with failing to disclose all of the company’s accounts receivable on the bankruptcy petition, 18 U.S.C. 152(3). Singh pled guilty and agreed to restitution in the amount of $54,418.08. He was sentenced to 10 months. DHS initiated removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Immigration Judge entered an order of removal, which the BIA affirmed, finding that conviction under 152(3) categorically involves fraud and that the restitution order established that the offense caused loss to the trustee exceeding $10,000. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that the statute requires actual, not merely intended, loss. The court rejected an argument that 152(3) is a perjury offense that must meet the requirements for perjury-based aggravated felonies under 8 U.S.C 1101(a)(43)(S).View "Singh v. Atty Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Castaneda, a Peruvian officer, was accused of participation in a massacre during Peru's conflict with the Shining Path guerrilla movement. He was acquitted of charges in Peru, but his name was associated with the massacre. He and his family received death threats. Shining Path repeatedly attacked, killing innocent bystanders. They fled to the U.S. in 1991. An Immigration Judge denied an application for asylum. The BIA affirmed in 2005. While appeals were pending, Castaneda was in custody; he was released on bail in 2010. The First Circuit remanded for consideration of whether Castaneda was credible in testimony that he did not know of the massacre until after it happened. The IJ denied the application. The BIA held that Castaneda was ineligible for asylum, reasoning that Shining Path attacked not because he was a member of a specific group, military officers linked to the massacre, but as revenge. The First Circuit remanded for consideration of whether that comprised a social group. The BIA answered in the affirmative; in 2012, the IJ granted asylum. The government has not appealed, but claimed that the court lacked authority to issue final judgment. The First Circuit disagreed, noting that it explicitly retained jurisdiction to ensure a speedy final resolution. View "Castaneda-Castillo v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered the U.S. in 1988 as a visitor, overstayed, and, in 1990, married María, a fellow Colombian. The couple had two children before separating in 1995. In 1996, petitioner's father sought an immigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2)(B), which permits unmarried children of an alien who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence to obtain a visa. The petition was approved. Petitioner and Maria finalized their divorce one month later and María immediately married a U.S. citizen and attained lawful permanent resident status as his spouse. In 1999, María and petitioner ostensibly reconciled and had a third child. They remarried after Maria’s divorce. DHS denied petitioner’s request for adjustment of status and revoked his immigrant visa and began removal proceedings. An IJ denied his application for cancellation of removal finding that petitioner had failed to show that he was a "person of good moral character" while living in the U.S. Meanwhile, Maria filed a visa petition on his behalf as a permanent resident applying for naturalization. USCIS denied María's application when it determined that María's second marriage was a sham. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied review. Findings concerning false testimony were reasonable. View "Restrepo v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Ukraine, sought review of a final order of removal issued by the BIA dismissing her appeal of an IJ's ruling denying her application for asylum and withholding of removal, as well as protection under the CAT, based on a finding of adverse credibility. The court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, both the IJ and the BIA weighed the evidence of authenticity and determined that the State Department's Report was more credible than petitioner's testimony and the claims of her family. Their determinations were not based on any single source or inconsistency, but on substantial record evidence. Therefore, the court found no reason to disturb these rulings. The court also concluded that petitioner did not overcome the presumption of regularity afforded to government investigations. Therefore, the court affirmed the BIA's finding that petitioner's right to confidentiality in the asylum application process was not breached. View "Lyashchynska v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Lebanon, petitioned for review of a decision from the BIA which upheld the IJ's determination that petitioner had committed a particularly serious crime, rendering him ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal. The BIA also affirmed the IJ's finding that conditions had changed in Lebanon such that it was no longer more likely than not that petitioner would be tortured upon his return. The court affirmed the IJ and BIA's determination that petitioner had committed a particularly serious crime by committing a complex mail fraud scheme to defraud victims of nearly $2 million and was therefore, not eligible for asylum or withholding removal. The court also held that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that conditions in Lebanon had changed such that it was no longer more likely than not that petitioner would be tortured upon his return there. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Khalil-Salim v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Chen, a citizen of the People's Republic of China, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1996. In 1997, the INS instituted removal, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Chen sought political asylum and withholding of deportation under the Convention Against Torture based on religion and political opinion. An IJ found his testimony incredible and denied the application, but, noting Chen's young age and crimeless record, granted voluntary departure. Counsel withdrew Chen's appeal, stating that Chen had returned to China. Chen was actually living in the U.S., had married and was starting a family, which grew to include three children. Chen later asserted that he thought the case had been resolved in his favor and was unaware of what transpired because his lawyer had died. In 2010, Chen was apprehended and sought to reopen his removal proceedings with the BIA. The BIA denied the motion as untimely. He filed a second motion, alleging changed country conditions and that the BIA, in formulating its decision, improperly considered a 2007 Country Profile. The BIA denied the motion, finding Chen's evidence inadequate to show that he will be persecuted or tortured in China on the basis of his religion. The First Circuit denied review. View "Chen v. Holder" on Justia Law

Based on petitioner's conviction for an aggravated felony, the United States sought to remove him. The IJ denied petitioner's statutorily eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility and the BIA affirmed, concluding that petitioner's post-entry adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident constituted an "admission" to the United States. Because the court found that the plain language of section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), did not bar an alien who adjusted post-entry to lawful permanent resident status from seeking a waiver of inadmissibility, the court granted the petition, vacated the order of removal, and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Bracamontes v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law