Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, an Indian citizen and former resident of the nation's Punjab state, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision that his asylum application was time-barred because he failed to provide corroboration of his date of entry under 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(B). At issue was whether the BIA erred in imposing the corroboration provision pursuant to section 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) on petitioner's showing of timely filing under section 1158(a)(2)(B). The court held that, under basic principles of statutory construction, the BIA improperly imported the corroboration requirement of 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(B)(ii), which governed demonstration of refugee status, into section 1158(a)(2)(B), which required applications to be timely filed. The court also held that section 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) applied to the merits of an asylum claim, not the one-year filing deadline for asylum applications and that the one-year provision was governed by section 1158(a)(2)(B), which was silent on the issue of corroboration. The court further held that the one-year bar determination was not reviewable absent a legal or constitutional question. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded the matter to the BIA.

Defendant was convicted of immigration fraud and sentenced to 51 months imprisonment. At issue was under what circumstances did the exclusion of the public from a courtroom during voir dire violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court held that, although the district court's exclusion of defendant's brother and girlfriend during voir dire failed to meet the four-factor test set forth in Waller v. Georgia, and now Presley v. Georgia, the exclusion was too trivial to implicate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court also held that Presley did not alter the "triviality exception" to the public trial guarantee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner brought this mandamus action to compel USCIS to make a determination on the merits of her I-212 application, alleging that USCIS denied her application in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed petitioner's complaint, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(5), and in the alternative, petitioner's claims were barred by res judicata. The court held that petitioner was indirectly challenging her reinstated order of removal and accordingly, the court held that section 1252(a)(5)'s jurisdictional bar applied equally to preclude such an indirect challenge. Therefore, because the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint, the court did not reach her remaining arguments.

The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), precludes withholding of removal if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States. In November 2003, the Government of Uzbekistan requested the extradition of the petitioners, asserting they participated in seeking the forced overthrow of the Republic and the establishment on its territory of a religious extremist Islamic fundamental state. Immigration judges concluded that the extradition request would be given no weight, coming from a government with a history of persecution and torture. On remand from the Third Circuit, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that petitioners are a danger to national security and ineligible for withholding of removal, but granted deferral of removal under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. The Third Circuit held that petitioners are entitled to withholding of removal as a matter of law; the determination that petitioners are a danger to national security was not supported by substantial evidence and there is no question that they will be persecuted and tortured on religious and political grounds if returned.

After pleading guilty to illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. 1326) the defendants challenged their sentences, claiming that their Fifth Amendment rights were violated as a result of the Department of Justice "fast-track" programs that allow a departure from sentencing guidelines in return for a guilty plea and waiver of right of appeal. Such programs have been implemented in several areas, but not in any district within the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the program is rationally related to, among others, the goals of allocating prosecutorial resources and enforcing the immigration laws. The sentences imposed on the defendants were reasonable.

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, contended that section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. 1101, which rendered inadmissible any alien who made a false claim to United States citizenship, should not apply to her because, at the time she made the misrepresentation, she was an unaccompanied minor. The IJ accepted petitioner's argument and granted her adjustment of status. The BIA reversed, pointing to the lack of authority for the IJ's actions yet refusing to enunciate the controlling standard. Accordingly, the court held that it could not discern whether the BIA rejected petitioner's argument on a wholesale basis, refusing to exempt from the statute any minors no matter what the age, or whether the BIA's analysis was more nuanced and hinged on certain facts that warranted the application of the statute to petitioner's case. Therefore, the court remanded the matter to the BIA with instructions to clarify the standard it used in applying section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) to unaccompanied minors and to articulate the reasons petitioner deserved no relief under that standard.

The plaintiffs were subjected to raids as part of "Operation Return to Sender," implemented to apprehend fugitive aliens. The complaint included "Bivens" claims: unreasonable home entries, unreasonable searches; unreasonable seizures, all in violation of the Fourth Amendment; a Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force by four individuals; a Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim involving three individuals; and a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim by one individual. The district court denied a motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit reversed on qualified immunity grounds. The plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants, high-level federal Immigration enforcement supervisors, participated in the raids, adopted an unconstitutional policy, or had legally sufficient notice of the unconstitutional conduct of subordinates. They did not identify what defendants should have done differently with respect to training or other matters, that would have prevented the unconstitutional conduct. The plaintiffs may pursue official capacity claims for injunctive relief against any further intimidation or unlawful entry. The court did not address individual capacity claims for damages against the lower-ranking agents

Petitioner entered a conditional plea where he admitted that he was a citizen and native of Mexico illegally present in the United States and that he knowingly possessed a firearm in or affecting commerce which had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce. At issue was whether petitioner's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5), for being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm, violated the Second Amendment and whether his conviction violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court held that the phrase "the people" in the Second Amendment did not include aliens illegally in the United States such as petitioner and that section 922(g)(5) was constitutional under the Second Amendment. The court also held that the text of the conditional guilty plea only reserved petitioner's right to appeal on the grounds that the statute violated the Second Amendment and therefore, did not reach the merits of whether petitioner's due process rights were violated.

Petitioner, a citizen of the Philippines, filed a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's final order of removal, concluding that petitioner was barred from seeking adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(d). At issue was the relationship between 8 U.S.C. 1255(d) and (i) where section 1255 prescribed the terms upon which various classes of aliens could adjust their status to that of a lawful permanent resident ("LPR"). The court held that the provisions in subsection 1255(d) barred petitioner as a K-1 visa holder from adjusting her status on any basis other than her marriage to the U.S. citizen who petitioned on her behalf and that these provisions were consistent with the carefully crafted scheme that Congress created for the purpose of avoiding marriage fraud. The court also held that petitioner's due process rights were not violated where she was not entitled to a further hearing after she conceded removability and was ineligible for adjustment of status. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.

Petitioner Edwin Chepsiror sought the Tenth Circuit's review of a removal order issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Petitioner was denied asylum by an immigration judge after he withdrew from classes at Utah State University in 2005. Petitioner claimed that he feared returning to his native Kenya because he had assisted the Kenyan police investigate the murder of his father and was afraid that if he returned those responsible for the murder would kill him too. Upon review of Petitioner's application and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit held that Petitioner did not present sufficient evidence to overturn the immigration judge's nor BIA's denial of asylum. Therefore, the Court denied Petitioner's application and affirmed Petitioner's removal from the United States.