Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A Cuban national fled his home country after enduring years of persecution and briefly stayed in Mexico, where he also faced threats and extortion. Upon entering the United States, he sought asylum, describing his fears of returning to both Cuba and Mexico. An Immigration Judge granted him withholding of removal to Cuba, but did not designate Mexico or any other country as an alternative for removal. Neither party appealed this decision, making it final. Despite this, federal immigration officials removed him to Mexico, where he was threatened by gang members. He returned to the United States two days later, was detained, and was ultimately granted asylum.After these events, the individual filed a lawsuit for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that his removal to Mexico was improper and caused him harm. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g), which restrict judicial review of certain immigration actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) did not bar the lawsuit because the plaintiff’s claims challenged the legal authority and process of his removal to Mexico, not the discretionary decision to execute a removal order. The court found that the claims were based on actions taken after the conclusion of removal proceedings and were not subject to the exclusive petition-for-review process. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Federal Tort Claims Act suit and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "IBARRA-PEREZ V. USA" on Justia Law

A family from Mexico fled their home after a criminal cartel murdered one of their members and issued repeated threats demanding that the family abandon their land and leave the area. The threats continued even after the family relocated within Mexico, ultimately leading them to enter the United States without valid documents. The family sought asylum and withholding of removal, arguing that they were persecuted because of their membership in a particular social group—namely, their family.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the family members credible but denied their applications, concluding that the asserted social groups were not cognizable and that, even if they were, the evidence did not show that family membership was a central reason for the persecution. The IJ found that the cartel’s primary motive was to control the land, not to target the family because of their familial ties. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the appeal, upholding the IJ’s finding that there was no sufficient nexus between the persecution and the protected ground of family membership. The BIA stated that if a persecutor targets a family as a means to achieve an unrelated goal, family membership is only incidental or subordinate and not a central reason for the harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed only the BIA’s decision. The court held that the BIA applied an erroneous legal standard for determining whether family membership was “at least one central reason” for the persecution, as required by the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Tenth Circuit found that the BIA’s categorical rule improperly excluded mixed-motive claims where both protected and unprotected grounds may be central reasons for persecution. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. View "O.C.V. v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, born in Mexico in 1976 to a U.S. citizen father and a Mexican citizen mother, sought recognition of U.S. citizenship based on his father’s physical presence in the United States prior to his birth. His father, born in Texas, had lived in the U.S. for a cumulative sixteen years, including seven years after turning fourteen. The plaintiff’s parents were unmarried at his birth but married in Texas the following year. In 2012, the plaintiff applied to the United States Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS) for a certificate of citizenship, submitting various documents to establish his father’s physical presence in the U.S. prior to his birth.USCIS denied the application in 2015, finding insufficient proof of the father’s physical presence. The plaintiff appealed to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), which dismissed the appeal in 2018. He then filed a timely motion to reconsider and reopen, submitting additional evidence, but the AAO denied this motion in September 2018. Nearly five years later, in August 2023, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), seeking a declaration of citizenship.The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the five-year statute of limitations in § 1503(a) was jurisdictional and had expired, starting from the AAO’s dismissal of the appeal rather than the denial of the motion to reopen. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the five-year time bar in § 1503(a) is not jurisdictional but a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule. The court further held that a timely motion to reconsider or reopen extends the time to file suit, and since the plaintiff’s motion was timely, his suit was not time-barred. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sarabia v. Noem" on Justia Law

The defendant, a noncitizen, was charged in Los Angeles County with carjacking, second degree robbery, and resisting an executive officer. The jury found him guilty of carjacking and found true the allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon, but acquitted him of robbery. He had previously pleaded guilty to resisting an executive officer. He was sentenced to a total of 12 years in prison. Years later, after being released from criminal custody, the defendant faced removal proceedings in immigration court based on his conviction, and he sought to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7, arguing he had not understood the immigration consequences of going to trial or accepting a plea.The defendant filed a motion in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to vacate his conviction, providing evidence of indigency and making a prima facie showing for relief. He requested appointment of counsel for the hearing. The trial court denied his request, relying on People v. Fryhaat, and reasoning that appointed counsel was only required if the moving party was in federal immigration custody and unable to attend the hearing. The court proceeded with an evidentiary hearing and ultimately denied the motion, finding no evidence that an immigration-neutral plea offer had been made.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the trial court’s denial of appointed counsel. The appellate court held that the right to appointed counsel in section 1473.7 proceedings attaches when an indigent defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief and the court proceeds to an evidentiary hearing, regardless of whether the defendant is in federal immigration custody. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of the request for appointed counsel and a new hearing on the merits of the section 1473.7 motion. View "P. v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

A woman who entered the United States illegally as a child was later granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, which rendered her prior removal order unenforceable. She frequently visited a local Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office to post bond for detainees and was well known to the staff. During one such visit, ICE agents detained her without a warrant or probable cause, despite being aware of her DACA status. She was held for eight days and transferred between multiple locations before being released. While detained, she sought habeas relief, but her petition was denied as moot after her release.She subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against the ICE agents, alleging violations of her First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court initially dismissed her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that DACA status rendered the removal order non-executable and outside the jurisdiction-stripping provision. The Sixth Circuit also dismissed her First Amendment claim based on Supreme Court precedent. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, finding they constituted new Bivens contexts and that alternative remedies existed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims arose in new Bivens contexts—specifically, immigration enforcement by ICE agents outside the home and outside the federal employment context. The court further found that alternative remedies, such as administrative complaint procedures under the Immigration and Nationality Act and habeas corpus, precluded the extension of Bivens. Thus, no implied damages remedy was available. View "Enriquez-Perdomo v. Newman" on Justia Law

