Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A former restaurant owner from Mexico, Alma Reyes Galeana, and her three daughters sought asylum and withholding of removal in the United States after fleeing violent threats from gangs in Mexico. Reyes Galeana claimed that, as a Mexican business owner, she was a member of a "particular social group" that deserved protection from deportation under federal law. However, both the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected this argument, asserting that "Mexican business owners" do not constitute a specific social group.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Board's decision and agreed with the lower courts' rulings. The court ruled that Reyes Galeana's proposed social group of "Mexican business owners" failed on grounds of particularity and social distinction. The court held that this group was neither specifically defined nor perceived as socially distinct in Mexican society. Furthermore, the court maintained that being a target for extortion, a common threat faced by business owners, does not establish membership in a particular social group. The court also found that Reyes Galeana failed to provide evidence that Mexican society perceives business owners as a distinct class of persons subject to persecution.Consequently, the court denied her petition for review, affirming the Board's decision that Reyes Galeana does not qualify for asylum or withholding of removal as a member of a particular social group. View "Galeana v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Wendy Miguel-Peña and her minor daughter, natives and citizens of El Salvador, who entered the United States without authorization. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and an immigration judge found them removable and ineligible for asylum or protection under the Convention Against Torture. They appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which also dismissed their appeal.Miguel-Peña and her daughter then sought review of the Board's order, alleging error in denying their motion to terminate removal proceedings and denial of Miguel-Peña’s asylum claim based on a lack of connection between alleged persecution and a protected ground, and a finding that “women business owners in El Salvador” is not an immutable particular social group. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the petition, finding that the petitioners failed to exhaust their claim-processing arguments under the law, and that the Board of Immigration Appeals did not err in its analysis of the asylum claim.Specifically, the court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's findings that the alleged persecution was not based on an anti-gang political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The court also agreed with the Board's conclusion that the proposed social group of "women business owners in El Salvador" was not immutable, and therefore, not a cognizable social group under asylum law. View "Miguel-Pena v. Garland" on Justia Law

Hector Herrera-Elias, a Honduran citizen, entered the United States unlawfully and was charged with removability. In response, he petitioned for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming he feared persecution and torture in Honduras due to his involvement with the MS-13 gang and his sexual orientation. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him ineligible for asylum due to an untimely application, and deemed him barred from asylum and withholding of removal due to his having committed a serious nonpolitical crime (transporting firearms and drugs for criminal organizations in Honduras). The IJ also found that Herrera-Elias failed to prove that he would likely face torture if returned to Honduras.Upon appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, concluding that Herrera-Elias knowingly participated in serious criminal activity and that no duress exception applied to the serious nonpolitical crime bar. One panel member dissented, arguing that Herrera-Elias's age and limited involvement in gang operations should not constitute a serious nonpolitical crime.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the BIA's judgment. The court found substantial evidence supporting the IJ’s and BIA’s findings regarding Herrera-Elias's involvement in serious nonpolitical crime. Additionally, the court rejected Herrera-Elias's attempt to introduce a duress exception to the serious nonpolitical crime bar, noting that the elements of this bar and the persecutor bar (where the duress exception has been debated) are different, and that Herrera-Elias did not explain how duress is relevant to this specific bar. View "Hererra-Elias v. Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Miguel Angel Uribe Andrade, sought a review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision dismissing an appeal of the Immigration Judge (IJ) order denying him asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Uribe proposed the social group, “Mexicans with mental health disorders characterized by psychotic features who exhibit erratic behavior,” as the basis for his asylum and withholding claims.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Uribe’s petition, ruling that the BIA did not commit legal error in finding that Uribe’s proposed social group lacked particularity. The court stated that the term "erratic behavior" was not defined in the record and was not used by Uribe’s treatment providers in describing his conditions or symptoms. Therefore, the BIA could conclude that "erratic behavior" did not provide a clear indication of who might be in the proposed group.The court also found that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s denial of CAT protection. Uribe had not shown that it was more likely than not that he would be institutionalized in Mexico and tortured. Even if Uribe were committed to a mental health institution, the poor conditions in Mexico’s mental health facilities were not created with the intent to inflict suffering. Furthermore, Uribe’s claim that he would be tortured due to his former gang membership and tattoos was also speculative. View "URIBE ANDRADE V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Sara Esteban-Garcia, a native and citizen of Guatemala and an indigenous woman of Mam descent, petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) which affirmed an immigration judge's order denying her application for asylum and claim for withholding of removal under sections 208 and 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Esteban-Garcia had fled Guatemala after a man she had been romantically involved with, along with his friends, demanded she become a prostitute or sell drugs to earn money for them. The immigration judge and the BIA found that Esteban-Garcia had failed to establish a nexus between the harm she experienced and a statutorily protected ground. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. It noted that the petitioner consistently stated the reason why her alleged persecutors wanted her to become a prostitute and drug seller was so that they could benefit financially, which is not a protected ground. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Esteban-Garcia v. Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was asked to review a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concerning F.J.A.P., a petitioner from El Salvador. F.J.A.P. had previously been removed from the U.S. but returned due to threats from the MS-13 gang. After his return to the U.S., his original removal order was reinstated. F.J.A.P. then applied for withholding-only relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), which an immigration judge granted. However, the BIA reversed this decision. F.J.A.P. petitioned the Seventh Circuit for review.The court first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to review F.J.A.P.'s claim. The court concluded that a reinstated order of removal was not final for purposes of judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 until the agency had completed withholding proceedings. Therefore, F.J.A.P.'s petition was timely because it was filed within 30 days of the completion of his CAT proceedings.On the merits of the case, the court found that the BIA had not applied the correct standard of review to the immigration judge's decision. The BIA was required to review the immigration judge's factual findings for clear error, not de novo. However, the BIA had failed to address the immigration judge's key factual findings, had given more weight to certain facts in the record than others, and had not explained how the immigration judge's alleged errors displayed a lack of logic, plausibility, or support in the record. As a result, the court granted F.J.A.P.'s petition and remanded the case to the BIA for reconsideration of the immigration judge's decision under the correct standard of review. View "F. J. A. P. v. Garland" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a petition by Israel Amador-Morales, a Mexican citizen, challenging the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to deny his motion to reopen his case. Morales had entered the United States without inspection in 2003, was voluntarily departed in 2012, and then re-entered without inspection in 2013. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought his removal and issued a Notice to Appear alleging his removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Morales admitted the allegations and conceded removability in 2016. However, in 2019, he withdrew his admission and concession, and moved to terminate the proceedings. The Immigration Judge denied the motion, ordered his removal, and the BIA dismissed his appeal and denied the motion to reopen.Morales argued that the BIA should have granted his motion to reopen, erred in ruling his objection to the Notice to Appear as untimely, and misconstrued his motion as asking it to compel DHS to exercise prosecutorial discretion. The court, however, found that Morales's objections to the Notice to Appear were untimely as they occurred after the closing of pleadings. The court also determined that the BIA's decision that it lacked the authority to compel the DHS to exercise prosecutorial discretion did not constitute an abuse of discretion.The court denied the petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision to deny the motion to reopen and maintaining Morales's removal order. View "Amador-Morales v. Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, Jamie Avila Reyes, the appellant, appealed his 15-year prison sentence for crimes including homicide by vehicle in the first degree and driving under the influence of alcohol. Reyes, an undocumented immigrant, contended that the trial court improperly considered his immigration status during sentencing, violating his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Reyes also argued that OCGA § 17-10-1.3, a Georgia statute that allows a trial court to consider potential deportation when determining whether to probate a convicted person's sentence, is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that OCGA § 17-10-1.3 is constitutional. The court found that the statute survived rational basis review because it bears a rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest in ensuring the complete execution of judicial sentences. The court also held that the trial court did not violate Reyes' due process or equal protection rights when it applied the statute and declined to probate any portion of his sentence due to his impending deportation. The court noted that there was no evidence the trial court based its sentence on discriminatory animus towards undocumented noncitizens. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "REYES v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Mario Alejos-Perez, a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, sought a review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) final order of removal that found him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) based on his Texas conviction for possessing a synthetic cannabinoid. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied his petition for review. The court agreed with the BIA's conclusion that Alejos-Perez failed to prove there was a "realistic probability" that Texas would use the state statute he was convicted under to prosecute the possession of drugs that are not criminalized under federal law, which would mean his conviction would not be a removable offense. Alejos-Perez argued that the "realistic probability" standard should not apply, but the court rejected his argument, citing the rule of orderliness and the law of the case doctrine. The court also found that Alejos-Perez failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding several authorities he cited for the first time during his appeal. View "Alejos-Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Israeil Guzman-Maldonado, a lawful permanent resident of the United States and a citizen of Mexico, was convicted of three counts of armed robbery under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-1904(A) in 2019. He was sentenced to concurrent eight-year terms for the first two counts and two years of probation for the third. In 2022, an immigration judge ordered Guzman's removal because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony theft offense and two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising from a single scheme. Guzman appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal, prompting him to petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit denied Guzman's petition for review, concluding that a conviction for armed robbery under A.R.S. § 13-1904(A), for which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one year, is categorically an aggravated felony theft offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), thereby giving rise to removability. Applying the categorical approach, the court compared the elements of the generic federal crime and of Arizona armed robbery and concluded that Guzman’s conviction under A.R.S. § 13-1904(A) necessarily required proof of each element of generic theft. The court rejected Guzman's arguments that the Arizona statute encompasses "consensual" takings or the theft of services, both of which would have made it broader than generic theft. View "GUZMAN-MALDONADO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law