Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirming an Immigration Judge's denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. At issue was whether substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination that petitioner failed to show that he was persecuted on account of his membership in a particular social group. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination where, although petitioner was not precluded from demonstrating membership in a particular social group as a former military officer, he failed to establish that any persecution was or will be on account of his membership in such a group.

Husband and wife, citizens of Ukraine, entered the United States in 1994. When their visas expired they conceded removability and applied for asylum. While proceedings were pending, husband's employer filed an I-140 petition for alien workers; the notice of approval indicated that husband was not eligible for adjustment of status. An immigration judge denied asylum. The BIA dismissed an appeal, subsequently denied adjustment of status, and refused to reopen removal proceedings. The Sixth Circuit denied petitions for review. The petitioners failed to establish that they maintained lawful status under either INA 245(c)(2) or (k) as required for an application for adjustment under INA 245(a).

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Vietnam, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") decision affirming an Immigration Judge's order of removal. At issue was whether petitioner's state misdemeanor conviction for rendering criminal assistance was a crime related to obstruction of justice and thus constituted an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. 101(a)(43)(S). The court granted the petition for review and held that petitioner's conviction lacked the necessary actus reus and was not categorically an obstruction of justice according to the definition provided in In Re Espinoza-Gonzalez. The court also held that nothing in the record of petitioner's conviction established that he provided assistance to an individual who was subject to a pending judicial proceeding or ongoing police investigation and therefore, his conviction did not qualify as obstruction of justice under the modified categorical approach.

Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court alleging that his prolonged detention was unlawful. At issue was whether petitioner's bond hearing, provided under Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, violated due process. The court clarified that once an alien received a Casas bond hearing before an immigration judge ("IJ"), he could appeal the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). If the alien was dissatisfied with the BIA's decision, he could then file a habeas petition in the district court challenging his continued detention. The district court's decision on the habeas petition could then be appealed to this court. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss petitioner's petition without prejudice where he did not exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing habeas relief.

Petitioners, husband and wife citizens of Guatemala, were eligible for suspension of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, 111 Stat. 2160, but their lawyer never cited NACARA during removal proceedings before the immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals and failed to notify the couple of the decisions. After the husband was taken into custody they learned of their eligibility and moved to reopen their case. The Board denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. The Board retains jurisdiction, although the husband has been deported, and the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to the wife's petition. The couple was diligent in pursuing their rights after learning of their lawyer's ineffective assistance; the Board can explore the issue of their diligence prior to revocation of their work permits.

In 2000, the petitioner attempted to enter the United States on a false passport, refused to reveal her true identity, and stated that she had no fear of returning to Cambodia. In 2002 she entered on a six-month visitor visa. In 2003 she filed a petition for asylum; in 2004 a notice of removability issued. An immigration judge denied the petition. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the First Circuit rejected appeals. The petitioner did not corroborate her testimony; there was no evidence that family members remaining in Cambodia suffered persecution. Even accepting testimony that she was raped by police officers, there was no evidence that the rapes were politically motivated or amounted to persecution.

Defendant was arrested and charged with illegal entry into the United States and appeared at a group plea hearing in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona as part of the district's "Operation Streamline." At issue was whether the taking of guilty pleas at a large group plea hearing violated a criminal defendant's rights protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The court held that any Rule 11(b)(1) error was harmless where defendant would not have changed her plea of guilty if the magistrate judge had conducted sixty-seven separate advisements of rights and that, although the district court failed to comply strictly with Rule 11(b)(2), such failure was not plain error where the record reflected that defendant's plea was fully informed and the record did not demonstrate that such a plea would have changed if the magistrate had expressly inquired into the voluntariness of her decision. The court also held that the record did not suggest that defendant misunderstood her rights or involuntarily entered her plea and there was no question that this procedure complied with due process. The court further held that the plea hearing did not deprive defendant of her right to counsel where she was provided with adequate, even superior, representation by counsel and failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if counsel had not been temporarily separated from her during the group advisement. Accordingly, the court confirmed defendant's conviction and sentence.

Appellees filed suit asserting that their due process rights were violated when the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") failed to make additional attempts at service after it had knowledge that the initial attempt at notice failed where the notice informed an obligor that an alien had been detained by DHS and that the obligor could post a cash bond to secure the alien's release. At issue was whether, in order to satisfy due process, the government must take additional reasonable steps to notify a bond obligor that the bond had been breached when the government had knowledge that the initial attempt at notice failed. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of appellees and held that DHS violated the bond obligor's due process rights when it failed to take additional reasonable steps to notify the obligors of the bond demand after the initial notice was returned as undeliverable before it collected the bond.

Petitioner Felix Sanchez Rodriguez-Heredia, a Mexican national, petitioned the Tenth Circuit to review two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). One decision, a request for a change in Petitioner's custody status, was dismissed as moot, because Petitioner was deported while waiting for this appeal. The second decision involved the order to remove him from the United States. Petitioner argued that he was not eligible for removal based on his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude because he received nothing "of value" in perpetration of the crime. Specifically, Petitioner argued that a social security number was not like a good or service that constituted something of value that could be taken under Utah state law. Petitioner used another person's social security number in order to gain employment. The BIA found that Petitioner's fraud involved a crime of moral turpitude, and recommended his removal. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that because the state law required fraudulent intent in all circumstances regardless of whether anything of "value" was obtained, the law categorically described a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court upheld the BIA's order for Petitioner's removal.

Petitioner, a native of India, petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirming the immigration judge's ("IJ") determination that he was removable for having been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude ("CIMT"). At issue was whether the BIA properly determined that petitioner's conviction for failing to register constituted a CIMT and, coupled with a conceded theft CIMT, rendered him removable. The BIA then found it unnecessary to conduct a modified categorical analysis regarding petitioner's indecent exposure convictions. The court held that, in light of significant intervening developments, the case must be remanded for the BIA to consider whether petitioner's crime constituted a CIMT under the proper definition of moral turpitude as outlined in Matter of Silva-Trevino. The court also held that should the BIA determine that petitioner's failure to register conviction did not qualify as a CIMT, it should consider the issue left open in its prior ruling regarding petitioner's indecent exposure convictions.