A man born in New York City in July 1950 lived for nearly seventy years in the United States, believing himself to be a U.S. citizen. His father, a Nicaraguan national, was working for Nicaragua’s permanent mission to the United Nations at the time of his birth. Over the years, the government repeatedly issued him passports and affirmed his citizenship. However, in 2018, after a review of historical records, the government determined that his father had been an attaché, not a consul, at the time of his birth. This distinction was crucial because, under federal and international law, the children of diplomats (such as attachés) are not considered “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States for purposes of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed the case after the government revoked the man’s passport and denied his claim to citizenship. The Secretary of State presented a recently executed certificate asserting that the man’s father had diplomatic immunity at the time of his birth. The district court declined to treat this certificate as conclusive evidence but, after considering the full record, found by clear and convincing evidence that the father was an attaché with diplomatic immunity, and thus the plaintiff was not a birthright citizen.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that while the President’s reception of a person as a diplomat is conclusive, whether that reception occurred is a factual question for the courts to decide, even when presented with a certificate from the executive branch. The court found no clear error in the district court’s determination that the plaintiff’s father held diplomatic immunity at the time of birth, and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to birthright citizenship. View "MONCADA V. RUBIO" on Justia Law

A private company operating a federal immigration detention facility in Washington State challenged the enforcement of several provisions of a state law that imposed health, safety, and inspection requirements on private detention centers. The law required the state Department of Health to adopt rules ensuring sanitary and safe conditions, authorized unannounced inspections, provided for civil penalties for violations, and created a private right of action for detainees. The company argued that these provisions violated the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity and were preempted by federal law, claiming they improperly targeted federal contractors and conflicted with federal standards.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the challenged sections of the law violated intergovernmental immunity by discriminating against the federal government and its contractor. The court compared the requirements imposed on the federal facility to those imposed on state prisons and concluded that the law treated the federal contractor less favorably. The state appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Washington legislature amended the law, but the changes did not materially alter the issues on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that the appropriate comparison for determining discrimination under intergovernmental immunity is between the federal immigration facility and other civil detention facilities in the state, not state prisons. The court directed the district court to make this comparison in the first instance. The Ninth Circuit also held that the challenged provisions were not preempted by federal law and that the district court erred in enjoining the private right of action, as the state officials named as defendants had no enforcement authority under that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. INSLEE" on Justia Law

In August 2022, law enforcement officers in Sterling, Virginia, stopped a Ford Explorer as part of an operation to execute an arrest warrant for a suspected armed robber. Herbert Murillo-Lopez was driving the vehicle. During the stop, officers recovered a firearm from a satchel worn by Murillo-Lopez. He admitted to being an undocumented non-citizen. Subsequent investigation confirmed he was born in El Salvador, had no lawful status in the United States, and had no record of legal entry.A grand jury indicted Murillo-Lopez for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits possession of a firearm by an undocumented non-citizen. He moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing the stop and search were unconstitutional, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the motion. Shortly before trial, he moved to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, but the district court found the motion untimely and unpersuasive. After a jury found him guilty, the district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to eight months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Murillo-Lopez knew he was unlawfully present in the United States. The court also found the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that Murillo-Lopez might be the subject of the arrest warrant, and that the search of his satchel was consensual. Finally, the court rejected his Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(5)(A), holding that existing circuit precedent remains valid after recent Supreme Court decisions. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Murillo-Lopez" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident of the United States, originally from Mexico, was convicted for purchasing firearms in the United States and reselling them in Mexico without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). As a result of these unlicensed sales, he was sentenced to 78 months in prison. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically as “illicit trafficking in firearms.”An immigration judge determined that the conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that the conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) matched the generic definition of “illicit trafficking in firearms” as used in the INA. The petitioner then sought review of the BIA’s order, arguing that the statute of conviction criminalized a broader range of conduct than the generic aggravated felony and thus was not a categorical match.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether a conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) categorically constitutes “illicit trafficking in firearms.” The court held that the plain meaning of “illicit trafficking in firearms” is “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms,” and that the statute of conviction fits within this definition. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments regarding overbreadth and found no ambiguity in the statutory language. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) qualifies as an aggravated felony for “illicit trafficking in firearms” under the INA. View "Alvarez Ronquillo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Mexican national who entered the United States without authorization in 2000 was detained by the Department of Homeland Security in 2023 and charged as removable. Between 2019 and 2021, he was arrested and convicted of multiple offenses, including several DUIs in different states. He conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and later, cancellation of removal. At his hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) declined to hear live testimony from his wife and psychologist, relying instead on their written reports and other documentary evidence. The IJ denied all forms of relief, finding, among other things, that his DUI convictions precluded a finding of good moral character and that he failed to show his removal would cause his wife exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. The BIA found that he had waived his challenges to the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection by failing to raise them in his notice of appeal or briefing, rendering those claims unexhausted. The BIA also agreed with the IJ that his multiple DUI convictions established a lack of good moral character, making him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA rejected his due process claim, concluding he had received a full and fair hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the unexhausted claims for asylum, withholding, and CAT protection. Regarding cancellation of removal, the court found that substantial evidence supported the finding that the petitioner lacked good moral character and that he failed to show prejudice from the exclusion of live witness testimony. The court dismissed the petition in part and denied it in part. View "Sanchez v. Attorney General" on Justia Law