Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, born in Germany in 1957, was admitted as a lawful permanent U.S. resident in 1961. In 1990 he entered a plea of guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. He was discharged from parole in 1993; 14 years later the Department of Homeland Security issued a notice to appear. An immigration judge found the petitioner ineligible for waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1182(c) and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied relief. A waiver must be denied if the alien is deportable on a ground that does not have a statutory counterpart in section 212 of the Act; an aggravated felony involving sexual abuse of a minor has no statutory counterpart. It is irrelevant that he could have been charged differently and may have believed, when he entered his plea, that he was eligible for waiver. The court rejected due process and equal protection arguments.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, appealed from the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order affirming the Immigration Judge's ("IJ") denial of his claims for asylum where petitioner had allegedly lied about previously applying for asylum in Canada. At issue was whether the IJ's adverse creditability finding was not supported by substantial evidence in the record and that petitioner was denied due process of law by the denial of continuance so that he could put his father on the stand. The court held that substantial evidence on the record supported the adverse creditability decision, the need for corroboration, and the conclusion that petitioner had not borne his burden of proof to establish eligibility for asylum. The court also held that the IJ did not abuse her discretion in denying another continuance where the IJ was not required to grant a motion for continuance based upon speculations.

Petitioner, a native of China, appealed the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order affirming the Immigration Judge's ("IJ") denial of her asylum and withholding of removal claims based upon an adverse credibility determination, as well as the IJ's decision that petitioner filed a frivolous asylum application. At issue was the distinction between an applicant for asylum whose testimony lacked creditability and one who had deliberately fabricated material aspects of her application. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's denial of petitioner's asylum and withholding of removal claims based on petitioner's lack of creditability. The court also held that the issue of whether petitioner submitted a frivolous asylum application was a distinct question requiring a separate analysis and that, although the grounds cited for the adverse creditability determination overlapped to some extent with the grounds cited for the frivolous findings, the heightened requirements of the latter finding were not met.

Defendant pled guilty to having been found in the United States after deportation following a felony conviction and was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Almost three years after the completion of defendant's prison sentence, he was arrested for criminal trespass. At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction to revoke defendant's three-year term of supervised release after his arrest for criminal trespass. The court reasoned that resolution of the issue depended on the date on which defendant was released from imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. 3624(e) and held that defendant was released from imprisonment the moment his administrative detention began, i.e. the moment he was transferred from Bureau of Prisons custody to Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody to await deportation. However, because the record was not clear as to the exact date on which defendant was released from imprisonment, the court remanded for further fact-finding in order to determine the exact date on which defendant was released from imprisonment.

Petitioner Francis Efagene petitioned the court for review of a final order issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Petitioner was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1991. In 2005, Petitioner plead guilty to a sexual misconduct misdemeanor in the State of Colorado, and was sentenced to 364 daysâ imprisonment. Part of his sentence required that he register as a sex offender for a ten year period. Petitioner served his time. In 2007, he failed, however, to meet the registration deadline and was rearrested. He plead guilty to the misdemeanor of failure-to-register as a sex offender and was sentenced to thirty daysâ imprisonment. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Petitioner as âremovableâ for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. Petitioner challenged his removability status before an Immigration Judge (IJ), arguing that failing to register is not a crime of moral turpitude. The IJ disagreed and ordered Petitioner to be deported. In an unpublished order, the BIA affirmed the IJâs decision and dismissed Petitionerâs appeal. The Tenth Circuit stayed Petitionerâs case and found upon later review that the BIAâs lacked jurisdictional authority to interpret the State of Coloradoâs misdemeanor failure-to-register statute as one involving âmoral turpitude.â The Court reversed the BIAâs decision and vacated Petitionerâs deportation order.

Defendants, in consolidated appeals, appealed their convictions for violations of 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1) for attempting to travel by boat from Saipan in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands ("CNMI") to the Territory of Guam by boat. At issue was whether defendants violated section 1325(a)(1) for being aliens who knowingly and willingly attempted to enter the United States at a time and place other than as designated by immigration officers on or about January 5, 2010, a date within Title VII of the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008's ("CNRA"), 48 U.S.C. 1806-1808, transition period. The court held that defendants did not violate section 1325(a)(1) by attempting to travel by boat from the CNMI to Guam where the CNMI and Guam were parts of the United States and an alien did not enter or attempt to enter the United States for purposes of section 1325(a)(1) when traveling from one part of the United States to another, even if when doing so they passed through international waters.

Petitioner, a native of the Soviet Union and citizen of Azerbaijan, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirming an immigration judge's ("IJ") denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. At issue was whether there was substantial evidence to support the IJ's determination that petitioner was not credible due to inconsistencies between his testimony before an asylum officer and his subsequent written statements and testimony, which described additional incidents of persecution. The court denied the petition and held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's conclusion that the additional incidents materially altered petitioner's account of persecution in a way that casted doubt on his credibility.

After pleading guilty to being in the United States without authorization after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), the defendant requested a prison term below the guidelines range on the grounds that his criminal history category was overstated and that his reasons for returning to this country, to escape poverty and help his family, mitigate his illegal reentry. The district court imposed a 46-month sentence, at the bottom of the guidelines. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, based on the district court's failure to explain its choice of sentence.

Petitioners, citizens of Guatemala, petitioned for review of removal orders that became final after the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") dismissed their appeals from decisions of an Immigration Judge ("IJ") that found each man removable under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the INA. At issue was whether the BIA erred in concluding that petitioners were statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status where their release on "conditional parole" under section 236(a)(2)(B) of the INA did not satisfy the "paroled in the United States" requirement of section 245(a). The court held that the requirement that an alien be "paroled into the United States" in order to seek adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) was not satisfied by the alien's release on "conditional parole" under section 1226(a)(2)(B). The court also held that petitioners were correctly ordered removed under section 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) where they were present in the United States without being admitted or paroled and therefore, petitioners were statutorily ineligible for adjustment status under section 1255(a) despite having been released on conditional parole under section 1226(a)(2)(B).

Appellant Jose Santos Vaquera-Juanes was indicted for knowingly attempting to re-enter the United States after having been previously deported. Appellant plead guilty to the charge, and was sentenced to forty-nine months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release. Although he did not raise the issue during sentencing, in this appeal Appellant argues that the lower court erred by imposing supervised release without first making required findings. On appeal, the Circuit Court dismissed Appellant's argument on ripeness grounds, holding that "because [Appellant] has shown no practical possibility he will ever legally be in a position to violate the terms of the condition he challenges, he has failed to show any likelihood his term of supervised release will be revoked because of a violation of the challenged condition⦠even if the [â¦] condition remains part of the criminal judgment, there is no reasonable possibility it will result in [his] re-incarceration⦠he has failed to show he will suffer any hardship."