Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A citizen of Mexico, who had been a lawful permanent resident in the United States since 1982, was convicted twice for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—first in 2011 for shooting his ex-wife and again in 2018 for assaulting a roommate with a knife. These felony convictions led the Department of Homeland Security to initiate removal proceedings against him under Section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which concerns firearm offenses. An immigration judge ordered his removal after he completed his sentences, finding him ineligible for relief due to his convictions.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the removal order in 2020. The individual’s first petition for review to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was dismissed as untimely. In 2022, he filed his first motion to reopen or reconsider with the BIA, arguing that a Supreme Court decision, Borden v. United States, changed the legal landscape regarding his removability. The BIA denied this motion, finding Borden inapplicable because his removal was based on a firearm offense, not an aggravated felony, and that the motion was untimely. In 2024, he filed a second motion to reopen, again citing Borden and seeking equitable tolling of both the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen. The BIA denied this second motion, holding that the statutory limit of one motion to reopen applied and that equitable tolling did not extend to the numerical bar.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial. The court held that the statutory “number bar” in the INA, which generally allows only one motion to reopen, is not subject to equitable tolling. The court dismissed the petition in part and denied it in part, concluding that the BIA did not err in refusing to reopen the removal proceedings. View "Garcia Morin v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Several individuals who had received grants of parole under programs established by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela challenged the government’s decision to terminate those grants. The parole programs, created during the Biden Administration, allowed eligible individuals from these countries to enter the United States temporarily for up to two years, based on urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. When President Trump took office in January 2025, he issued executive orders directing DHS to end categorical parole programs, including the CHNV programs. DHS subsequently published a notice terminating the programs and revoking all existing grants of parole within thirty days, rather than allowing them to expire naturally.The plaintiffs, affected by the early termination, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court certified a class of affected individuals and granted a preliminary stay, preventing DHS from revoking their parole grants before the original expiration dates. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the categorical termination was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), in part because the agency’s rationale rested on a legal error and failed to adequately consider reliance and humanitarian interests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The First Circuit held that the relevant statute requires DHS to grant parole only on a case-by-case basis, but does not impose the same limitation on the termination of parole. The court also found that the agency’s explanation for terminating the parole programs was not so deficient as to be arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Concluding that the plaintiffs had not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the First Circuit vacated the district court’s stay and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Noem" on Justia Law

A native of Uzbekistan and citizen of Israel entered the United States on a visitor’s visa in 2009, married a U.S. citizen, and had two children who are U.S. citizens. After his visa expired, he was placed in removal proceedings, conceded removability, and was ordered removed. He sought to adjust his status based on marriage, but after divorcing in 2017, that petition was withdrawn. He then applied for cancellation of removal on two grounds: (1) that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S. citizen children, and (2) that he was eligible for special cancellation under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) due to alleged battery or extreme cruelty by his ex-wife.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied both applications, finding his testimony credible but insufficient without corroborating evidence such as medical records for his daughter, proof of child support payments, or tax returns. The IJ also found that his ex-wife’s conduct did not rise to the level of battery or extreme cruelty required by statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the evidence did not meet the statutory standards for either form of relief and that the lack of corroboration was fatal to his claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the application of legal standards to established facts as mixed questions of law and fact. The court concluded that the BIA correctly determined the petitioner failed to provide required corroborating evidence for hardship and that the ex-wife’s actions did not constitute battery or extreme cruelty under the statute. The petition for review was denied. View "Simantov v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Philip Myers, a native and citizen of Liberia, was adopted by a U.S. citizen and entered the United States as a child. He later sustained several criminal convictions, including for aggravated felonies. In 2021, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Myers claimed derivative citizenship through his adoptive mother, who had become a naturalized U.S. citizen, and also alleged that he had been abused by her. