Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In 1994 defendant entered a plea of guilty to unlawfully furnishing a controlled substance. He was sentenced to 220 days in jail and 3 years of probation. In 1998, he violated probation and was sentenced to 365 days, with 234 days of credit for time served. He was subsequently deported from the United States four times. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon. Investigation revealed the deportations and 1994 conviction, an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). Defendant pleaded guilty to being present in the United States after being deported for an aggravated felony conviction (8 U.S.C. 1326(a) & (b)(2)). The district court sentenced him to 70 monthsâ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly calculated the sentence, based on a finding that the 1994 conviction resulted in a sentence of more than 13 months. The sentence of imprisonment for guidelines purposes is the sentence pronounced, not the length of time actually served, with no subtraction of credit for time served.

Petitioner Vickers Waugh appealed a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that ordered him removed from the United States. In August 2009, Petitioner pled guilty in Utah state court to one count of felonious sexual contact with a minor. Following his conviction, the government instituted removal proceedings. The immigration judge (IJ) found petitioner removable on two grounds: for sexual abuse of a minor and for child abuse. While Petitioner's proceedings were pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Padilla v. Kentucky," which held that a non-citizen defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to be advised of the risk of removal resulting from a guilty plea. Relying on that case, Petitioner unsuccessfully moved to terminate his removal proceedings. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Petitioner challenged the IJ and BIA's refusal to terminate the removal proceedings against him, arguing that his constitutional rights had been violated when no one advised him of the potential of removal when he pled guilty to the state felony charges. The Tenth Circuit found that "Petitioner attempt[ed] to frame his argument as a denial of due process . . . [i]t appears Petitioner's true objection, however, is to the way the IJ and BIA exercised their discretion. . . . This challenge raise[d] neither a constitutional nor a legal issue." The Court found it did not have jurisdiction to review his petition, and declined further review.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's denial of his request for discretionary relief and order of removal. At issue was whether an attorney rendered ineffective assistance when he conceded, at a second removal hearing, that petitioner had sought to procure an immigration benefit through willful misrepresentation of a material fact in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); 1227(a)(1)(A). The court denied the petition for review and held that substantial evidence supported the finding by the BIA that the attorney's decision to concede removability was a reasonable strategic decision.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenged a decision of the BIA denying him cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. At issue was whether the BIA erred in determining that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his convictions for carrying a concealed weapon under California Penal Code 12025(a) did not constitute a removable firearms offense under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C). Also at issue was whether the BIA erred in denying petitioner voluntary departure because the denial was based on his criminal conviction under section 12025(a) and that conviction did not render him ineligible for voluntary departure. The court held that a conviction under section 12025(a) was categorically a "firearms offense" under section 1227(a)(2)(C) and therefore, the BIA properly held that petitioner was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court dismissed petitioner's second ground for appeal because it found that the BIA's denial of voluntary departure was a matter of discretion and the court lacked jurisdiction to review such a discretionary decision. Accordingly, the court denied in part and dismissed in part.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision of the BIA determining that petitioner was ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. 1255(i), because she was inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(9)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(i), and was not eligible for the exception to inadmissibility in INA section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii). The court held that the BIA correctly concluded that petitioner returned to the United States after having been "unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year," which rendered her inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). The court rejected petitioner's argument that the section 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) one-year period of unlawful presence must occur after the April 1, 1997 effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), 8 U.S.C. 1101. The court further held that the BIA correctly concluded that petitioner did not satisfy the requirements of 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii)'s exception to inadmissibility and held that in order to be eligible under this section, an alien must remain outside the United States for more than ten years before returning to the United States. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.

Plaintiffs, lawful permanent residents taken into custody based on past convictions, (8 U.S.C. 1182) sought a declaratory judgment that continued detention of putative class members, without bond hearings, violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Due Process Clause. The District Court denied class certification and dismissed the class complaint, based on 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1), which precludes class actions that seek to "enjoin or restrain the operation of" several immigration statutes. The Third Circuit reversed. The word "restrain" does not encompass classwide declaratory relief.

Petitioner, an Indian citizen and former resident of the nation's Punjab state, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision that his asylum application was time-barred because he failed to provide corroboration of his date of entry under 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(B). At issue was whether the BIA erred in imposing the corroboration provision pursuant to section 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) on petitioner's showing of timely filing under section 1158(a)(2)(B). The court held that, under basic principles of statutory construction, the BIA improperly imported the corroboration requirement of 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(B)(ii), which governed demonstration of refugee status, into section 1158(a)(2)(B), which required applications to be timely filed. The court also held that section 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) applied to the merits of an asylum claim, not the one-year filing deadline for asylum applications and that the one-year provision was governed by section 1158(a)(2)(B), which was silent on the issue of corroboration. The court further held that the one-year bar determination was not reviewable absent a legal or constitutional question. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded the matter to the BIA.

Defendant was convicted of immigration fraud and sentenced to 51 months imprisonment. At issue was under what circumstances did the exclusion of the public from a courtroom during voir dire violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court held that, although the district court's exclusion of defendant's brother and girlfriend during voir dire failed to meet the four-factor test set forth in Waller v. Georgia, and now Presley v. Georgia, the exclusion was too trivial to implicate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court also held that Presley did not alter the "triviality exception" to the public trial guarantee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner brought this mandamus action to compel USCIS to make a determination on the merits of her I-212 application, alleging that USCIS denied her application in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed petitioner's complaint, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(5), and in the alternative, petitioner's claims were barred by res judicata. The court held that petitioner was indirectly challenging her reinstated order of removal and accordingly, the court held that section 1252(a)(5)'s jurisdictional bar applied equally to preclude such an indirect challenge. Therefore, because the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint, the court did not reach her remaining arguments.

The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), precludes withholding of removal if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States. In November 2003, the Government of Uzbekistan requested the extradition of the petitioners, asserting they participated in seeking the forced overthrow of the Republic and the establishment on its territory of a religious extremist Islamic fundamental state. Immigration judges concluded that the extradition request would be given no weight, coming from a government with a history of persecution and torture. On remand from the Third Circuit, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that petitioners are a danger to national security and ineligible for withholding of removal, but granted deferral of removal under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. The Third Circuit held that petitioners are entitled to withholding of removal as a matter of law; the determination that petitioners are a danger to national security was not supported by substantial evidence and there is no question that they will be persecuted and tortured on religious and political grounds if returned.