Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Andre Louis Keller drove to a permanent immigration checkpoint where a Customs & Border Protection (CBP) canine alerted to his vehicle. Upon searching, agents found an alien unlawfully present in the United States concealed under luggage. Keller conditionally pleaded guilty and appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a hearing on Keller’s motion to suppress. Testimonies were provided by CBP Agent Jesse Sandoval, Matthew B. Devaney from CBP’s Canine Academy, and Andre Falco Jimenez, a private police dog trainer. The district court denied Keller’s motion, leading to his conditional guilty plea. Keller was sentenced to 20 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. He then appealed the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that stopping a vehicle for brief questioning at a permanent immigration checkpoint is not a Fourth Amendment search and does not require probable cause. The court found that the canine’s alert provided probable cause to search Keller’s vehicle. The court also concluded that the canine’s actions did not constitute an unlawful search and that the district court did not err in its ruling. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Keller’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Keller" on Justia Law

Simon Quito-Guachichulca, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota law. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his crime was an "aggravated felony" under federal law, making him deportable. Initially, the government classified the crime as a "crime of violence," but the Supreme Court's decision in Sessions v. Dimaya rendered that classification impermissibly vague. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit vacated the removal order and remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for reconsideration.On remand, the government reclassified Quito's crime as "rape," another type of "aggravated felony." Both an immigration judge and the BIA agreed with this classification. Quito then petitioned for review, arguing that the government’s change in theory violated the doctrine of res judicata. The Eighth Circuit found that res judicata did not apply because there was no final judgment on the merits due to the vacated order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether Minnesota’s third-degree criminal sexual conduct statute fits the federal definition of "rape" under immigration law. The court applied the categorical approach, examining the statutory elements rather than Quito's actual conduct. The court determined that the federal definition of "rape" in 1996 did not include digital or mechanical penetration, which is covered under Minnesota’s statute. Therefore, the court concluded that there was a categorical mismatch between the state and federal definitions.The Eighth Circuit granted Quito's petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Minnesota’s third-degree criminal sexual conduct does not qualify as "rape" under federal immigration law. View "Quito-Guachichulca v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 1999, the defendant admitted to sufficient facts to support a finding of guilty for distributing a class A substance. He later sought to withdraw this admission, claiming his plea counsel failed to inform him that it would lead to mandatory deportation. The defendant, a legal permanent resident since 1994, argued that he would have insisted on going to trial had he known the immigration consequences, citing his strong ties to the United States, including his American citizen wife and children, and his consistent employment as a welder.The defendant's initial motion for a new trial was denied due to the absence of an affidavit from his plea counsel. He then filed a renewed motion with the necessary affidavit, which was also denied by a District Court judge after a non-evidentiary hearing. The judge concluded that while the plea counsel was ineffective, the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. The Appeals Court affirmed this decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case, focusing on whether the defendant established prejudice from his counsel's ineffectiveness. The court found that the motion judge improperly assessed the defendant's claim by not applying the reasonable person standard and by making credibility determinations about the defendant's assertion that he would have gone to trial. The court vacated the denial of the renewed motion and remanded the case for further findings on whether the defendant's ties to the United States constituted special circumstances and whether a reasonable person in his situation would have chosen to go to trial if properly advised. View "Commonwealth v. Torres" on Justia Law

Jose Rodolfo Escobar Larin, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that affirmed the denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Escobar also petitioned for review of a separate BIA ruling that denied his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had issued Escobar a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for being present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled. Escobar filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal, claiming a well-founded fear of persecution in El Salvador due to his mental illness and opposition to gang authority.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Escobar credible but denied his claims, determining that his asylum application was untimely and that he failed to meet the requirements for withholding of removal and CAT protection. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Escobar did not demonstrate extraordinary or changed circumstances to excuse the late filing of his asylum application. The BIA also found that Escobar did not establish a likelihood of persecution or torture if returned to El Salvador.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in its interpretation of the changed-circumstance exception to the one-year filing deadline for asylum applications. The court vacated and remanded the BIA's ruling on Escobar's asylum claims, withholding of removal claims, and CAT claim for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the denial of Escobar's motion to reopen, concluding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in that decision. View "Escobar Larin v. Garland" on Justia Law

King County, Washington, issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO, which directed county officials to ensure that future leases at Boeing Field prohibit fixed base operators (FBOs) from servicing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charter flights. This order was based on the county's disagreement with federal immigration policies. Following the issuance of the order, all three FBOs at Boeing Field ceased servicing ICE flights, forcing ICE to relocate its operations to Yakima Air Terminal, which increased operational costs and security concerns.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the Executive Order violated both the Supremacy Clause’s intergovernmental immunity doctrine and a World War II-era contract reconveying Boeing Field to King County. The district court concluded that the Executive Order discriminated against the federal government and its contractors and breached the Instrument of Transfer, which required King County to allow the United States nonexclusive use of the landing area at Boeing Field.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States had Article III standing to bring the suit, as it had suffered concrete and particularized injuries due to the increased operational costs and imminent risk of future injury from the Executive Order. The court also found that the United States’ claims were ripe for adjudication.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violated the Instrument of Transfer by preventing ICE from using Boeing Field, thus breaching the contractual right of the United States to use the airport. Additionally, the court held that the Executive Order violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by improperly regulating federal operations and discriminating against the federal government and its contractors. The court rejected King County’s defenses, including the anti-commandeering and market participant doctrines. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. KING COUNTY" on Justia Law