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) had previously denied his derivative citizenship application, finding insufficient evidence that he was in his adoptive mother’s legal and physical custody at the relevant time. During removal proceedings, Myers, sometimes represented by counsel and sometimes pro se, was found competent to proceed without safeguards. He applied for various forms of relief, including asylum and protection under the Convention Against Torture, but these were denied.The Immigration Judge ordered Myers removed to Liberia. Myers appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the competency determination was flawed and that he should have been found incompetent to proceed pro se. The BIA found no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s competency finding and dismissed the appeal. Myers then moved to reopen the proceedings, citing a pending motion with USCIS regarding derivative citizenship, alleged errors in the competency determination, a new asylum claim based on his sexual orientation, and a pending T-visa application as a victim of sex trafficking. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, and Myers was removed to Liberia.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and found none. The court also rejected Myers’s constitutional challenge to the statutory requirements for derivative citizenship and found no genuine issue of material fact regarding his nationality claim. The petition for review was denied. View "Myers v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Luis Alfredo Lezama-Ramirez, a noncitizen who had previously been removed from the United States, pleaded guilty to unlawfully reentering the country in violation of federal law. After his guilty plea, the Probation Office prepared a presentence report (PSR) that included a list of standard and special conditions for supervised release. At sentencing, Lezama-Ramirez’s counsel indicated there were no objections to the PSR, and the district court adopted it. The court imposed a one-year term of supervised release, referencing compliance with standard and special conditions, but did not read these conditions aloud. The written judgment later included the same conditions as those in the PSR.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana entered the judgment, and Lezama-Ramirez appealed, arguing that there were discrepancies between the oral pronouncement of supervised release conditions at sentencing and those listed in the written judgment. He specifically challenged the imposition of certain standard and special conditions that were not read aloud, as well as differences between the oral and written versions of two particular conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that because Lezama-Ramirez had notice of the supervised release conditions through the PSR and did not object at sentencing, there was no reversible error in imposing the conditions that were not read aloud. However, the court found that the written version of one special condition (Special Condition 2) imposed an additional reporting requirement not included in the oral pronouncement, which constituted an impermissible conflict. The Fifth Circuit vacated the imposition of Special Condition 2 and remanded for the district court to conform it to the oral pronouncement, while affirming the remainder of the judgment. View "United States v. Lezama-Ramirez" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Black native and citizen of Guyana, entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in infancy and lived there since. He suffered from untreated mental illness, including schizophrenia, and physical disabilities requiring a wheelchair. After a psychotic episode, he was convicted of several felonies and served sixteen years in prison. Following his release, the Department of Homeland Security charged him as removable due to his aggravated felony conviction. Fearing torture if deported to Guyana because of his mental health, physical disabilities, criminal-deportee status, and race, he sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, presenting testimony and evidence of mistreatment faced by similar groups in Guyana.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner and his expert credible but denied relief, concluding that the likelihood of torture in Guyana was insufficient. The judge determined that Guyanese police do not actively seek to harm or torture mentally ill persons and that government acquiescence was not supported by the evidence. The judge also found that discrimination and poor conditions existed but did not rise to the level of torture or government acquiescence. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing that the judge failed to consider the cumulative risk of torture based on all asserted grounds and misapplied the definition of torture. The Board affirmed, focusing only on mental illness and finding no clear error in the judge’s conclusions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed only the Board’s decision. The court held that the Board abused its discretion by ignoring relevant, unrebutted evidence regarding the petitioner’s risk of torture due to his race, physical disabilities, and criminal-deportee status. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the agency to consider all evidence and apply the definition of torture to each claim. View "McDougall v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Nigerian citizen, after returning to his home country from Venezuela, was recruited under false pretenses to work as a cook at a rural camp. Upon arrival, he discovered the camp was operated by a group known as the Unknown Gunmen, which the Nigerian government considers a terrorist organization. He was not allowed to leave, was forced to cook for the group’s leaders, and was eventually held without pay. After several months, he managed to escape and, fearing for his life due to repeated threats and attacks by the group, fled Nigeria. He traveled to Venezuela and then to the United States, where he sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming a well-founded fear of persecution.An Immigration Judge found him removable for entering the United States without valid documents. The judge denied his applications for asylum and withholding of removal, concluding that by cooking for the Unknown Gunmen, he had provided “material support” to a terrorist organization, which barred him from relief. The judge also denied his claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture, finding insufficient evidence that he would likely be tortured with the acquiescence of a public official if returned to Nigeria. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, agreeing that the material-support bar applied and that there was no de minimis or duress exception.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the petitioner’s forced cooking for the group did not constitute “material support” under the relevant statute, as his actions were not sufficiently substantial to help the organization accomplish its terrorist activities. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s order of removal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ozurumba v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Mariano Ortiz Trejo, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection in 1999, briefly returned to Mexico in 2004, and reentered the U.S. without inspection in 2005. He resides in Rhode Island with his minor son, a U.S. citizen, and the child’s mother, who is not a legal permanent resident. Ortiz Trejo works in construction and contributes to the household income. In 2015, he was served a Notice to Appear, conceded removability, and applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his son due to the child’s allergies and emotional health. He also sought voluntary departure as an alternative.The Immigration Judge of the Immigration Court found Ortiz Trejo credible but determined that he had not established the requisite hardship for cancellation of removal. The judge found that the child’s allergies were controllable, the likelihood of a severe reaction was low, and the child’s mother could provide for him, with continued access to medical care in Rhode Island. The judge admitted a psychological evaluation diagnosing the child with “Adjustment Disorder” but gave it limited weight. Cancellation of removal was denied, but voluntary departure was granted.Ortiz Trejo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed the denial of cancellation and the grant of voluntary departure. The Board found that the Immigration Judge had considered all evidence, including the psychological evaluation, and concluded that the record did not establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Ortiz Trejo then petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit held that the Board did not err in its decision, finding no legal error or failure to consider key evidence. The court denied the petition for review, upholding the Board’s determination that Ortiz Trejo had not met the hardship standard required for cancellation of removal. View "Ortiz Trejo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan nationals living in the United States received Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which allowed them to work and protected them from deportation due to ongoing humanitarian crises in Venezuela. In January 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security extended TPS for Venezuelans through October 2026, consolidating two prior designations to streamline the process. Shortly after, a new Secretary, following a change in administration, attempted to vacate this extension and terminate TPS for one group of Venezuelan nationals, citing confusion and alleged improvements in Venezuela’s conditions. This abrupt reversal threatened TPS holders with imminent loss of status, employment, and the risk of deportation.The National TPS Alliance and several individual TPS holders filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking to restore the extension. The district court granted preliminary relief, postponing the effective dates of the vacatur and termination notices nationwide under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored postponement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the preliminary relief and that neither the TPS statute nor 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) barred judicial review of the Secretary’s authority. The court concluded that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to vacate a prior extension of TPS, as the statute provides specific procedures for designation, extension, and termination, but not for vacatur. The court also found that nationwide relief was necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs. The district court’s order postponing the vacatur and termination of Venezuelan TPS was affirmed. View "National TPS Alliance v. Noem" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan national who had lived in the United States since 2000 applied for cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). She testified that, before leaving Guatemala, she received frequent death threats from individuals seeking to extort her father's meat shop and experienced a separate violent incident unrelated to her family. She feared returning to Guatemala due to potential targeting by gangs, particularly as a deportee perceived to have money. In the United States, she had three U.S. citizen children, one of whom suffered from anxiety and was receiving therapy.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all three forms of relief. The IJ found that the petitioner was not statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal due to insufficient continuous presence in the United States and, alternatively, that she failed to show her children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if she were removed. The IJ also determined that the threats and harm she experienced in Guatemala did not amount to persecution on account of a protected ground, but rather were motivated by general criminal activity. The IJ further found no evidence that she would be tortured with the acquiescence of the Guatemalan government, denying her CAT claim.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision on all grounds. The BIA agreed that the hardship to her children did not meet the statutory threshold, that there was no nexus between the harm feared and a protected ground for withholding of removal, and that the CAT claim was waived due to lack of meaningful challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court held that the BIA did not err in its determinations regarding hardship, nexus to a protected ground, or waiver of the CAT claim. View "Lopez Cano v. Bondi" on Justia Law