Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jesus Balbin-Mesa appealed his sentence after he pled guilty to a charge of reentering the United States after having been deported. In March 2010, Defendant filed a motion to ask for a downward adjustment from the applicable sentencing guideline range. The district court considered it "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to sentence Defendant to twenty-eight months' imprisonment. The court ordered a two-year period of supervised release, and added a special condition that Defendant not reenter the United States again without prior legal authority. The court warned Defendant that if he violated the special condition, he would be "immediately be placed in prison and likely have to serve a longer sentence." At the end of the hearing, the court asked whether Defendant had anything else to present to the court. Defendant did not object then to the sentence, but he appealed it to the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit noted that Defendant provided his own assessment of the statutory sentencing factors "making an oblique argument (unsupported by case authority) that the district court should have varied more than it did." However, none of Defendant's arguments showed "reversible error." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's sentence.

Petitioner, who came to the United States from Armenia, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision that she failed to satisfy her burden of proving eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal and the BIA's decision that petitioner also failed to satisfy her burden of proving eligibility for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). At issue was whether the whistleblowing doctrine extended to petitioner who faced retaliation from a notorious criminal who was protected by corrupt government officials. The court held that the record compelled the conclusion that petitioner expressed a political opinion in her unsuccessful attempts to have the notorious criminal prosecuted and that the record compelled a finding that in his threats and attacks on petitioner and her family, the notorious criminal was motivated, in part, by the knowledge that she was exposing his corrupt ties to law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the court applied the whistleblowing doctrine and granted the petition as to the BIA's denial of her claims for asylum and withholding of removal. The court denied, however, the petition to the extent petitioner sought to remand for adequate consideration of her CAT claim where the BIA concluded that the record did not show a likelihood that petitioner would face torture upon returning to Armenia.

Petitioner Alfonso Jiminez-Guzman sought review of a removal order issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). On appeal, he argued that the agency erred in denying his request for a continuance and by applying an incorrect legal standard to the evidence of his controlled-substance conviction. Petitioner was a lawful permanent resident to the United States. In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security issued a notice-to-appear to Petitioner, charging that he was subject for removal due to a 2002 Colorado conviction for heroin possession. The Immigration Judge granted Petitioner two continuances so that he could obtain counsel. Once he obtained counsel, Petitioner unsuccessfully petitioned to cancel his removal. Upon review of Defendant's conviction record and the BIA's proceedings, the Tenth Circuit found "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence" to support Defendant's removal. The Court found BIA committed no error in dismissing Petitioner's appeal.

Petitioner, a native of the Philippines, petitioned for review of an order of the BIA directing his removal, as well as the BIA's order denying reconsideration. At issue was whether the IJ erred in finding him removable, whether the IJ erred in finding him ineligible for withholding of removal, and whether the IJ violated his due process rights. As a preliminary matter, the court held that petitioner's notice of appeal gave the BIA an adequate opportunity to pass on the arguments he presented. The court also held that the government satisfied its burden of proving removability where petitioner was convicted of a controlled substance offense. The court held, however, that petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving that he was entitled to relief from removal where he failed to demonstrate persecution on a protected ground or that the IJ violated his due process rights where petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied.

In 1994 defendant entered a plea of guilty to unlawfully furnishing a controlled substance. He was sentenced to 220 days in jail and 3 years of probation. In 1998, he violated probation and was sentenced to 365 days, with 234 days of credit for time served. He was subsequently deported from the United States four times. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon. Investigation revealed the deportations and 1994 conviction, an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). Defendant pleaded guilty to being present in the United States after being deported for an aggravated felony conviction (8 U.S.C. 1326(a) & (b)(2)). The district court sentenced him to 70 monthsâ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly calculated the sentence, based on a finding that the 1994 conviction resulted in a sentence of more than 13 months. The sentence of imprisonment for guidelines purposes is the sentence pronounced, not the length of time actually served, with no subtraction of credit for time served.

Petitioner Vickers Waugh appealed a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that ordered him removed from the United States. In August 2009, Petitioner pled guilty in Utah state court to one count of felonious sexual contact with a minor. Following his conviction, the government instituted removal proceedings. The immigration judge (IJ) found petitioner removable on two grounds: for sexual abuse of a minor and for child abuse. While Petitioner's proceedings were pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Padilla v. Kentucky," which held that a non-citizen defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to be advised of the risk of removal resulting from a guilty plea. Relying on that case, Petitioner unsuccessfully moved to terminate his removal proceedings. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Petitioner challenged the IJ and BIA's refusal to terminate the removal proceedings against him, arguing that his constitutional rights had been violated when no one advised him of the potential of removal when he pled guilty to the state felony charges. The Tenth Circuit found that "Petitioner attempt[ed] to frame his argument as a denial of due process . . . [i]t appears Petitioner's true objection, however, is to the way the IJ and BIA exercised their discretion. . . . This challenge raise[d] neither a constitutional nor a legal issue." The Court found it did not have jurisdiction to review his petition, and declined further review.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's denial of his request for discretionary relief and order of removal. At issue was whether an attorney rendered ineffective assistance when he conceded, at a second removal hearing, that petitioner had sought to procure an immigration benefit through willful misrepresentation of a material fact in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); 1227(a)(1)(A). The court denied the petition for review and held that substantial evidence supported the finding by the BIA that the attorney's decision to concede removability was a reasonable strategic decision.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenged a decision of the BIA denying him cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. At issue was whether the BIA erred in determining that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his convictions for carrying a concealed weapon under California Penal Code 12025(a) did not constitute a removable firearms offense under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C). Also at issue was whether the BIA erred in denying petitioner voluntary departure because the denial was based on his criminal conviction under section 12025(a) and that conviction did not render him ineligible for voluntary departure. The court held that a conviction under section 12025(a) was categorically a "firearms offense" under section 1227(a)(2)(C) and therefore, the BIA properly held that petitioner was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court dismissed petitioner's second ground for appeal because it found that the BIA's denial of voluntary departure was a matter of discretion and the court lacked jurisdiction to review such a discretionary decision. Accordingly, the court denied in part and dismissed in part.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision of the BIA determining that petitioner was ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. 1255(i), because she was inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(9)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(i), and was not eligible for the exception to inadmissibility in INA section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii). The court held that the BIA correctly concluded that petitioner returned to the United States after having been "unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year," which rendered her inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). The court rejected petitioner's argument that the section 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) one-year period of unlawful presence must occur after the April 1, 1997 effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), 8 U.S.C. 1101. The court further held that the BIA correctly concluded that petitioner did not satisfy the requirements of 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii)'s exception to inadmissibility and held that in order to be eligible under this section, an alien must remain outside the United States for more than ten years before returning to the United States. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.

Plaintiffs, lawful permanent residents taken into custody based on past convictions, (8 U.S.C. 1182) sought a declaratory judgment that continued detention of putative class members, without bond hearings, violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Due Process Clause. The District Court denied class certification and dismissed the class complaint, based on 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1), which precludes class actions that seek to "enjoin or restrain the operation of" several immigration statutes. The Third Circuit reversed. The word "restrain" does not encompass classwide declaratory relief.