The State of Texas placed a concertina wire fence along part of the border with Mexico in the Eagle Pass area to deter illegal crossings. The United States Border Patrol agents cut the wire multiple times, claiming it was necessary to fulfill their duty of patrolling the border to prevent illegal entry. Texas sued for an injunction, arguing that the Border Patrol was needlessly cutting the wire. The district court found that the Border Patrol was not hampered by the wire and had breached it numerous times without apparent purpose other than to allow migrants easier entrance. However, the court denied the injunction, citing the United States' sovereign immunity against Texas's claims.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied Texas's request for a preliminary injunction, despite agreeing with Texas on the facts. The court believed that the United States retained sovereign immunity. A motions panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed and granted a temporary injunction pending appeal. The United States sought relief in the Supreme Court, which vacated the injunction without providing reasons. The case was remanded to the district court to investigate events in Shelby Park, where Texas's actions were alleged to have obstructed Border Patrol operations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that Texas is entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court held that the United States waived sovereign immunity as to Texas's state law claims under § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court also rejected the United States' arguments that the injunction was barred by intergovernmental immunity and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court found that Texas satisfied the injunction factors from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and granted Texas's request for a preliminary injunction, with modifications based on the district court's supplemental fact findings. View "Texas v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Mohamed Lamine Kouyate, a 36-year-old native and citizen of Guinea, entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2014 due to concerns about political unrest in Guinea. He overstayed his visa and was later convicted in Maryland for identity fraud involving over $100,000, resulting in a 15-year prison sentence. Following his release on parole, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability for overstaying his visa. Kouyate applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be persecuted or tortured if returned to Guinea due to his father's political notoriety.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Kouyate's applications, ruling that his identity fraud conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime," making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and CAT. The IJ also denied his application for deferral of removal under the CAT, finding insufficient evidence that he would likely be tortured if returned to Guinea. The IJ noted that the political climate in Guinea had changed, and Kouyate's fears were speculative and based on generalized concerns of violence.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Kouyate's appeal, deeming his challenge to the IJ's particularly serious crime ruling waived and affirming the IJ's denial of deferral of removal under the CAT. The BIA agreed with the IJ's assessment that Kouyate's fears were speculative and not supported by sufficient evidence of a particularized risk of torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ's and BIA's decisions, finding no reversible error. The court upheld the BIA's determination that Kouyate had not exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the particularly serious crime ruling and affirmed the denial of deferral of removal under the CAT, concluding that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision. The petition for review was denied. View "Kouyate v. Garland" on Justia Law

Gleysi Idalia Diaz-Valdez, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States in May 2019 and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing persecution by gang members in Guatemala. An immigration judge (IJ) denied her requests on August 6, 2021. Diaz attempted to appeal the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) by sending her Notice of Appeal via FedEx's next-day delivery service on September 4, 2021, expecting it to arrive by the September 7 deadline. However, FedEx delivered the package on September 8, resulting in the BIA summarily dismissing her appeal as untimely.Diaz then requested the BIA to accept her late filing, arguing that FedEx's failure to deliver on time warranted equitable tolling of the appeal deadline. The BIA construed her request as a motion to reconsider its summary dismissal but denied the motion, stating that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Diaz had delivered the appeal to FedEx on September 4 and that the federal holiday was not an extraordinary circumstance.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA applied the incorrect legal standard by disregarding the representation of Diaz's counsel and failing to consider supporting evidence, such as the FedEx label and tracking information. The court also held that the BIA abused its discretion by not applying its own precedent from Matter of Morales-Morales, which allows for equitable tolling when a guaranteed delivery service fails to fulfill its guarantee.The First Circuit granted Diaz's petition, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the BIA to reevaluate Diaz's diligence and the extraordinary circumstances under the correct legal standards. View "Diaz-Valdez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Gerson Adonay Cortez-Mejia, his wife, and their two minor children, all natives and citizens of El Salvador, petitioned for judicial review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). They sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming fear of persecution by rival gangs in El Salvador. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the petitioners credible but denied their applications, determining they had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. The IJ also found they failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal and CAT protection.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the petitioners' experiences did not rise to the level of past persecution and that they had not established a well-founded fear of future persecution linked to a protected ground. The BIA also noted the petitioners had not articulated a cognizable particular social group and had not meaningfully pursued their CAT claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA's determinations were supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the petitioners' fear of gang violence was generalized and not linked to a protected ground. The court also upheld the BIA's finding that the petitioners had not established a cognizable particular social group. Consequently, the court denied the petition for judicial review, affirming the BIA's decision to deny asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. View "Cortez-Mejia v. Garland" on Justia Law

Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, a native and citizen of El Salvador, along with his wife Sayra Iliana Gamez-Mejia and their minor child, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of their asylum requests. Urias-Orellana also sought review of the denial of his application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The denials were based on the grounds that the petitioners did not demonstrate harm rising to the level of persecution for asylum or withholding of removal and did not show they could not reasonably relocate within El Salvador. Additionally, Urias-Orellana did not prove it was likely he would face torture with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.The IJ found Urias-Orellana's testimony credible but concluded that the threats and assault he experienced did not amount to past persecution. The IJ also determined that the petitioners did not meet their burden of showing a reasonable fear of future persecution, noting that Urias-Orellana's relatives lived unharmed in El Salvador and that he had successfully relocated within the country without facing harm. The IJ further found that Urias-Orellana's CAT claim failed because he did not report his harassment to the police and did not demonstrate that doing so would be futile.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the threats and assault did not constitute persecution and that the petitioners had not shown that internal relocation would be unreasonable. The BIA also upheld the IJ's finding that Urias-Orellana had not shown he qualified for CAT relief, noting his failure to report the mistreatment to the authorities.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for judicial review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Agency's conclusions that the petitioners did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution and that Urias-Orellana did not meet the burden for CAT protection. View "Urias-Orellana v. Garland" on Justia Law