Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Citizens of Jordan received visitor visas and came to the U.S. in the 1990s. The family stayed beyond the expiration of the visas because a child born in the U.S. had health problems. Wife was told that, because of rumors of adultery spread by her sister-in-law, wife's brother planned to kill her when she returned to Jordan in order to restore the family's honor. An immigration judge denied asylum and other relief and the BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Withholding of removal is mandatory if an applicant establishes that it is more likely than not that she would be persecuted in the country of removal because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3). To obtain protection under the Convention Against Torture, one must show that it is more likely than not that one would be tortured if removed. Wife is a member of the group of women in Jordan who have, allegedly, flouted moral norms, and who face a high risk of honor killing. It is more likely than not that brother will severely harm or murder wife if she is returned. The agency ignored strong evidence of governmental toleration of, or indifference to, honor crimes.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitioned for review of a decision of the BIA dismissing his appeal from an IJ's order removing him from the United States. Petitioner asserted that the evidence of his alienage was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the evidence should have been suppressed or, at a minimum, he should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress evidence. The court held that the exclusionary rule generally did not apply to a civil deportation proceeding; petitioner's case for exclusion of evidence was even weaker where the alleged misconduct was committed by an agent of a separate sovereign; and, in any event, the court agreed with the BIA that the evidence of alleged "egregious violations" here was insufficient to warrant a hearing on petitioner's motion to suppress. The court also held that there was no need for a hearing or exclusion of evidence because the record contained no support for petitioner's belief that the traffic stop and arrest were racially motivated and because the DHS, in any event, justified the officer's actions. The court further held that the statements petitioner made to police and ICE agents were voluntary and admissible where he did not submit evidence of "promises, prolonged interrogation, interference with his right to counsel or other indicia of coercion or duress" that might suggest that his statements were involuntary. Therefore, the petition for review was denied.

In 1996, an immigration judge ordered petitioner deported unless he voluntarily left the U.S. In 2009 he was detained and sought a stay of removal, claiming he had departed before the 1996 voluntary-departure deadline, precluding his conditional order of removal from becoming a final order of removal. He presented an expired Mexican passport and a marriage certificate, both issued in Mexico in 1998. The application was denied and petitioner was deported. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Federal courts of appeal do not have jurisdiction over denials of petitions to stay removal; petitioner had not appealed to the BIA the decisions on his motion for a speedy bond hearing and never challenged his removability in 1996. He cannot challenge enforcement of the 1996 order as if it were a new order.

Petitioner was detained for 1,072 days pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which requires that any person who is removable from this country because he has committed a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime involving a controlled substance be taken into custody and does not provide for release on bond. Petitioner, a citizen of Senegal, apparently had a state conviction for possessing a controlled substance. The district court concluded that the detention was lawful. The Third Circuit construed the pro se petition as seeking habeas corpus and reversed. The statute authorizes only detention for a reasonable period of time, after which the Due Process Clause requires that the government establish that continued detention is necessary to further the purposes of the detention statute. Detention of petitioner for nearly three years without further inquiry into whether it was necessary to ensure his appearance at the removal proceedings or to prevent a risk of danger to the community, was unreasonable.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, petitioned for review of a decision of the BIA affirming the IJ's decision denying asylum in the exercise of its discretion. The BIA's decision balanced the likelihood of persecution and its severity against the negative factors in the record and agreed with the IJ that petitioner's method of entry into the United States - being concealed in a metal box that was welded to the bottom of a car and driven across the border in the desert heat - was so dangerous that asylum should be denied. Petitioner appealed the BIA's decision related to the denial of asylum. After petitioner filed his appeal with the court, DHS successfully completed background checks and the IJ signed and filed a one-page standardized form confirming that withholding of removal had been granted. The form also indicated that appeal from the order was waived. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the BIA's final order denying relief despite the fact that the BIA remanded pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(d)(6). The court held that because the BIA properly considered the totality of the circumstances and weighed the risk of persecution against the egregious nature of petitioner's entry into the United States, the court denied the petition for review.

Petitioner entered the U.S. in 1993 as a minor and became involved with a gang. In 2000, he was serving an Illinois sentence for robbery and aggravated battery. He was removed to Mexico in 2001 and was prohibited from re-entering without first seeking waiver of his inadmissible status. See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)-(iii). Petitioner re-entered illegally and claims he was attacked by strangers in 2002. In 2010 he was arrested and the removal order was reinstated. He sought a U Visa (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)), which would grant him temporary lawful status based on the 2002 attack and his cooperation with the police at that time and waiver of his inadmissible status. Both were denied. The Seventh Circuit upheld reinstatement of removal and declined to review the visa denial for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Venezuela, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision, affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner's testimony was not credible. At issue was whether substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision. The court held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's and the BIA's finding that petitioner's testimony was not credible where the IJ and BIA offered specific and cogent reasons for the finding and where they cited numerous material inconsistencies between petitioner's testimony and the documentary evidence introduced in support of his asylum application. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review.

Petitioners, natives and citizens of India, petitioned for review of an order of the BIA affirming the IJ's denial of their motions to reopen and rescind their in absentia orders of deportation to India. Petitioners contended that they did not receive proper notice of the deportation hearing, which the IJ held in absentia. The court held that the IJ and BIA reasonably concluded that petitioners failed to rebut the strong presumption of effective service because they did not provide documentary evidence from the Postal Service, third party affidavits, or other similar evidence demonstrating that there was improper delivery or that nondelivery was not due to their failure to provide an address where they could receive mail. Therefore, the court concluded that the government satisfied its burden of showing delivery by sending the notices of deportation proceedings by certified mail.

Petitioner, a citizen of Pakistan, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of less than two ounces of marihuana. At issue was whether a waiver was available where an applicant had been convicted of two separate offenses of possessing 30 grams or less of marihuana but had already received an 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) waiver relating to the first offense. The court held that based on the plain language of section 1182(h), the implausibility of petitioner's reading, and prior BIA and Fifth Circuit precedent, an alien who had been convicted of two or more offenses of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marihuana was ineligible for a 1182(h) waiver, regardless of whether he previously received a 1182(h) waiver related to one of his offenses. Therefore, the petition for review of the BIA's decision was denied.

Petitioner left China to seek asylum in the U.S. and claims that family-planning authorities forced her to have an abortion. Her evidence included a letter from her mother, confirming her version of events and documents that she said were issued by the hospital. One was an outpatient medical record stating that the procedure was due to pregnancy without marriage; the other was a disease certificate. An immigration judge denied the application, concluding that, although she credibly testified to having an abortion, she failed to establish that it was involuntary. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted review and remanded, concluding that the agency misread precedent. The agency did not identify other readily- available evidence that might have helped prove the forced nature of her abortion, especially when the IJ found her testimony about her strenuous efforts to avoid the abortion as being credible.