Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, natives and citizens of Japan who have been lawful permanent residents of the United States since 1984, appealed a removal order after husband pleaded guilty to one count of willfully making and subscribing a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) and wife pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). At issue was whether aliens who commit certain federal tax crimes were subject to deportation as aliens who have been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Court held that violations of section 7206(1) and (2) were crimes "involv[ing] fraud or deceit" under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) and were therefore aggravated felonies as that term was defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., when the loss to the Government exceeded $10,000. Because petitioners were subject to deportation as aliens who have been convicted of aggravated felonies, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Kawashima v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, petitioned for review of the BIA's order dismissing his appeal. Petitioner claimed that the BIA wrongly determined that a violation of California Penal Code 422 constituted a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), thus rendering him removable. Although the court previously determined that a violation of section 422 was an aggravated felony, the court had not yet decided whether section 422 was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The court did so now and answered the question in the affirmative. The court also addressed and rejected petitioner's other claimed errors. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed in part and denied in part. View "Latter-Singh v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant arrived in the U.S. in 1985, at age three. He became a lawful permanent resident and submitted an Application for Naturalization (N-400). He orally went through the form at a Citizenship and Immigration Service office. He answered "No" to: "Have you ever committed a crime or offense for which you were not arrested?" and "Have you ever sold or smuggled controlled substances, illegal drugs or narcotics?" His application was recommended and he was notified by N-445 of a mandatory oath ceremony. The N-445 contained questions to confirm that the applicant had maintained good moral character. Defendant again answered "No." He was naturalized in 2006. In fact, he had distributed cocaine 2004-2005, and, between the N-400 interview and the oath ceremony, was arrested for distributing cocaine and amphetamines. After pleading guilty to drug charges, defendant was convicted of making a material false statement to DHS (18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2)) and unlawfully applying for and obtaining naturalization (18 U.S.C. 1425(b)). The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that admission of form N-445 violated his right to confrontation; that admission of form N-445 under the public records exception to hearsay was error; and that repeated reference to his prior conviction was unfairly prejudicial. View "United States v. Lang" on Justia Law

Petitioner has lived in the U.S. since entering on a visitor’s visa in 1980, when he was 20 years old. His wife became a U.S. citizen by naturalization in 1997 and they have a child, born in New Jersey in 1990. In 2006, petitioner filed an application to adjust his status to permanent residence based on his marriage. He disclosed a 2004 arrest for propositioning an undercover officer for prostitution, which resulted in a plea of guilty to disorderly conduct. DHS concluded, based on the arrest report, that he had falsely claimed to be from Puerto Rico rather than Costa Rica at the time of arrest, triggering a bar to admissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii). In 2007, DHS initiated removal proceedings. An immigration judge found him inadmissible and the BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The statute applies to false citizenship claims made in conjunction with applications for private employment or for public services and benefits.

Defendant appealed his convictions for willfully and knowingly making a false statement on a passport application after he prepared, signed, and submitted passport applications for his three stepsons and listed himself as the children's father. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the Bronston literal truth defense did not entitle defendant to judgment as a matter of law; in the context of an application for a United States passport, the word "father" was not fundamentally ambiguous; the evidence was sufficient to find that defendant understood the inquiry made by the passport application as the Government itself did and answered the question posed falsely; and the district court did not err in refusing to give defendant's proposed instruction regarding the lack of statutory definition of the word "father." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, first entered the U.S. in 1989. In 1993, he went to Mexico for two or three weeks. When he attempted to reenter he was arrested and charged with falsely claiming U.S. citizenship and possessing a false identification document. He pleaded guilty to possession of a false identification document, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(4), (b)(3). After being released in Mexico he immediately crossed the border on foot. In 2000, the INS charged petitioner with removability, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(C)(i). The IJ held that his 1993 departure interrupted continuous physical presence and made him ineligible for cancellation of removal and granted voluntary departure. On remand, petitioner testified that he was not told about the possibility of taking his case to immigration court or given a voluntary departure option in 1993. The IJ found that the 1993 departure was "clearly different from" a mere turn-around at the border and again granted voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied appeal. Although the 1993 conviction did not declare that he was inadmissible, petitioner was subjected to a "formal, documented process" sufficient to break his continuous physical presence in the U.S.

Plaintiff, a citizen of Malaysia, alleged that she was mistakenly placed on the "No-Fly List" and other terrorist watchlists. Plaintiff was legally in the United States from 2001 to 2005 as a Ph.D. student at Stanford University. In 2005, plaintiff attempted to travel to Malaysia on a Stanford-sponsored conference where she was to present her doctoral research, she was prevented from flying and detained for questioning, eventually permitted to fly to Malaysia the following day, but has not been permitted to return to the United States since returning to Malaysia. Plaintiff brought suit in federal court seeking, among other things, injunctive relief under the First and Fifth Amendments, with the ultimate aim of having her name removed from the government's watchlists. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff had standing under Article III to challenge the presence of her name on government watchlists. The court also held that plaintiff had established "significant voluntary connection" with the United States such that she had the right to assert claims under the First and Fifth Amendments. However, the court expressed no opinion on the validity of the underlying constitutional claims. The court vacated in part and affirmed in part the district court's discovery rulings.

Petitioner, a member of the Mam Mayan group, an indigenous group whose members live predominantly in Guatemala, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), on the ground, inter alia, that petitioner had not been the victim of past persecution because he was never "personally challenged or confronted by any potential persecutor." The court concluded that the BIA's ruling that the petitioner did not suffer past persecution because his exposure to persecution was "second hand" reflected an incorrect view of the applicable law, which permitted the BIA to take account of the indirect effects of persecution as well as the direct effects, at least where, as here, the connection between the two was so immediate and strong. Therefore, the court remanded the petition to the BIA for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a deported alien found in the United States without permission. Defendant contended that the district court should have granted his motion to dismiss the indictment because it was based on a 2001 removal order that was entered in violation of his due process right to counsel, prejudicing his ability to obtain immigration relief. The court concluded that defendant did not waive his right to counsel and was denied his due process right to counsel because he was not properly advised of his rights in a language that he could understand. The court held, however, that this violation of his right to counsel was not inherently prejudicial. Because defendant could not demonstrate that he had a plausible claim to relief in 2001, he was not actually prejudiced as a result of the due process violations in his removal proceedings. Accordingly, entry of the 2001 removal order was not fundamentally unfair.

Petitioner, using a fake Italian passport, came to the U.S. in 2002, at age 23. Less than a year later, she applied for asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that she feared returning to Albania because, as a young woman living alone, she would be kidnapped and forced into prostitution and that police would not protect her because she is Christian and supports the Democratic party, which was not in power. She claimed that she was harassed by the leader of a Muslim gang and that police had taken no action. An IJ granted asylum, concluding that she belonged to a particular social group comprised of young women targeted by traffickers for prostitution, and that the Albanian government was unwilling or unable to protect women such as her. The decision was vacated by the BIA. The Seventh Circuit denied review, finding that the proposed "group" to which petitioner belongs is defined solely by the persecution feared by its members and lacks the type of common, immutable characteristics otherwise required of a particular social group. Substantial evidence supported a conclusion that she did not establish well-founded fear of persecution if she returns to Albania.